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Abstract 
Essays on Benchmarking Credit Performance 
By DIMITRA MICHALA 
 
Dissertation Supervisor: Professor Theoharry Grammatikos 
 
The first essay examines idiosyncratic and systematic distress predictors for small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) using a dataset from eight European countries over the period 2000-
2009. In the European Union, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) represent 99% of all 
businesses and contribute to more than half of total value-added. In this essay, we find that SMEs 
across Europe are vulnerable to common idiosyncratic factors but the relevant systematic factors 
vary across regions. This indicates the superiority of regional distress models. We also find that 
systematic factors move average distress rates in the economy and that small SMEs are more 
vulnerable to these factors compared to large SMEs. By including many very small companies in 
the sample, this essay offers unique insights into the European small business sector. By 
exploring distress in a multi-country setting, our models uncover regional vulnerabilities and 
allow for regional comparisons. Finally, by incorporating systematic dependencies, they capture 
distress co-movements and clustering. 
The second essay provides an explanation of the default anomaly documented in the 
empirical asset pricing literature. While empirical literature has documented a negative relation 
between default risk and stock returns, theory suggests that default risk should be positively 
priced. In this essay, we calculate monthly probabilities of default (PDs) for a large sample of 
European firms and break them down into systematic and idiosyncratic components. The 
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approach that we follow does not require data on credit spreads, thus it can also be applied to 
small firms that do not have such data available. In accordance with theory, we find that the 
systematic part, measured as the PD sensitivity to aggregate default risk, is positively related to 
stock returns. We show that stocks with higher PDs underperform because they have, on 
average, lower exposure to aggregate default risk. Moreover, their idiosyncratic risk is a hedge 
against downside market conditions. Finally, small and value stocks are quite heterogeneous with 
respect to such exposure. 
The third essay compares private equity-backed IPOs with IPOs of stand-alone companies in 
a matching framework. The literature suggests that the IPO market may involve higher 
information asymmetries than acquisitions. Such a setting can influence the behavior of private 
equity (PE) sponsors as professional insiders. In most cases, I do not find significant differences 
between these IPOs and comparable IPOs of stand-alone companies. The financial situation of 
PE-backed companies in the pre-IPO year is similar to that of their peers. PE sponsors do not 
target their IPOs in “hot” periods any more than would managers of stand-alone companies, nor 
are they more prone to rush their companies into premature IPOs. They also do not inflate 
valuations and are not more likely to seek to sell firms with poor prospects (“unload lemons”) 
onto the market. Finally, I find that IPOs that take place in hot periods are significantly more 
likely to delist due to default, but this result is not any stronger for PE-backed IPOs. This essay 
provides evidence to contradict media criticism of PE sponsors. This can also have important 
policy implications regarding the PE regulatory framework related to PE. This work comes as a 
timely contribution given the increasing importance of PE in the IPO market. 
JEL Codes: C13, C41, C53, G11, G12, G15, G23, G24, G32; G33 
Keywords: buyout; credit risk; default risk; default anomaly; distress; forecasting; idiosyncratic 
risk; IPO; logit; Merton model; private equity; SMEs; venture capital  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Identifying the determinants of corporate credit performance and measuring it correctly is of 
crucial importance for banks, investors and policy makers. This work focuses on default risk in 
particular. It explores default risk in private firms (SMEs), listed firms (especially mid and small-
caps), and companies that are in the transition phase between private and public ownership 
(IPOs). The work contributes to the existing literature by (i) uncovering regional corporate 
default risk vulnerabilities, (ii) explaining the observed anomalous pricing of default risk in the 
stock market, and (iii) exploring the impact of alternative investment funds such as private equity 
and venture capital on the default risk of their portfolio companies. In the paragraphs that follow, 
a summary of the chapters together with the main findings is presented. 
Chapter 2 explores the performance of distress prediction hazard models for non-financial 
SMEs using a dataset from eight European countries over the ten-year period 2000-2009. The 
panel structure of the dataset allows us to: exploit both the time-series and the cross-sectional 
dimension; and differentiate between firm-specific, macroeconomic and industry effects. 
We find that, in addition to financial indicators (whose importance is noted in past studies) 
the location and number of shareholders are important determinants of SMEs’ distress 
probabilities. We validate the superiority of models that incorporate macroeconomic 
dependencies (as suggested by previous research) also in the case of SMEs. However, we do not 
find strong evidence that industry-effects improve prediction accuracy significantly. We also 
examine interaction effects between the size of SMEs and systematic variables. We find that as 
SMEs become larger, they are less vulnerable to macroeconomic changes, contrary to the 
assumptions inherent in the Basel regulations. Interestingly, when we split our sample into 
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regional sub-samples, we show that SMEs across Europe are sensitive to the same firm-specific 
factors, but we identify significant regional variations in the selection and importance of macro 
variables. Specifically, macro variables differ among European regions based on region-specific 
conditions and characteristics. Since our regional distress models always perform better than a 
generic model estimated for the regional sub-samples, we conclude that using these models can 
lead to performance improvements in the risk management of international SME portfolios. 
Finally, we perform a variety of tests and show that our results remain robust to different distress 
definitions, estimation techniques and time periods. 
Chapter 3 sheds more light on the recent contradictory literature that explores the relationship 
between default risk and stock returns. We follow a simple and intuitive approach to break down 
physical PDs into systematic and idiosyncratic components, use the VIX index as a measure of 
aggregate default risk, and provide European evidence to study the default anomaly. 
Initially, we sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on their physical PDs and (in line with 
the literature that documents a default anomaly) we find that the difference in returns between 
high and low PD stocks is negative, and that the returns almost monotonically decrease as the PD 
increases. However, a closer look shows that physical PD is usually a poor measure of exposure 
to aggregate default risk; in accordance with George and Hwang (2010), we find that stocks in 
the highest PD quintile have relatively low systematic default risk (SDR) exposure. We then sort 
stocks into quintile portfolios based on their SDR betas instead.  As expected, we find a positive 
and significant relationship between this measure of default risk and returns. In other words, 
investors do indeed require a premium to hold stocks that are riskier when aggregate default risk 
is higher. Interestingly, there are non-monotonic patterns across the SDR beta portfolios. On 
average, the firms in the low and high SDR beta portfolios are smaller, have a higher level of 
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book-to-market (BM), and higher physical PDs than the firms in medium SDR beta portfolios. 
We find that the SDR betas are negatively related to the idiosyncratic default risk (IDR) 
exposures (measured by IDR alphas). Therefore it is the idiosyncratic, not the systematic factors 
that drive the default anomaly. We confirm this conjecture by showing that stocks sorted on IDR 
alphas have on average lower returns. Investors do not require compensation to hold stocks with 
high firm-specific risk because these stocks are a source of portfolio risk diversification. Further 
analysis with double-sorted portfolios helps us confirm these statements. 
Our results suggest that riskier stocks, as measured by the physical PDs, will tend to 
underperform because they have, on average, lower exposure to aggregate default risk. Their 
riskiness is mostly idiosyncratic and can be diversified away, thus providing an explanation for 
the default anomaly typically found in the literature. On the contrary, it is the systematic 
component of default risk (measured by the SDR betas) that requires a return premium. 
Chapter 4 studies the role of both buy out (BO) and venture capital (VC) sponsors in a setting 
of high information asymmetry, such as the IPO market. These professional insiders may be 
more capable of taking advantage of such asymmetries compared to insiders of stand-alone 
companies. But, when the market eventually becomes aware there is then increased risk to  
reputational capital. BO and VC sponsors may also behave differently from each other. Thus, I 
differentiate my analysis for each type of PE sponsor and compare BO and VC-backed IPOs 
with IPOs of stand-alone companies in a matching framework. 
I do not find significant differences between these IPOs and matched IPOs of stand-alone 
companies. The financial situation of both BO and VC-backed companies in the pre-IPO year, as 
measured by their default risk, is similar to that of their peers. Moreover, PE sponsors do not 
target their IPOs in “hot” periods more than would managers of stand-alone companies. They 
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also are not more prone to rush their companies into a premature IPO and do not inflate 
valuations. Finally, PE-backed companies do not default more often post-IPO. This is evidence 
that PE sponsors are not more likely to seek to sell firms with poor prospects (“unload lemons” 
in the IPO market. 
Chapter 4 provides evidence against media criticism of PE sponsors (e.g. “Rush to get to the 
front of the IPO queue”, Financial Times, 18 February 2014). It can also have important policy 
implications for the regulatory framework related to PE, such as the Dodd-Frank Act (signed by 
US President Obama in July 2010). Finally, this paper comes as a timely contribution given the 
increasing importance of PE-backed IPOs in the market (“Private equity-backed IPOs could hit 
seven-year high”, Financial Times, 29 September 2014). 
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Chapter 2 Forecasting Distress in European SME Portfolios 
 
2.1 Introduction 
SMEs play a crucial role in most economies. In the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries, SMEs account for 95% of all enterprises and generate two-
thirds of employment. In the European Union (EU) in particular, SMEs represent 99% of all 
enterprises and contribute to more than half of all value-added created by businesses. Despite 
their importance, SME credit risk remains largely unexplored by the academic literature, mainly 
due to the lack of appropriate data. 
In this paper, we explore a dataset that is representative of the European SME sector because 
it includes a high number of very small companies. This is important for Europe, where nine out 
of ten SMEs have fewer than 10 employees and turnover of €2million. To our knowledge, we are 
the first to examine distress in a multi-country setting, since earlier studies always focus on a 
single economy. Hence, we are able to uncover regional vulnerabilities, perform comparisons 
and study the need of regional models in international SME portfolios. In addition to 
idiosyncratic distress determinants, we consider systematic factors, such as the macroeconomy, 
bank lending conditions, and legal aspects. Therefore, we are able not only to compute individual 
distress probabilities, but also to estimate average distress rates in the economy and capture 
distress co-movements. 
Our paper contributes to the overall literature on corporate credit risk, and on SME risk in 
particular. It is well known that, unlike larger corporations with easier access to capital markets, 
SMEs face more challenges in their credit risk modeling. In fact, widely used structural market-
based models, such as the distance-to-default (DD) measure inspired by Merton (1974), cannot 
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be applied in the non-listed SME setting due to the unavailability of market data. Instead, 
empirical predictive models such as credit scoring approaches (i.e. Altman, 1968; Edminster, 
1972) are most commonly use. Many authors, such as Dietsch and Petey (2004), Berger and 
Udell (2006), and Beck et al. (2008), note the need for SME specific research. In line with their 
concerns, Altman and Sabato (2007) (in an early SME study) develop a one-year default 
prediction model using only accounting information. They apply panel logit estimation on a 
sample of around 2,000 US SMEs over the period 1994-2002. They find that their model 
outperforms generic corporate models such as Altman’s Z”-score (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2005). 
Stein (2002), Grunert et al. (2005) and other authors note the possibility of using qualitative 
variables in default prediction models to improve discrimination. In the specific case of SMEs 
(where there is usually a problem of scarcity of reliable “hard” financial information) such non-
financial elements can be very useful when trying to predict distress. Altman et al. (2010) 
combine both qualitative and financial information in a default prediction model for SMEs in the 
UK. They find that data relating to legal action by creditors, company filings and audit 
reports/opinions significantly increases the performance of their model. However, such 
information is not always available sufficiently in advance to facilitate timely predictions. 
Another strand of literature (though not focusing on SMEs) analyzes the additional benefit of 
using macroeconomic variables to forecast distress. Two influential US studies of this nature are 
Duffie et al. (2007) and Campbell et al. (2008). International studies always focus on specific 
countries, such as Jacobson et al (2005), Carling et al. (2007) and Jacobson et al. (2013) on 
Sweden, Bonfim (2009) on Portugal, Bruneau et al. (2012) on France, and Nam et al. (2008) on 
Korea. The above articles find that macroeconomic variables are important for explaining the 
time-varying default likelihoods, but they examine relatively larger (and, in the case of US, 
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listed) corporates. The authors also note the importance of industry effects. For instance, Chava 
and Jarrow (2004) observe improving forecasting performance by including industry groupings 
in their models. 
Our paper is related to the studies of Glennon and Nigro (2005), Altman et al. (2010), 
Jacobson et al. (2013) and Laekholm-Jensen et al. (2013), who, respectively, examine business 
cycle effects on SMEs defaults in the US, the UK, Sweden, and Denmark. Glennon and Nigro 
(2005), using a dataset of US small loans, include business cycle dummy variables,  industrial 
production index growth and rates of regional business bankruptcies. They find that the failure of 
a small loan is closely related to both regional and industrial economic conditions. Altman et al. 
(2010) use sector-level failure rates of SMEs in the UK and also report a significant relationship 
with failure probability. Jacobson et al. (2013) consider both idiosyncratic and macroeconomic 
factors for the entire Swedish corporate sector and perform a careful cross-industry comparison. 
Finally, in a recent working paper, Laekholm-Jensen et al. (2013) find that macro variables play 
the most important role in default prediction over time for their Danish sample. Our paper 
extends the above studies by using a wider sample that includes SMEs from different European 
countries, by allowing for regional models and comparisons, and also by examining a larger 
variety of systematic factors (ranging from exchange rates to bank lending conditions). Europe 
offers a unique setting for such a study compared to the US due to the higher level of variation 
between economic and legal environments faced by SMEs. Another slight complication of the 
US studies is that they often use the average sample default rate as an explanatory variable in 
their models in order to capture business cycle effects. This technique can introduce bias and 
may result in opposite coefficient signs (Gormley and Matsa, 2014). 
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In our study, we find that, in addition to indicators of profitability, coverage, leverage and 
cash flow, the location and the number of shareholders are important distress determinants for 
SMEs. We also confirm that systematic factors significantly affect average distress rates in the 
European economy, a finding that is well-documented in previous US and international literature 
(Duffie, 2005; Carling et al., 2007; Altman et al., 2012; Jacobson et al., 2013; Laekholm-Jensen 
et al., 2013). Nevertheless, industry effects often do not demonstrate significance. Moreover, we 
examine interaction effects between SMEs’ size and systematic variables. We find that as SMEs 
become larger, they are less vulnerable to systematic factors, a finding that is particularly 
important in light of the current Basel regulations. 
Our most interesting results appear when we split our sample into regional sub-samples. We 
find that SMEs in different regions are vulnerable to the same idiosyncratic factors but 
coefficient levels differ among these regions. Most importantly, SMEs in different regions are 
exposed to different systematic factors, according to region-specific conditions and 
characteristics. Our regional distress models always perform better than a generic model 
estimated for each regional sub-sample. These findings indicate the importance of using regional 
models for distress prediction in international SME portfolios. Finally, our results remain robust 
to different distress definitions, estimation techniques and time periods. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the methodology and the reasons for 
its selection. Section 2.3 describes the dataset, discusses the choice of variables and presents 
summary statistics. Section 2.4 presents the models and discusses the results, Section 2.5 
presents the robustness tests, and Section 2.6 concludes. 
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2.2 The Methodology 
We follow Shumway (2001) and estimate the probability of distress over the next year using a 
multi-period logit model. We assume that the marginal probability of distress (or hazard rate) 
over the next year follows a logistic distribution and is given by: 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) = 𝑃(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) =
1
1 + exp(−𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1−𝛾𝑦𝑡−1)
, (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator that equals one if the firm 𝑖 is distressed in year 𝑡, 𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 is a function 
of firm-specific characteristics that includes a vector of firm-specific variables 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 known at 
the end of the previous year and 𝛾𝑦𝑡−1 is the baseline hazard function that includes some other 
time-dependent variables 𝑦𝑡−1. The baseline hazard influences similarly all firms in the economy 
and expresses the hazard rate in the absence of the firm-specific covariates 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1. In this paper, 
we follow Duffie et al. (2007), Campbell et al. (2008) and other authors and specify the baseline 
hazard using macroeconomic variables. 
Shumway (2001) proves that, for a discrete random variable 𝑡, a multi-period logit model is 
equivalent to a discrete-time hazard model with an adjusted standard error structure. We need to 
adjust the standard errors because test statistics produced by the logit program assume that the 
number of independent observations is the number of firm-years and they also ignore the panel 
structure of the data. Calculating correct test statistics requires the adjustment of the sample size 
to account for dependence among firm-year observations. The firm-year observations of a 
particular firm cannot be independent, since a firm cannot fail in period 𝑡 if it failed in period 
𝑡 − 1. Likewise, a firm that survives to period 𝑡 cannot have failed in period 𝑡 − 1. Thus, the 
correct value of 𝑛 for test statistics is the number of firms in the data, not the number of firm-
years. The 𝜒2 test statistics produced by the logit program are of the form: 
1
𝑛
(μ̂𝑘 − μ0)
′Σ−1(μ̂𝑘 − μ0)~χ
2(𝑘),       (2) 
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where there are 𝑘 estimated moments being tested against 𝑘 null hypotheses, μ0. Dividing these 
test statistics by the average number of firm-years per firm makes the logit program’s statistics 
correct. This is equivalent to calculating firm clustered-corrected standard errors to adjust for the 
number of firms in our samples. Specifically we use Huber/White standard errors (calculated 
from Huber/White sandwich covariance matrix, see Froot, 1989; White, 1994; and Wooldridge, 
2002). 
Finally, we account for the survivorship bias, which is the risk that SMEs are more likely to 
be in our sample if they are survivors and consequently, have lower distress probabilities. 
Particularly in 2000 (, which is the first year of our sample period), all firms that are present in 
the database are survivors. This happens because 2000 is the year that our database becomes 
more complete. As firms enter the database later on, they are always survivors in the first year of 
their existence in the sample (firms that fail quickly simply are never included in the sample). 
Thus, we follow a technique similar to Carling et al. (2007) and introduce one more factor, the 
“duration” variable that accounts for the “time-at-risk” of firms only during the sample period, 
(i.e. the number of years that a firm stays in the sample). The value of this variable is given by 
the formula duration=t and is measured in discrete time units. (iI.e., if an SME appears in the 
sample for three years in total, the value of this variable in the first year is one, in the second year 
two and in the third year three). By censoring the number of years that a firm existed before it 
joined the sample, we weight all firms on equal terms and account for duration dependence. This 
is because, since we allow the time a firm remains in the sample to directly affect the probability 
of distress, over and above its accounting data and the systematic factors.
1
  
                                                          
1
 However, the “duration” variable is still an imperfect measure. This is because we can underestimate the lifespan 
of firms that default in the beginning of the sample period. 
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2.3 The Data 
In order to estimate the multi-period logit model, we need an indicator of distress (dependent 
variable) and a set of predictors (independent variables). We use the Amadeus and Orbis Europe 
databases (both available from Bureau Van Dijk) to detect the status of each firm in each year 
and to extract the raw data that include financial and qualitative information. Finally, we use the 
European Statistical Service’s (Eurostat), the European Central Bank’s (ECB), the World Bank 
and Datastream databases for the systematic variables. 
In this part, we first discuss the definition of distress that we adopt, we then explain what 
criteria need to be met for a company to be included in the sample and, finally, we describe the 
examined predictive variables and the procedure we follow to select the best among them. 
 
2.3.1 Definition of Distress 
We classify firm-years into two mutually exclusive categories: “distressed” and “healthy”. A 
firm-year is distressed if the following two conditions are both met: (i) it is the last firm-year for 
which we have available financial statements before the firm leaves the sample; (ii) the firm (a) 
either appears with one of the statuses defaulted, in receivership, bankrupt, in liquidation or (b) it 
has no updated status information and disappears from the sample before 2010 with negative 
equity in the last year. A firm-year is healthy in all other cases. Specifically, we consider as 
healthy: (i) firm-years of distressed companies before the last available firm-year; (ii) all firm-
years of firms that disappear from the sample for a specified reason other than distress (i.e. 
merger or acquisition); (ii) all firm-years of firms that have no updated status information and 
disappear from the sample before 2010 without negative equity in the last year; (iv) all firm-
years of firms that remain active until 2010. 
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Let us elaborate further on the above. Firms enter the sample anytime during the years 1999-
2008. We track them until 2010 and use financial statements from the years 1999-2008 to predict 
distress on a one-year horizon for the period 2000-2009.
2
 There are two cases: 
Case 1: Firms that remain active in the sample until 2010 (in the sense that they report financial 
statements until 2010). All firm-year observations for these firms for the estimation period 2000-
2009 are classified as healthy. 
Case 2: Firms that disappear from the sample (in the sense that they no longer report financial 
statements) earlier than 2010. For these firms either we consult the available status information 
to find out why they disappeared or, when no updated status information is available, we 
consider as distressed the last available firm-year when the disappearing firm has negative equity 
in this particular year. 
It is important to note that the negative equity condition is not used for any of the firm-years 
of case 1. Now we explain the reason why we add this condition. Our intention in this study is to 
proxy for distress and not only failure. Thus, we are not only interested in incidents that are 
strictly determined by legal insolvency procedures. The extended indicator that we use is more 
appropriate for SMEs because these companies often do not follow such legal procedures at all. 
A characteristic example is Italy, where there is no clear framework for SMEs to file for 
insolvency. Even in cases where there is such a framework, filings are not mandatory or they 
                                                          
2 Although we have financial statements data for 2009 and 2010, we do not use them to predict distress for 2010 and 
2011 because we do not know which SMEs become distressed during these years. The negative equity condition 
does not help in this case, since the last available year of our sample is 2010 and we do not know which SMEs 
disappear the following year, thus we cannot construct our distress indicator for 2010. In Section 2.4, we calculate 
average distress rates for 2010 and 2011 based on coefficient estimates of the previous years and in Figure 2.1, we 
plot them together with realized distress rates obtained from an external source. 
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take a long period of time (e.g. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) show in a US study that many 
filings are missing for bankrupt firms). When these procedures are mandatory, legal insolvency 
is often related to negative equity. For example, in Germany, firms are obliged to file for 
bankruptcy once their equity turns negative (Davydenko and Frank, 2008) and in France even 
earlier, when their equity drops below a certain threshold (LaPorta et al., 1998). 
As a result, the proper tracking of the status of SMEs and their distress rates is a very 
challenging task. There are many different reasons for which an SME can go out of business but 
owners rarely report these reasons and authorities rarely document them. Watson and Everett 
(1996) find that small businesses often close for reasons other than distress. For example, a small 
business can be successful but the owner may still close it voluntarily to accept employment with 
another company or retire. Headd (2003) finds that only one out of three of start-ups close under 
conditions that the owners consider unsuccessful. The Amadeus and Orbis databases cooperate 
in different countries with credit bureaus which provide firm status information. In around 40% 
of cases though, a firm disappears from the database but the status information remains outdated. 
In order to separate the cases of closure from the ones of distress for these firms, we need to 
make a reasonable assumption. This is why we add the negative equity condition. 
This condition is well-rooted in various academic studies. A large strand of literature links 
equity values with firm distress. For example, Davydenko (2012) describes as economic default 
the point when a firm’s equity turns negative and characterizes this as a distress-triggering event. 
The definition in Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Law is very similar. Davydenko (2012) finds 
support for models in which the default timing is chosen endogenously such as Merton’s DD. 
Ross et al. (2010) point out that a stock-based insolvency occurs when a company has negative 
equity. 
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In our sample, we observe that negative equity is 200% more likely for firms that disappear 
from the sample at some point before 2010 than for firms that remain active. From an accounting 
perspective, negative equity is almost always connected with accumulation of past losses. From a 
capital structure point of view, negative equity means that the company's total liabilities are 
higher than its total assets. In both cases, a negative value for equity is a flag that the company is 
undergoing serious financial difficulties and it is a good proxy for distress (and not only failure). 
To verify our point, in Section 2.5 we perform a robustness test where we exclude all firms 
that disappear from the sample before 2010 without updated status situation. These are the firms 
that, under our main distress definition described above, are classified as distressed if their equity 
is negative in the last year. By excluding these firms, the distress definition in the resulting 
restricted sample is strictly linked to a legal insolvency procedure. Despite the fact that our 
sample size decreases significantly, our results remain robust to this alternative distress 
definition. In Section 2.5 and Appendix 2.3, we report the estimation results as well as 
comparative statistics between the two distress definitions and samples used. Finally, in 
unreported results, we replace the negative equity condition with one for negative earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). EBITDA is often used in the 
academic literature as a proxy for operating cashflow. In our sample, 67% of SMEs that have 
negative equity also report negative EBITDA in the same year. Our results also remain 
substantially similar under this distress definition. 
 
2.3.2 Sample Selection 
In our sample SMEs come from eight European countries, namely Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. We select these countries for 
two reasons: (i) our version of Amadeus and Orbis Europe databases has only European 
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coverage but data are not of the same quality for all countries. (For Scandinavian countries there 
are very few distress cases for estimation purposes and for most eastern European countries there 
are very few firms with complete information); (ii) this particular set of countries creates a 
combination that reflects the variability of SMEs across the EU. This is obvious from Table 2.1, 
which provides an overview of the key indicators for SMEs in the EU27 and in the countries of 
our sample. In Italy, Portugal and Spain, SMEs account for larger than EU-average shares of 
total employment and value added, and present in higher density. This suggests that SMEs in 
these economies have a greater role than in most EU countries. On the other hand, for France, 
Germany and the UK, these figures are consistently lower than the EU average. For the Czech 
Republic and Poland, the share of employment and value added for SMEs is similar. 
To study whether the distress determinants differ across Europe and in order to perform 
comparisons, we split our sample in regional sub-samples. We select the groups based on the 
following criteria: (ii) the importance of SMEs in the local economies, reflected in Table 2.1; (ii) 
geography, i.e. west, south, east; (iii) the similarity of the macroeconomic environment, i.e. 
correlations of macroeconomic variables, currency etc; and lastly, (iv) previous literature. Thus, 
we form three groups. Group 1 includes the relatively stronger economies of western Europe, 
namely France, Germany and the UK, group 2 includes the peripheral economies of southern 
Europe, namely Italy, Portugal and Spain, and group 3 includes two economies from eastern 
Europe, namely the Czech Republic and Poland. We discuss criterion (i) above and criterion (ii) 
is clear. Concerning criterion (iii), when we calculate correlations of macroeconomic variables 
between all country combinations, we find a clear division along the regions. Finally, on 
criterion (iv), these countries are often bundled together in existing studies (Jaumotte and 
Sodsriwiboon, 2010; Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2012; Perego and Vermeulen, 2013). 
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Because of the European focus of the study, we adopt the European Commission’s definition 
for SMEs, instead of the more generic one of the Basel Committee previously applied by Altman 
et al. (2010). We extract companies that meet the following requirements: (i) they have fewer 
than 250 employees and, either, annual turnover up to €50 million, or total assets up to €43 
million; (ii) no single company holds more than 25% of their equity; (iii) they do not have 
subsidiaries; (iv) they have up to ten shareholders; (v) they have at least two years of data 
available; (vi) they are not firms in the financial sector. 
We need criteria (ii)-(iv) to ensure that the companies are independent.
3
 Specifically, since 
we cannot track the subsidiaries and check if the companies still satisfy the criteria to be 
classified as SMEs once they become subsidiaries, we need to exclude companies that have 
subsidiaries. Concerning criterion (iv), since the average number of shareholders in our sample is 
two, we exclude companies with more than ten shareholders as they are possibly outliers. As to 
criterion (v), we keep companies with at least two years of data in order to be able to lag 
variables, calculate growth ratios and study the evolution of distress risk. Finally, on criterion 
(vi), we follow Shumway (2001) and other authors and exclude financial firms from the sample 
                                                          
3
 Altman et al. (2010) do not take into account the independence requirement when selecting their sample, but try to 
control for it using a subsidiary dummy. They find that subsidiaries are less risky than non-subsidiaries. Small 
entities which are subsidiaries of large groups, though, can be very different from SMEs, especially when assessing 
their probability of distress. For example, Becchetti and Sierra (2003) find that group membership is inversely 
related to the probability of distress. Subsidiaries have access to financial and other resources of the group, and can 
survive during periods of poor financial performance. Moreover, the group may have reasons to support a subsidiary 
other than for financial reasons. Finally a subsidiary may be in distress as a result of group-wide distress. 
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(NACE
4
 rev.2 codes from 64 to 68) due to financial firms having reporting practices that 
preclude combining them with other firms in models using financial information. 
After the initial extraction, we apply standard filtering and data cleaning techniques. We first 
check if missing values can be deduced from other items (i.e. if total assets are missing but fixed 
and current assets are available, we simply replace total assets with their sum). If the above 
method does not work, we exclude companies with missing values. We also exclude companies 
with errors in the data entered (i.e. companies that violate accounting identities). These 
constrains limit our initial dataset by around 25%. 
Our estimation sample consists of 2,721,861 firm-years observations (644,234 firms) out of 
which 49,355 are distressed. We additionally keep a random one-tenth of the firms from each 
country as a hold-out sample. The hold-out sample consists of 304,037 firm-year observations 
(71,823 firms) out of which 5,487 are distressed. Table 2.2 summarizes the properties of our 
distress indicator for the overall sample and for the regional subsamples. As already mentioned, 
there is a bias due to the fact that in the beginning of the period (2000-2001), most firms in the 
database are survivors. It is immediately apparent that Eurozone distress rates are relatively high 
in 2002-2003, are lower in 2004-2006 and are elevated again from 2007 onwards. This evidence 
is in accordance with the gloomy business climate in the early years of the last decade, which 
was followed by an impressive boom of the European economy in 2004-2006 and the subsequent 
slowdown that started in 2007. The figures are somewhat different for group 3, which consists of 
two non-Eurozone members. This may be attributed to the fact that the credit supply by banks 
did not shrink in these countries in the years 2002-2003, as it did in most of the Eurozone. The 
                                                          
4
 NACE stands for “Nomenclature statistique des Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la 
Communauté européenne”. 
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distressed SMEs are 1.81% of all observations in the overall sample. Group 3 has the highest 
distress rate (2.4% of all firm-years). 
 
2.3.3 Variables Selection 
The factors that can lead SMEs to distress vary from firm-specific characteristics (such as high 
debt) to industry specific characteristics and macroeconomic effects (such as high interest rates). 
To select among these factors, we take into account the models’ stability, fit and parsimony as 
well as economic and statistical significance. 
 
2.3.3.1 Idiosyncratic Variables 
Concerning the accounting data, we calculate financial ratios from nine categories: liquidity, 
profitability, interest coverage, leverage, activity, cash flow, growth (i.e. in sales or profits), asset 
utilization and employee efficiency.
5
 We choose the ratios mainly based on economic intuition 
and suggestions from past literature. A list of the ratios examined is available upon request. As 
economic intuition suggests, we expect the probability of distress to be positively related to 
leverage and negatively related to all other ratio categories. 
For the calculations, when denominators have zero values, we replace them with low values 
of €10 so that the ratios maintain their interpretation. Additionally, to ensure that statistical 
results are not heavily influenced by outliers, we set the bottom one percent to the first percentile 
                                                          
5 We do not examine ratios that have equity as one component because we characterize firms with negative equity 
that drop from the sample as distressed and in some cases such ratios have no economic meaning (i.e. equity to 
profits, when both equity and profits are negative). We need to note though that a distressed firm has negative equity 
in its latest balance sheet before leaving the sample, whereas in our models, we use accounting data lagged by one 
year. 
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and the top one percent to the ninety-ninth percentile, a popular technique known as winsorizing. 
Finally, because annual reports for SMEs become available with a significant time delay, we lag 
all ratios in the estimations by 12 months. This means that we assume that data for year 𝑡 − 1 
become available at the end of year 𝑡. 
After we calculate the candidate ratios, we follow a standard three-step procedure to select 
the best for our models. First, we follow Altman and Sabato’s (2007) approach and apply the 
area under the curve (AUC) criterion. The AUC is constructed from the estimated distress 
probabilities versus the actual status of the firms in each year for all possible cut-off probability 
values. Thus, we find the AUC for each ratio, applying univariate analysis and keeping those 
with an AUC above 0.65. Second, we perform correlation analysis to avoid multi-collinearity 
problems. When the correlation between two ratios is above 0.6, we keep the ratio with the 
highest AUC. If the difference in the AUC is small, we keep the ratio that was found to be 
significant in previous studies. Finally, we apply a forward stepwise selection procedure of the 
remaining ratios, setting the significance level at 10% and performing the likelihood ratio test 
which is more accurate than the standard Wald test. 
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for the five ratios that are found to be the most effective 
in predicting distress. A comparison of Panels B and C in Table 2.3 reveals the differences 
between distressed SMEs. Earnings before taxes to total assets differ substantially across the two 
groups, suggesting the dominance of unprofitable SMEs in the distressed group. Another striking 
difference is that the distressed firm-years have, on average, around 130 times lower interest 
coverage compared to healthy firm-years. Short-term borrowing is also much higher in the case 
of distressed SMEs. Similarly, turnover to total liabilities ratio is around 180% higher in the 
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healthy firm-years. Finally, the gap between distressed and healthy firm-years in the cash flow 
ratios indicates the importance of having high cash flows relative to current liabilities. 
We do not expect large variations in the identified ratios when we repeat the selection 
exercise for different regions, since several past studies also note their importance. We do expect 
differences in their coefficients though, since when we look at Panels D, E and F, we notice 
differences in the ratios’ sizes depending on the region. 
We also account for size, industry type, number of shareholders, location, legal form and age. 
The European Commission classifies SMEs into three groups based on their number of 
employees and turnover or total assets: medium-sized enterprises, small enterprises, and micro 
enterprises. As indicated in Panel A of Table 2.4, our sample is dominated by micro enterprises. 
In the sixth column of Panel A, the relationship between size and distress risk appears to be non-
monotonic, with distress risk relatively stable for medium and small companies and higher for 
micro companies. This finding is consistent with other studies such as Dietsch and Petey (2004) 
and is also in line with the argument that smaller companies are more vulnerable to economic 
fluctuations. To test these predictions, we follow Altman et al. (2010) and employ the natural 
logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size. We also test for other specifications of size, 
such as total turnover and the number of employees. Additionally, we examine interaction effects 
between size and the systematic variables that we introduce in the next subsection. For this 
purpose we use three size dummies (medium, small, micro) and combine them with the 
systematic variables to test the impact of the macroeconomy on different size groups. 
We also control for industry conditions using sector dummies to catch concentration effects. 
To construct our dummies we use the NACE codes which group industries into 21 major sectors. 
For estimation purposes though, this classification is too fine. The difficulty here relates to the 
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grouping of sectors into wide sector classes in order to achieve an appropriate degree of 
homogeneity. It is true that such groupings can always be subject to a certain degree of 
arbitrariness. In our case, we follow an approach similar to Chava and Jarrow (2004) and form 
six wide sectors: (i) Sector 1: Agriculture, Mining and Manufacturing, (ii) Sector 2: 
Transportation, Communication and Utilities, (iii) Sector 3: Construction, (iv) Sector 4: Trade, 
(v) Sector 5: Accommodation and Food, and (vi) Sector 6: Other services. We select these wide 
sectors based on different regulatory environments, competition levels and product structures. 
We also test for alternative groupings but mostly we get insignificant results for more detailed 
industry classifications. Panel B of Table 2.4 shows the way these broad sectors are partitioned. 
This initial evidence shows that Accommodation and Food has the highest distress rate and 
Transportation, Communication and Utilities the lowest. 
Finally, we include a dummy for shareholders (equal to one if the shareholders are more than 
two), a location dummy (equal to one if the SME is located in an urban area) and three legal 
form dummies in our models (for limited, unlimited and other legal forms). The average number 
of shareholders in our sample is two, but 24% of SMEs have between three and ten shareholders. 
14% of SMEs are located in big cities. 92% of SMEs have limited legal forms and few SMEs are 
cooperatives or partnerships. Generally, we expect SMEs with more shareholders to receive 
more injections of capital in difficult times, thus will have lower distress probabilities. Moreover, 
we expect SMEs in urban areas to be riskier due to higher competition among them. The 
intuition behind testing for the legal form of SMEs is that limited partners may be less interested 
in monitoring firm performance compared to unlimited partners, leading limited SMEs to 
distress more frequently. Whereas, (as we show in the “results” section) we find support for our 
hypotheses concerning the number of shareholders and the location of SMEs, the coefficients of 
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the legal dummies are statistically insignificant. Thus, we do not include them when reporting 
the results. 
Lastly we examine the age of a smaller sample of firms for which we have the date of 
establishment. Hudson (1987) finds that companies which are less than ten years old make up the 
highest proportion of distressed firms. In our sample, the average age at the time of distress is 
11.9 years, whereas the average age for healthy firm-years is 15 years. Thus, we expect age to be 
negatively (but not monotonically) related to distress. 
 
2.3.3.2 Systematic Variables 
In order to construct the systematic variables, we use data from Eurostat, the ECB, the World 
Bank and Datastream. Since these variables are often reported with a higher than annual 
frequency (quarterly, monthly or daily), we often need to annualize or calculate averages. We 
also usually lag them in order to avoid causality considerations and because they are available 
for forecasting with a time delay. So, we always use past realizations rather than expected values, 
assuming that these realizations are the best prediction we can have for the future. This is more 
appropriate for forecasting purposes since our objective is to predict distress at a certain point in 
time (given the definite information that we have available at this point) and because it is 
difficult to get reliable estimations for some systematic variables (i.e. FX rate or credit supply). 
In our models, we use country-specific values and examine systematic variables from three 
categories: business cycle, credit conditions, and insolvency codes. In Appendix 2.1 we present 
the variables examined, their expected signs, calculation methods and number of lags, when 
applied. 
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Basing our predictions on economic rationale, we expect the probability of distress to be 
negatively related to business cycle variables such as the appreciation of the local currency, 
disposable income, GDP growth, and economic sentiment indicators. On the other hand, we 
expect it to be positively related to other business cycle variables such as country debt, inflation, 
oil price, unemployment and exchange rate volatility. European SMEs are mainly local market 
players and most often import raw materials and other supplies instead of exporting. Thus, an 
appreciation of the local currency makes these imports cheaper and lowers distress rates. 
Concerning disposable income, GDP, and economic sentiment, an increase in their values means 
a better economic climate, thus it should be negatively related to distress. On the contrary, an 
increase in country debt, inflation, oil price, unemployment and exchange rate volatility signals 
uncertainty about future economic conditions and should be positively related to distress. 
Concerning credit conditions, we expect the level of interest rates to be positively related to 
distress and bank lending to be negatively related to distress. An increase in interest rates makes 
it harder for SMEs to borrow, whereas higher bank lending growth results in greater access to 
finance. 
Finally, at this point, we need to elaborate on the effect of bankruptcy laws on distress risk. 
Davydenko and Franks (2008) examine defaults in three European countries and find differences 
in insolvency codes among these countries to be important determinants of default outcomes. 
The World Bank measures the efficiency of insolvency codes in different countries based on the 
achieved recovery rate, which is the average percentage that claimants recover from an insolvent 
firm. The recovery rate depends on many factors, such as the time it takes to resolve insolvency 
proceedings, costs and the outcome of the process. In general, fast, low-cost proceedings and 
stronger creditor rights characterize the economies with high recovery rates. On the contrary, the 
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more years to resolve an insolvency case, the less friendly the code is and the less likely for the 
firm to survive during this process. This is also obvious in Appendix 2.2. Countries where the 
insolvency procedure takes longer (such as the Czech Republic and Poland) score very low as 
regards the percentage of recoveries. The opposite is true for countries with swift procedures, 
such as UK and Germany. Thus, we expect distress rates to be negatively related to recovery 
rates and positively related to the time it takes to resolve insolvency proceedings. The above is 
also consistent with Acharya et al. (2011), who show that firms in countries with stronger 
creditor rights (thus higher recoveries) are more conservatively financed (i.e. have less debt). 
In order to find among the systematic variables, those which significantly influence the 
probability of distress for SMEs, we follow a standard procedure. First, we fit the models using 
only accounting information. Then, we run models that include the ratios and only one 
systematic variable at a time. We calculate the AUC for each of these models for the overall 
sample and for the sub-samples, and keep the systematic variables that result to models with the 
highest AUCs. At this point, we need to account for correlation between the systematic variables. 
Correlations in this kind of variable are often high, lead to unreasonable signs of the estimated 
coefficients, and create large changes in the values of these coefficients in response to small 
changes in the models’ specifications. For this reason, between two systematic variables that 
have a correlation higher than 0.6, we keep the one that results in the model with the highest 
AUC. 
When we fit our models using the regional sub-samples, we anticipate that systematic 
variables will vary across regions. Based on economic intuition, we suspect that group 2 (Italy, 
Portugal, Spain- the peripheral economies of south Europe) is more exposed to the 
macroeconomic situation compared to group 1 (France, Germany, United Kingdom - more stable 
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economies). Also, we suspect that group 3 (Czech Republic, Poland) is exposed to additional 
currency risk since these countries are not members of the Eurozone. 
Finally, we also examine interaction effects between industry dummies and systematic 
variables and firms' size and systematic variables. Generally, we predict that industries such as 
construction and smaller SMEs are more vulnerable to the macroeconomic situation. 
 
2.4 The Results 
In this section, we present results of models fitted and estimated using the overall sample, 
models fitted and estimated using the regional sub-samples, and models fitted using the overall 
sample and estimated using the regional sub-samples. We refer to the models fitted using the 
overall sample as generic models, and to those fitted using the regional sub-samples as regional 
models. We identify interesting differences among the European regions, and we show that 
regional distress models always perform better compared to a generic model estimated using the 
regional sub-samples. 
 
2.4.1 Generic Models Estimated for the Overall Sample 
We estimate five models for the period 2000-2009. Model I includes only the idiosyncratic 
variables (accounting ratios, size, dummy for SMEs with more than two shareholders, and a 
dummy for SMEs in urban areas), model II includes both the idiosyncratic and the systematic 
variables, model III also includes the industry dummies, model IV includes some interaction 
terms, and finally, model V includes age (available for a smaller sample). All models control for 
the duration effect, which is the “time at risk” of each firm in the sample. 
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Panel A of Table 2.5 presents the estimated coefficients and chi-square values for the five 
alternative model specifications. In model I, all firm-specific variables are significant and have 
the expected signs. Specifically, the probability of distress is negatively related to profitability 
(earnings before taxes to total assets), coverage (EBITDA to interest expenses), cash flow (cash 
flow to current liabilities) and activity (turnover to total liabilities) and is positively related to 
leverage (current liabilities to total assets). Surprisingly, we do not find liquidity ratios as 
significant in the models. An explanation is that information contained in these ratios is proxied 
by others. That is, the significance of current liabilities to total assets may indicate that SMEs 
rely more on short-term borrowing than cash holdings to finance their operational needs. The 
probability of distress is a decreasing function of the firm size (natural logarithm of total assets), 
indicating that as the firms become larger, they are less likely to undergo distress (see also 
Carling et al., 2007). In unreported results, we also test for the non-linear effects of size, by 
introducing the natural logarithm of squared total assets. We find a positive coefficient, 
indicating that for the largest SMEs distress risk starts to increase, probably because these 
companies are more likely to be pursued in liquidation process by their creditors. Two additional 
interesting findings in accordance with our predictions are that SMEs with less than three 
shareholders and SMEs in urban areas on average face higher risks. It seems that SMEs with 
more shareholders receive higher capital support in difficult times. This effect dominates the 
higher administrative costs that the existence of more shareholders may entail. A possible 
explanation for the higher risks faced by SMEs in urban areas is that these companies face higher 
competition (due to geographical proximity) and pay higher rent than their counterparts in non-
urban areas. Another reason may be that owners of urban SMEs are less willing to support their 
enterprises in times of difficulties. This strategic distress caused because it is a more often a 
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viable option for business owners to close the business and find employment elsewhere. 
 6
 These 
effects seem to out-weigh the fact that there is a larger customer base available for urban SMEs. 
In model II, the firm-specific variables retain their significance and signs once the systematic 
variables are added. We identify five systematic variables as doing the best overall job in 
predicting distress, namely the FX rate change, the unemployment, the economic sentiment 
indicator, and the change in bank lending. As we hypothesized, an appreciation of the currency, 
an increase in the economic sentiment indicator and an increase in lending by banks result in 
lower distress rates. Conversely, an increase in unemployment and a greater number of years to 
achieve insolvency resolution result in higher distress rates. To assess the usefulness of the 
systematic variables, we perform a likelihood ratio test for the nested models I and II. The null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of these variables are jointly equal to zero is strongly rejected, as 
indicated in Table 2.5. 
Moving to model III, the firm-specific and systematic variables retain both their signs and 
significance and all industry dummies, except for industry 1 (Agriculture, Mining, 
Manufacturing) enter with significant coefficients. Concerning the signs of the industry dummy 
coefficients, industries 2 (Utilities, Transportation, Communication) and 4 (Trade) are negatively 
related to distress and industry 3 (Construction) and 5 (Accommodation and Food) positively 
related to distress. To assess the usefulness of the industry dummies, we perform a likelihood 
ratio test for the nested models II and III. The null hypothesis is again rejected. 
In model IV, we report results with interaction effects, in addition to the variables of model 
III. Specifically, we first test interaction effects between systematic variables and industry 
                                                          
6
 Dietsch and Petey (2006) show something similar. Specifically, they find evidence from French SMEs that more 
attractive and wealthy regions demonstrate higher distress rates on average. 
28 
dummies, between systematic variables and size, and finally, between industry dummies and 
size. We find that the interaction effects that are most important in terms of performance 
improvement are between systematic variables and size dummies and we report only these 
results for reasons of parsimony. From the coefficients of the interaction effects it is obvious that 
the distress probability of relatively larger SMEs (small and medium firms) is less sensitive to 
the systematic factors than the distress probability of the smallest SMEs (micro firms). For 
example, let us look how the effect of a bank lending change differs for the small and medium 
firms compared to micro firms. When we introduce interaction effects, the negative coefficient 
of the bank lending change increases in absolute size, demonstrating the increased sensitivity of 
micro firms to such a change. On the other hand, the additional effect of the bank lending change 
for small firms is positive (but still lower in absolute terms), and even more positive for medium 
firms. Thus, for the relatively larger SMEs, the same change in bank lending has less influence 
on their distress probability (but to the same direction) compared to micro firms. There are 
similar patterns with all other interaction effects with the exception of unemployment. 
Interestingly, the additional effect of unemployment for small and medium firms is of a higher 
magnitude (-10.495 and -11.241 respectively) in absolute terms than the coefficient for 
unemployment (4.802). Thus, an increase in unemployment is positively related to the distress 
probability of micro firms, but negatively related to the distress probability of small and medium 
firms. This may be due to the fact that in times of difficulty larger SMEs are more likely to fire 
employees in order to avoid bankruptcy and still be operational with fewer employees. Micro 
firms may not have such flexibility. 
In model V, we introduce firm age and test its effect on distress probability for the slightly 
smaller sample for which we have available data on age. We find, in accordance with previous 
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literature, that older firms are safer. We also follow Altman et al. (2010) and check for non-linear 
effects of age. As in their study, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for a 
dummy variable equal to one if SMEs are between three and nine years old. 
We notice that the pseudo-R
2
 (McFadden’s R2) is increasing along the different model 
specifications, indicating a better fit as we add more variables. The pseudo-R
2 values may look 
low when compared to R
2 
values of linear regression models, but such low values are normal in 
logistic regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow; 2000). In order to evaluate more closely the 
performance of our models, we perform in-sample and out-of-sample testing. We employ two 
widely used measures, the Hosmer and Lemeshow grouping based on estimated distress 
probabilities and the area under the curve (AUC). 
According to the Hosmer and Lemeshow method, the estimated distress probabilities for 
each year are ranked and divided into deciles. Out of the ten groups created (each one containing 
the 1/10 of the firms in that year), the first group has the smallest average estimated distress 
probability and the last the largest. Next, we aggregate the number of distressed firms in each 
decile for each year over the 2000-2009 period and calculate the corresponding percentages of 
the distressed firms in each decile. 
The AUC is constructed from the estimated distress probabilities versus the actual status of 
the firms in each year for all possible cut-off probability values. Specifically, the curve plots the 
ratio of correctly classified distressed firms to actual distressed firms (sensitivity) and the ratio of 
wrongly classified healthy firms to actual healthy firms (1 - specificity) for all possible cut-offs. 
The AUC ranges from zero to one. A model with an AUC close to 0.5 is considered a random 
model with no discriminatory power. An AUC of 0.7 to 0.8 represents good discriminatory 
power, an AUC of 0.8 to 0.9 very good discriminatory power and an AUC over 0.9 is 
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exceptional and extremely unusual. The AUC criterion is an improvement to the traditional 
classification tables that rely on a single cut-off point to classify distressed and healthy firms. 
Several statistics are equivalent to the AUC, such as the accuracy ratio, the Gini coefficient and 
the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (Engelmann et al., 2003). While the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
method assesses mainly calibration, the AUC assesses discrimination. 
Panel B of Table 2.5 presents the results of the in-sample tests. According to the Hosmer - 
Lemeshow grouping, the percentage of distressed firms in the last three deciles increases from 
model I to model II (75.83% to 76.59%). Also, the percentage of distressed firms in the first five 
deciles drops (11.38% to 11.09%). These show that adding the systematic variables improves 
performance both in terms of an increase in the correct classification of distressed firms and a 
decrease in the incorrect classification of healthy firms. AUC also increases from 0.824 to 0.838. 
This result is stronger than those achieved by previous studies in the literature. Specifically in 
Altman et al. (2010) this figure ranges between 0.78 and 0.80. When it comes to model III, it 
only modestly outperforms model II. Specifically, by taking industry effects into account, the 
AUC remains almost the same and the percentage of distressed firms in the last three deciles 
increases slightly (76.59% to 76.66%). Given these results, controlling for industry effects 
improves performance only marginally, once we have already accounted for systematic factors. 
When we add interaction effects between size and systematic factors, we notice a further 
increase in the percentage of distressed firms in the last three deciles (76.66% to 77.06%). AUC 
also increases from 0.839 to 0.843. Moving to model V, it seems that age also helps slightly. 
However, we cannot directly compare model IV to model V since model V is estimated with a 
smaller sample. 
Panel C of Table 2.5 presents the results of the out-of-sample tests. Out-of-sample testing is 
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challenging since improvements in the in-sample fit can be a result of over-fitting of the original 
data. As seen, all results follow the same patterns as for the in-sample tests. 
The in-sample and out-of-sample tests provide evidence that distress is captured more 
successfully with systematic variables and their interaction effects than with industry effects 
(which help only marginally). In unreported results, we also run a model where we include only 
firm-specific information (model I) and the industry dummies. As expected, this model performs 
worse than model II, which includes firm-specific information and the systematic factors. 
The importance of systematic variables in distress prediction is also demonstrated in Figure 
2.1, where we plot the predicted and observed distress rate for the period 2000 to 2011. The 
predicted distress rate is the simple average of the probabilities of distress of all firms in each 
period. Since we have financial but not distress information for 2010 and for only a few 
companies in 2011, we do the following: (i) we use the estimated coefficients from 2000-2009 to 
predict the distress rate for 2000-2011; (ii) we use the in-sample observed distress rate for 2000-
2009 and we obtain the observed distress rate for 2010-2011 from Creditreform, the largest 
private credit bureau in Germany that gathers statistics on insolvencies in Europe. Thus years 
2010 and 2011 provide out-of-sample evidence. The columns denote recession periods in the 
Eurozone as indicated by the OECD. The graph shows that in model I, where only firm-specific 
variables are included, the predicted distress rates follow a smooth upward trend, but do not co-
vary with the observed distress rates. It is the systematic variables (present in models II, III and 
IV) that shift the mean of the distress distribution and are able to capture distress-clustering 
during recessions. When systematic variables are included, predicted distress rates move together 
with observed ones and vary greatly with the business cycle, increasing with downturns and 
lowering with upturns. Once again, industry effects do not seem to provide additional 
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improvements. These findings are in accordance with previous literature (Carling et al., 2007; 
Jacobson et al., 2005, 2013; Laekholm-Jensen et al., 2014). 
 
2.4.2 Generic and Regional Models Estimated for the Regional Subsamples 
Now, we turn our analysis to the regional sub-samples presented in Section 2.3. First, we use the 
generic specifications of subsection 2.4.1 and estimate the generic models for the regional 
subsamples. Our preferred model is model II of Table 2.5, because it considers both idiosyncratic 
and systematic variables, performs very well (AUC of 0.8382 and 65.44% of distressed SMEs in 
the last three Hosmer Lemeshow deciles) and, at the same time, has a simple specification. We 
ignore industry effects (model III) because they do not add much in terms of performance 
improvements. We also ignore interaction effects (model IV) and age (model V) for reasons of 
parsimony. Later, we fit idiosyncratic and systematic variables for the regional sub-samples and 
estimate three regional models. Lastly, we compare the generic models estimated for the regional 
sub-samples with the regional models.
7
 
Table 2.6 presents the results. In accordance with our hypothesis, we document performance 
improvements when we switch to the regional models. Interestingly, we find that the firm-
specific variables identified as the most important in predicting distress in the regional models 
are exactly the same as in the generic models. This is evidence that SMEs across Europe are 
sensitive to the same idiosyncratic factors. This does not hold in the case of systematic factors. 
Specifically, we document regional variations in the vulnerabilities to systematic factors, 
                                                          
7
 We also fit and estimate country models. Altman et al. (2014) show that the classification accuracy of the Z’’-score 
(that uses only accounting data) can be considerably improved with country specific estimation. Findings are similar 
for countries of the same group, but country sub-samples often suffer from small size bias. Thus, in the sake of 
brevity and efficiency, we stick to regions instead of countries. 
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according to region-specific conditions and characteristics. Moreover, we do not find that the 
years taken to resolve insolvency variable adds predictive power in the regional models. This can 
partly be due to regional groups being relatively homogeneous with respect to their insolvency 
regimes. 
For group 1 (France, Germany, U.K.), the models are estimated from a sample of 165,786 
SMEs (801,536 firm-year observations), which include 14,177 distressed SMEs. When we move 
from the generic to the regional model, we document small changes in the coefficient sizes of the 
idiosyncratic variables. We also find that we need only two (instead of five) systematic variables 
to predict distress. These variables are the bank lending and the GDP growth criteria. Both bank 
lending and GDP growth have significant coefficients and are, as expected, negatively related to 
the distress rate. Lower GDP growth means lower growth in sales by firms and thus an increased 
distress probability. Interestingly, even with less systematic variables, the regional model 
achieves higher performance than the generic one. Specifically, the percentage of distressed 
firms in the last three deciles increases from the generic to the regional model (72.94% to 
74.16%) and the AUC increases (0.806 to 0.825). Out-of-sample performance improvements are 
similar as in the case of in-sample results. The above provides evidence that SMEs in the 
countries of group 1, which consists of some of the strongest EU economies, are less sensitive to 
the macroeconomic situation. This is in accordance with the finding in subsection 2.4.1, that 
large SMEs are less vulnerable to the macro-economic situation compared to small SMEs, since 
SMEs in group 1 are, on average, larger. 
For group 2 (Italy, Portugal, Spain), the models are estimated from a sample of 429,978 
SMEs (1,741,707 firm-year observations), which include 30,900 distressed SMEs. When we 
move from the generic to the regional model, we identify almost the same systematic factors as 
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being the most useful for predicting distress. The years to resolve insolvency variable is replaced 
by the balance of payments variable, since these countries often suffer from current account 
deficits. It is interesting to note that, in accordance with our predictions, group 2 is vulnerable to 
more macroeconomic factors compared to group 1. The reason for this can be the generally less 
favourable economic climate in the economies of group 2 during the years of this study. Here, 
the regional and generic models have a very similar performance. Specifically, the regional 
model only modestly outperforms the generic one (a 0.05% improvement in the correct 
classification for distressed firms and a 0.07 improvement in AUC). This happens because group 
2 represents 64% of the overall sample, thus, it mainly drives the results of the generic model. 
For group 3 (Czech Republic, Poland), the models are estimated from a sample of 48,470 
SMEs (178,618 firm-year observations), which include 4,278 distressed SMEs. When we move 
from the generic to the regional model, coefficient sizes of the idiosyncratic variables differ 
slightly and we observe an interesting new set of systematic variables. We find the FX volatility, 
the 10-year government bond yield and the GDP growth variables as the most useful systematic 
variables in predicting distress. With respect to the volatility of the exchange rate, higher 
volatility is positively related to distress (see also Nam et al., 2008). Interestingly, as we 
hypothesized, it seems that, for the non-Eurozone countries of group 3, the stability of their 
national currencies plays a crucial role in the solvency of SMEs. This is presumably due to the 
fact that a very volatile FX rate in these economies increases instability and thus creates 
uncertainty about future economic conditions. Concerning the 10-year government bond yield 
variable, it enters with a positive coefficient. Thus, a higher interest rate is positively related to 
distress. Government bond yields are systematically higher in the countries of group 3 compared 
to the rest of the sample for the years of the study, indicating the higher sovereign risk (country 
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premium) for these economies. As before, GDP growth is negatively related to distress. 
According to the Hosmer-Lemeshow grouping, the percentage of distressed firms in the last 
three deciles increases from the generic to the regional model (81.79% to 82.54%). AUC also 
increases (0.853 to 0.875). Clearly, the specific set of systematic variables helps in better 
capturing distress risk. The out-of-sample results give the same picture. 
The above evidence shows that the fit is improved when we change some of the 
macroeconomic co-variates as we move from the generic to the regional models. This indicates 
that regional models are better able to capture the systematic effects. Although the improvements 
might seem small, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 give a better sense of the comparative performance. 
Figure 2.2 plots the predicted distress rate based on the regional and generic models of Table 
2.6, along with the observed distress rate for each group. It is obvious that the predicted distress 
rates from the three regional models match better the observed values, compared to the predicted 
distress rate from the generic models. For group 1, the generic model underestimates the distress 
rate for the early years of our study (before 2004) and overestimates it later on (from 2008 
onwards). In the case of group 2, the two time-series are very similar. This is probably due to the 
vast majority of companies in our sample belonging to group 2, thus the regional and generic 
model for this group include almost the same co-variates and give almost identical predictions. 
Finally, for group 3, the generic model overestimates the distress rates for the years 2003-2004 
and co-moves with the regional model (and the observed values) in later years. The years 2010-
2011 provide out-of-sample evidence for group 1 and 2. The predicted distress rate closely 
follows the pattern of the observed one, specifically the falling trend in 2010-2011. Please note 
that for group 3, we lack distress information for 2010-2011, thus the extension is not possible. 
Figure 2.3 plots the aggregate time series for four macroeconomic variables. They are 
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economic sentiment, unemployment (in percentage terms), the balance of payments (as a 
percentage of the GDP), and foreign exchange rate volatility. The economic sentiment, the 
unemployment and the balance of payments variables are average values for the countries in 
each group. The foreign exchange rate is in relation to the US dollar. We report volatility for 
each currency separately (euro, British pound, Czech koruna and Polish zloty). 
The economic sentiment indicator clearly captures the deep recession in 2008-2009. We find 
this variable to be an important distress determinant in the generic model for the overall sample 
and also in the regional model for group 2. We can see that from 2006 onwards, values of the 
economic sentiment indicator for group 2 are systematically lower than for groups 1 and 3, 
capturing the higher sensitivity of the distress rate for group 2 to the values of this indicator. 
The same situation holds for unemployment as well. Specifically, unemployment is relatively 
stable during the years of the study for group 1. For groups 2, it is increasing substantially from 
the economic slowdown of 2008 onwards. Group 3 experiences a substantial decrease for 2004-
2009 and a moderate increase later. Not surprisingly, we find unemployment to be an important 
distress determinant in the regional model for group 2. 
The balance of payments as a percentage of GDP is also relatively stable (values around 
zero) during the years of this study for group 1. For groups 2, values are always negative and 
usually much lower than for group 3. Again, not surprisingly, it has a significant impact in the 
regional model for group 2, but not for the regional models of the other groups. This is evidence 
that SME distress rates in the countries of group 2 are particularly sensitive to the high current 
account deficits of their economies. 
Finally, the volatility of foreign exchange rates against the dollar follow similar trends for all 
currencies, but it is the Czech koruna and Polish zloty that have the highest volatility values. 
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Thus, in the regional model for group 3, we identify this variable as a significant determinant of 
the SME distress rate. 
 
2.5 Robustness Tests 
2.5.1 Definition of Distress 
In Section 2.3, we discuss that in around 40% of our sample (254,887 out of 644,234 firms), a 
firm disappears from the database before 2010 but the status information remains outdated. We 
also extensively discuss the challenges in tracking properly the status of SMEs that lead us to 
adopt an assumption for this 40% of firms. Thus, under our main distress definition, in order to 
separate the cases of closure from the ones of distress, we assume that the last available firm-
year of these firms is distressed if equity is negative in this last year. Because this assumption 
influences a large percentage of our sample, the estimation results can be sensitive to it. 
Therefore, in this section, we perform a robustness test where we exclude the 254,887 firms 
(1,127,428 firm-years) that disappear from the sample before 2010 without updated status 
situation. So, under this alternative distress definition, distress is strictly linked to only a legal 
insolvency procedure. The remaining sample includes 1,594,433 firm-years (389,374 firms) out 
of which 12,362 are distressed. Appendix 2.3 reports comparative statistics between the two 
distress definitions and samples used. 
Table 2.7 reports the estimation results for all countries and for the regional groups under 
both definitions for comparison purposes. Despite the fact that our sample size decreases 
significantly and distress rates are much lower, our results remain robust. Almost all variables 
retain their signs and significance. In a few cases that the sign flips, coefficients do not 
demonstrate significance. The exception is size, which has a significantly negative coefficient 
under the main distress definition and a significantly positive coefficient for the overall sample 
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(as well as groups 1 and 2) under the alternative distress definition. An explanation for this can 
be its non-linear effect. Specifically, in page 23, we mention that we find a positive coefficient 
for squared size, indicating that for very large SMEs, distress risk starts to increase, probably 
because these companies are more likely to be pursued by their creditors in liquidation 
procedures. Further supporting this argument, we find that the 12,362 distressed cases under the 
alternative distress definition come from 200% larger companies than the 49,355 distressed cases 
under the main definition. 
Regarding the performance of the models, we report the pseudo R
2
 and AUC. We find them 
to be always higher under the main distress definition than under the alternative definition. 
 
2.5.2 Estimation Technique 
In addition to the multi-period logit model developed by Shumway (2001), we apply the Cox 
proportional hazard model (Cox, 1975) that makes different assumptions about the hazard 
function. A hazard model is a type of survival model, in which the co-variates are related to the 
time that passes before some event occurs (in this case distress). Specifically, we follow 
Laerkholm-Jensen et al. (2013) and estimate a fully parametric model with a constant baseline 
intensity, since the usual Cox semi-parametric model does not allow us to simultaneously 
identify the vector of macroeconomic coefficients as well as the time-varying baseline intensity. 
Table 2.8 reports the estimation results for the overall sample and for the regional sub-
samples under both techniques for comparison purposes. All our results remain robust when we 
instead apply the Cox model. Specifically, all regression coefficients retain their sign and 
significance. The sizes of the coefficients are very similar as well. 
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2.5.3 Time Periods 
We also split our sample into four rolling window periods (each one lasting five years). We find 
that whereas sensitivities to idiosyncratic factors remain relatively stable over time, coefficients 
of systematic variables are more volatile, responding to changes in the prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions. 
In this section, we estimate the generic model for the overall sample over four rolling 
windows, each five years long during the period 2002-2009. We perform this analysis for two 
reasons: first, in order to examine the stability of coefficients through time; and secondly, to 
further test performance. This time, we evaluate predictive power over exactly the next year 
following each model’s estimation period as well as over the last year of our sample (2009). 
Panel A of Table 2.9 presents the estimation results of the four rolling windows over the 
period 2002-2009, as well as of the overall sample (period 2000-2009) for comparison purposes. 
Coefficients of firm-specific variables are always significant and keep the same signs along the 
different windows, but there is relative variation in their magnitudes. The only puzzling result is 
the positive coefficient of size in the 2004-2008 window, but it seems that this result is sample 
specific. Coefficients of systematic variables follow the same patterns but display higher 
volatility, presumably as a result of the changing economic conditions during the period of the 
study. The years to resolve insolvency are negatively related to distress in the 2002-2006 
window but this is probably also sample specific since distress rates are increasing quite strongly 
from 2002 to 2003 (Table 2.2) but insolvency regimes remain stable or improve. 
Panels B and C of Table 2.9 present the out-of-the-sample performance of the estimated 
rolling windows. Specifically, Panel B presents performance over the next year following the 
estimation period and Panel C presents performance over the last sample year (2009). In Panel 
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A, the percentage of distressed SMEs in the last three deciles ranges from 72.93% - 78.15% and 
AUC ranges from 0.7825 – 0.8177. Similarly, in Panel B, the percentage of distressed SMEs in 
the last three deciles ranges from 71.93% - 72.93% and AUC ranges from 0.7795 – 0.7963. 
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
The paper explores the performance of distress prediction hazard models for non-financial SMEs 
using a dataset from eight European countries over the ten-year period 2000-2009. We find that 
(in addition to financial indicators whose importance is noted in past studies) the location and 
number of shareholders are important determinants of SMEs’ distress probabilities. We validate 
the superiority of models that incorporate macroeconomic dependencies, suggested by previous 
research, also in the case of SMEs but do not find strong evidence that industry effects 
significantly improve prediction accuracy. We also examine interaction effects between SMEs’ 
size and systematic variables. We find that as SMEs become larger, they are less vulnerable to 
the macroeconomic situation, contrary to what Basel regulations assume. Interestingly, when we 
split our sample in regional sub-samples, we show that SMEs across Europe are sensitive to the 
same firm-specific factors, but we identify significant regional variations in the selection and 
importance of macro variables. Specifically, macro variables differ among European regions 
based on region-specific conditions and characteristics. Since our regional distress models 
always perform better than a generic model estimated for the regional sub-samples, we conclude 
that their use can lead to performance improvements in the risk management of international 
SME portfolios. Finally, we perform a variety of tests and show that our results remain robust to 
different distress definitions, estimation techniques and time periods. 
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2.7 Tables of Chapter 2 
 
Table 2.1 
Key Indicators  
The economic and social contribution of SMEs varies substantially across the EU. The table 
gives an overview of SMEs in the EU27 and in the countries of our specific interest. The first 
column gives the contribution of SMEs to employment, the second the contribution to the value-
added in the economy and the third the density of SMEs per 1,000 inhabitants. 
 
(%) of 
employment 
(%) of 
value added 
Number per 
1000 inhabitants 
EU27 67.1 57.6 39.9 
Italy 81.3 70.9 65.3 
Portugal 82.0 67.8 80.5 
Spain 78.7 68.5 59.1 
France 61.4 54.2 36.3 
Germany 60.6 53.2 20.0 
United Kingdom 54.0 51.0 25.6 
Czech Republic 68.9 56.7 86.0 
Poland 69.8 48.4 36.8 
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Table 2.2 
Distressed SMEs as Percentage of Total SMEs 
 
The table summarizes the properties of our distress indicator for the overall sample and for the regional sub-samples. It gives the total number 
of SMEs at the beginning of the year, the number of distressed SMEs during the year and the distress rate per year. 
 Overall   Group 1   Group 2   Group 3  
Year Total Distressed (%) Total Distressed (%) Total Distressed (%) Total Distressed (%) 
2000 149,023 0 0.00 82,666 0 0.00 65,576 0 0.00 781 0 0.00 
2001 176,351 192 0.11 92,348 185 0.20 81,782 6 0.01 2,221 1 0.05 
2002 204,531 3,802 1.86 99,815 2,125 2.13 100,466 1,649 1.64 4,250 28 0.66 
2003 194,768 5,961 3.06 91,761 4,003 4.36 94,857 1,935 2.04 8,150 23 0.28 
2004 146,877 1,250 0.85 52,031 865 1.66 81,727 331 0.41 13,119 54 0.41 
2005 167,837 1,403 0.84 53,609 822 1.53 99,053 377 0.38 15,175 204 1.34 
2006 256,732 1,873 0.73 70,242 902 1.28 164,105 734 0.45 22,385 237 1.06 
2007 463,732 8,134 1.75 95,393 1,600 1.68 331,731 5,932 1.79 36,608 602 1.64 
2008 498,358 9,194 1.84 88,606 1,427 1.61 369,487 6,977 1.89 40,265 790 1.96 
2009 463,652 17,546 3.78 75,065 2,248 2.99 352,923 12,959 3.67 35,664 2,339 6.56 
Obser. 2,721,861 49,355 1.81 801,536 14,177 1.77 1,741,707 30,900 1.77 178,618 4,278 2.40 
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Table 2.3 
 Summary Statistics 
The table reports summary statistics for all of the accounting ratios used to forecast distress. Each 
observation represents a particular firm in a particular year. Panel A describes the distributions of 
the ratios in all firm-years, Panel B describes the sample of healthy years, and Panel C describes 
the distressed years. Panels D, E and F describe the distributions for Groups 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. The sample period is from 2000 to 2009. All ratios are winsorized at the ninety-ninth 
and first percentiles. 
 
Earnings before taxes 
to total assets 
EBITDA to 
interest expenses 
Current liabilities 
to total assets 
Cash flow to 
current liabilities 
Turnover to 
total liabilities 
Panel A. Entire data set 
Mean 0.05 687.28 0.61 0.31 3.60 
Median 0.04 7.00 0.59 0.12 2.57 
Std.Dev. 0.17 2,927.14 0.34 0.86 4.13 
Min -0.85 -2,600.00 0.00 -1.17 0.09 
Max 0.63 21,200.00 2.27 7.00 30.59 
N: 2,721,861      
Panel B. Healthy Group 
Mean 0.05 699.87 0.60 0.31 3.63 
Median 0.04 7.29 0.59 0.13 2.59 
Std.Dev. 0.17 2,945.99 0.33 0.86 4.15 
N: 2,672,506      
Panel C. Distressed Group 
Mean -0.13 5.39 1.02 -0.01 2.04 
Median -0.04 0.65 0.92 0.00 1.42 
Std.Dev. 0.29 1,448.37 0.56 0.59 2.50 
N: 49,355      
Panel D. Group 1 
Mean 0.08 1,064.80 0.61 0.32 3.76 
Median 0.06 12.75 0.60 0.16 3.18 
Std.Dev. 0.17 3,682.35 0.29 0.79 2.86 
N: 801,536      
Panel E. Group 2 
Mean 0.03 493.67 0.61 0.28 3.25 
Median 0.03 5.18 0.60 0.10 2.10 
Std.Dev. 0.17 2,426.19 0.35 0.85 4.22 
N: 1,741,707      
Panel F. Group 3 
Mean 0.09 881.04 0.58 0.55 6.32 
Median 0.07 13.00 0.53 0.20 4.31 
Std.Dev. 0.23 3,357.95 0.41 1.19 6.39 
N: 178,618      
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Table 2.4 
SMEs by Size and Industry 
Panel A. Size classification 
The panel shows the classification of SMEs by size. The first column shows the size classes. 
The second column shows the firm data available in each class, the third column shows the 
percentage of firm data available in each class, the fourth column shows the number of firm-
years data available in each class and the fifth column shows the distressed firm-years data 
available in each class. Finally the sixth column shows the distress rate as a percentage of 
total firm-years in each class. 
Size Firms (%) firms Firm-years Distressed (%) distressed 
Cat. Employees Turnover or Assets      
Medium < 250 ≤ € 50 m  ≤ € 43 m 21,408 3.32 123,123 1,815 1.47 
Small < 50 ≤ € 10 m  ≤ € 10 m 167,381 25.98 906,392 13,183 1.45 
Micro < 10 ≤ € 2 m  ≤ € 2 m 455,445 70.70 1,692,346 34,357 2.03 
Total 644,234 100.00 2,721,861 49,355 1.81 
Panel B. Industry classification (wide sectors) 
The panel shows the classification of SMEs by wide industry sectors. The first column 
shows the sectors. The second column shows the firm data available in each sector, the 
third column shows the percentage of firm data available in each sector, the fourth column 
shows the number of firm-years data available in each sector and the fifth column shows 
the distressed firm-years data available in each sector. Finally the sixth column shows the 
distress rate as a percentage of total firm-years in each sector. 
Sector Firms (%) firms Firm-years Distressed (%) distressed 
1. Agriculture, Mining and Manufacturing 133,746 20.76 608,696 9,815 1.61 
2. Transportation, Communication and Utilities 45,413 7.05 182,180 2,827 1.55 
3. Construction 113,147 17.56 482,031 9,170 1.90 
4. Trade 214,061 33.23 946,368 16,291 1.72 
5. Accommodation and Food 36,235 5.62 128,225 3,691 2.88 
6. Other services 101,632 15.78 374,361 7,561 2.02 
Total 644,234 100.00 2,721,861 49,355 1.81 
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Table 2.5 
Generic Models Estimated for the Overall Sample 
Panel A. Estimation results 
The models are estimated for 2000-2009 with lagged yearly observations using the multi-period logit technique. The data-set includes non-financial SMEs from eight European economies. 
Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-square values in parentheses. There are 644,234 firms in the sample (2,721,861 firm-year observations) out of which 49,355 distressed. 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
Earnings before taxes to total assets -0.755*** (-15.65) -0.770*** (-15.89) -0.763*** (-15.53) -0.779*** (-15.99) -0.777*** (-14.92) 
EBITDA to interest expenses -0.0000453*** (-14.98) -0.0000450*** (-14.49) -0.0000451*** (-14.58) -0.0000441*** (-14.38) -0.000045*** (-14.20) 
Current liabilities to total assets 1.381*** (101.27) 1.420*** (103.81) 1.417*** (102.97) 1.409*** (101.04) 1.38*** (95.92) 
Cash flow to current liabilities -0.480*** (-8.99) -0.485*** (-9.14) -0.491*** (-9.16) -0.475*** (-9.00) -0.517*** (-9.22) 
Turnover to total liabilities -0.182*** (-36.96) -0.177*** (-36.08) -0.176*** (-35.56) -0.182*** (-35.56) -0.187*** (-35.64) 
Size (ln(totals assets)) -0.127*** (-30.88) -0.0940*** (-22.95) -0.0913*** (-22.14) -0.109*** (-23.13) -0.097*** (-20.18) 
Dummy equal to 1 if shareholders are more than 2 -0.291*** (-23.53) -0.274*** (-21.99) -0.272*** (-21.76) -0.270*** (-21.50) -0.225*** (-17.54) 
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is located in an urban area 0.132*** (10.24) 0.141*** (10.85) 0.144*** (11.01) 0.153*** (11.54) 0.175*** (13.01) 
FX rate (% change)   -1,686.8*** (-59.04) -1,689.9*** (-59.01) -2,627.20*** (-68.63) -2,695.82*** (-69.51) 
Unemployment   1.883*** (12.39) 1.914*** (12.58) 4.802*** (28.84) 4.345*** (25.82) 
Economic sentiment indicator   -0.0259*** (-35.03) -0.0258*** (-34.90) -0.0388*** (-48.72) -0.0386*** (-46.76) 
Loans granted to non-financial sector (% change)   -4.414*** (-58.29) -4.407*** (-58.07) -5.246*** (-53.94) -5.226*** (-54.84) 
Years to resolve insolvency proceedings   0.0949*** (27.40) 0.0958*** (27.57) 0.1211*** (25.80) 0.1209*** (25.75) 
Industry 1 (Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing)       0.0442*** (3.48) 0.0938*** (7.26) 
Industry 2 (Utilities, Transportation, Communication)     -0.0762*** (-3.56)     
Industry 3 (Construction)     0.0798*** (5.84) 0.1035*** (8.06) 0.0782*** (6.01) 
Industry 4 (Trade)     -0.0295* (-2.50)     
Industry 5 (Accommodation and Food)     0.212*** (10.18) 0.251*** (12.25) 0.3169*** (15.49) 
Small firm* FX rate (% change)       1,796.63*** (35.16) 1,737.00*** (33.17) 
Small firm* unemployment       -10.495*** (-37.76) -10.591*** (-37.41) 
Small firm* economic sentiment indicator       0.0146*** (30.15) 0.0151*** (30.47) 
Small firm* loans to non-financial sector (% ch.)       1.771*** (10.93) 1.639*** (10.24) 
Small firm* years to resolve insolvency proceedings       -0.0493*** (-6.79) -0.0673*** (-8.95) 
Medium firm* FX rate (% change)       1,936.71*** (20.51) 1,975.46*** (19.98) 
Medium firm* unemployment       -11.241*** (-15.40) -12.091*** (-15.97) 
Medium firm* economic sentiment indicator       0.0174*** (16.96) 0.0196*** (18.36) 
Medium firm* loans to non-financial sector (% ch.)       4.084*** (14.02) 3.766*** (12.94) 
Medium firm* years to resolve insolvency proceedings       -0.1392*** (-9.81) -0.1605*** (-10.94) 
Age         -0.0133*** (-17.30) 
Age (3-9)         0.5501*** (43.76) 
Constant Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Duration Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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 Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  
Firm-year observations 2,721,861  2,721,861  2,721,861  2,721,861  2,652,157 
Firms 644,234  644,234  644,234  644,234  620,872  
Distressed firms 49,355  49,355  49,355  49,355  47,841  
Pseudo R-squared 0.147  0.171  0.171  0.178  0.187  
Log likelihood -210,601.30  -204,638.50  -204,538.30  202,880.11  194,837.44  
Wald test 78,110.8***  84,259.5***  84,526.8***  85,305.9  81,789.3***  
Likelihood ratio test   11,925.57***  200.45***  3,316.36  16,085.34***  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
Panel B. In-sample prediction tests 
Hosmer-Lemeshow decile 
1 to 5 11.38%  11.09%  10.96%  10.67%  10.24%  
8 11.20%  11.16%  11.25%  10.91%  10.33%  
9 17.46%  17.86%  17.84%  17.83%  17.34%  
10 47.17%  47.58%  47.57%  48.32%  49.49%  
8 to 10 75.83%  76.59%  76.66%  77.06%  77.16%  
Area under the ROC curve 0.824  0.838  0.839  0.843  0.857  
Panel C. Out-of-sample prediction tests 
 A hold-out sample of 71,823 European SMEs (304,037 firm-year observations) is used. 
Hosmer-Lemeshow decile 
1 to 5 11.46%  11.35%  11.26%  10.30%  10.15%  
8 11.24%  10.53%  10.66%  11.45%  10.71%  
9 17.51%  18.70%  18.53%  18.15%  17.16%  
10 46.78%  47.04%  47.04%  47.95%  48.95%  
8 to 10 75.54%  76.27%  76.23%  77.55%  76.82%  
Area under the ROC curve 0.823  0.837  0.837  0.844  0.847  
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Table 2.6 
Generic and Regional Models Estimated for the Regional Subsamples  
Panel A. Estimation results 
The models are estimated for 2000-2009 data with lagged yearly observations using the multi-period logit technique. The data-set is limited to non-financial SMEs. Parameter estimates are given first followed 
by chi-square values in parentheses. Group 1 has 165,786 French, German and British SMEs (801,536 firm-year observations) out of which 14,177 distressed. Group 2 has 429,978 Italian, Portuguese and 
Spanish SMEs (1,741,707 firm-year observations) out of which 30,900 distressed. Group 3 has 48,470 Czech and Polish SMEs (178,618 firm-year observations) out of which 4,278 distressed. 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
  Generic Model Regional Model Generic Model Regional Model Generic Model Regional Model 
Earnings before taxes to total 
assets 
-1.0667*** (-15.97) -1.077*** (-15.54) -0.681*** (-10.67) -0.677*** (-10.61) -0.534*** (-4.50) -0.547*** (-4.68) 
EBITDA to interest expenses -0.0000470*** (-11.10) -0.0000483*** (-11.31) -0.0000472*** (-9.80) -0.0000468*** (-9.82) -0.0000507*** (-4.62) -0.0000509*** (-4.55) 
Current liabilities to total 
assets 
1.908*** (71.61) 1.916*** (72.99) 1.216*** (69.49) 1.217*** (69.66) 1.415*** (33.07) 1.397*** (32.84) 
Cash flow to current 
liabilities 
-0.236*** (-4.15) -0.196** (-3.16) -0.654*** (-9.51) -0.650*** (-9.43) -0.336*** (-2.75) -0.314** (-2.64) 
Turnover to total liabilities -0.106*** (-14.72) -0.101*** (-14.07) -0.245*** (-30.10) -0.249*** (-30.41) -0.171*** (-13.05) -0.175*** (-13.28) 
Size (ln(totals assets)) -0.0226*** (-3.05) -0.00559 (-0.75) -0.101*** (-16.95) -0.107*** (-17.72) -0.0587*** (-4.60) -0.0754*** (-6.04) 
Dummy equal to 1 if 
shareholders are more than 2 
-0.0781*** (-3.44) -0.0812*** (-3.62) -0.334*** (-20.51) -0.324*** (-19.96) -0.344*** (-7.49) -0.347*** (-7.53) 
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is 
located in urban area 
0.151*** (4.82) 0.174*** (5.68) 0.103*** (6.50) 0.101*** (6.43) 0.351*** (9.75) 0.358*** (9.92) 
Loans granted to non-
financial sector (% change) 
-2.388*** (-14.95) -4.611*** (-25.53) -0.268 (-1.29) -3.378*** (-30.14) -6.203*** (-21.64) 
  
Years to resolve insolvency 
proceedings 
-1.206*** (-21.27) 
  
1.171*** (18.92) 
  
-0.237*** (-20.25) 
  
GDP growth (% change) 
  
-5.595*** (-9.44) 
      
-11.62*** (-22.52) 
FX rate (% change) -2,052.2*** (-49.78) 
  
-2,403.5*** (-46.89) -2276.6*** (-44.99) 340.15*** (3.06) 
  
Unemployment 19.425*** (13.59) 
  
13.441*** (27.02) 6.176*** (24.91) -22.213*** (-15.94) 
  
Economic sentiment -0.0206*** (-15.16) 
  
-0.0279*** (-23.62) -0.0256*** (-21.08) -0.0031 (-0.93) 
  
Balance of Payments (% 
GDP)       
-42.082*** (-16.28) 
    
FX rate volatility 
          
122.6*** (12.11) 
10-year government bond 
yield           
25.43*** (14.63) 
Constant Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Duration Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
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 Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
 Generic Model  Regional Model Generic Model  Regional Model Generic Model  Regional Model 
Firm-year observations 801,536 
 
801,536 
 
1,741,707 
 
1,741,707 
 
178,618 
 
178,618 
 
Firms 165,786 
 
165,786 
 
429,978 
 
429,978 
 
48,470 
 
48,470 
 
Distressed firms 14,177 
 
14,177 
 
30,900 
 
30,900 
 
4,278 
 
4,278 
 
Pseudo R-squared 0.150 
 
0.150 
 
0.170 
 
0.177 
 
0.214 
 
0.250 
 
Log likelihood -61,573.50 
 
-60,538.70 
 
-131,451.70 
 
-127,673.50 
 
-15,878.40 
 
-15,147.90 
 
Wald test 19,302.49*** 
 
20,225.9*** 
 
55,513.51*** 
 
55,783.8*** 
 
8,099.98*** 
 
8,083.9*** 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Panel B. In-sample prediction tests 
Hosmer-Lemeshow decile 
1 to 5 14.16% 
 
13.85% 
 
9.50% 
 
9.17% 
 
7.25% 
 
7.22% 
 
8 9.85% 
 
9.47% 
 
11.42% 
 
11.86% 
 
8.86% 
 
9.70% 
 
9 14.14% 
 
14.02% 
 
18.90% 
 
18.67% 
 
17.58% 
 
17.16% 
 
10 48.95% 
 
50.67% 
 
47.17% 
 
47.01% 
 
55.35% 
 
55.68% 
 
8 to 10 72.94% 
 
74.16% 
 
77.49% 
 
77.54% 
 
81.79% 
 
82.54% 
 
Area under the ROC curve 0.806   0.825   0.841   0.848   0.853   0.875   
Panel C. Out-of-sample prediction tests 
For Group 1, a hold-out sample of 18,449 French, German and British SMEs (88,957 firm-year observations) is used. For Group 2, a hold-out sample of 48,034 Italian, Portuguese and Spanish SMEs (195,236 
firm-year observations) is used. For Group 3, a hold-out sample of 5,340 Czech and Polish SMEs (19,844 firm-year observations) is used. 
Hosmer-Lemeshow decile 
1 to 5 13.84% 
 
13.47% 
 
9.23% 
 
9.11% 
 
7.49% 
 
7.73% 
 
8 9.47% 
 
8.79% 
 
11.06% 
 
10.80% 
 
9.37% 
 
8.90% 
 
9 13.22% 
 
15.01% 
 
19.02% 
 
19.57% 
 
16.86% 
 
16.63% 
 
10 47.79% 
 
48.95% 
 
47.66% 
 
47.38% 
 
57.61% 
 
58.08% 
 
8 to 10 70.48% 
 
72.76% 
 
77.73% 
 
77.75% 
 
81.26% 
 
83.61% 
 
Area under the ROC curve 0.805   0.824   0.843   0.850   0.841   0.868   
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Table 2.7 
Robustness Test with Different Distress Definitions 
The models are estimated for 2000-2009 data with lagged yearly observations using the multi-period logit technique. The data-set is limited to non-financial 
SMEs. Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-square values in parentheses. According to the main distress definition, a firm-year is distressed if 
the following two conditions are both met: (i) it is the last firm-year for which we have available financial statements before the firm leaves the sample; (ii) 
the firm (a) either appears with one of the statuses defaulted, in receivership, bankrupt, in liquidation or (b) it has no updated status information and 
disappears from the sample before 2010 with negative equity in the last year. In the alternative distress definition, we exclude all firms that disappear from 
the sample before 2010 without updated status situation. These include firms that, under the main distress definition are classified as distressed if their 
equity is negative in the last year. Thus, the alternative distress definition is strictly linked to a legal insolvency procedure.  
 
Overall Sample - Generic Model Group 1 - Regional Model 
  Main definition Alternative definition Main definition Alternative definition 
Earnings before taxes to total 
assets 
-0.770*** (-15.89) -0.699*** (-5.43) -1.077*** (-15.54) -0.525*** (-3.36) 
EBITDA to interest expenses -0.0000450*** (-14.49) -0.0000289*** (-6.33) -0.0000483*** (-11.31) -0.0000333*** (-6.15) 
Current liabilities to total assets 1.420*** (103.81) 1.536*** (49.76) 1.916*** (72.99) 2.007*** (44.26) 
Cash flow to current liabilities -0.485*** (-9.14) -1.277*** (-11.35) -0.196** (-3.16) -1.149*** (-8.13) 
Turnover to total liabilities -0.177*** (-36.08) -0.035*** (-5.67) -0.101*** (-14.07) -0.017* (-2.17) 
Size (ln(totals assets)) -0.0940*** (-22.95) 0.376*** (45.80) -0.00559 (-0.75) 0.308*** (27.33) 
Dummy equal to 1 if shareholders 
are more than 2 
-0.274*** (-21.99) -0.214*** (-9.48) -0.0812*** (-3.62) -0.0585 (-1.79) 
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is 
located in an urban area 
0.141*** (10.85) 0.0341 (1.15) 0.174*** (5.68) 0.239*** (5.05) 
FX rate (% change) -1,686.8*** (-59.04) -1,357.1*** (-27.83) 
    
Unemployment 1.883*** (12.39) 1.502*** (28.97) 
    
Economic sentiment indicator -0.0259*** (-35.03) -0.0047*** (-3.22) 
    
Loans granted to non-financial 
sector (% change) 
-4.414*** (-58.29) -5.194*** (-34.27) -4.611*** (-25.53) -6.404*** (-20.77) 
Years to resolve insolvency 
proceedings 
0.0949*** (27.40) 0.732*** (21.49) 
    
GDP growth (% change) 
    
-5.595*** (-9.44) 0.963 (0.00) 
Constant Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Duration Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm-year observations 2,721,861 
 
1,594,433 
 
801,536 
 
332,547 
 
Firms 644,234 
 
389,347 
 
165,786 
 
66,306 
 
Distressed firms 49,355 
 
12,362 
 
14,177 
 
5,646 
 
Pseudo R-squared 0.171 
 
0.115 
 
0.150 
 
0.098 
 
Log likelihood -204,638.50 
 
-60,050.11 
 
-60,538.70 
 
-25,683.62 
 
Wald test 84,259.5*** 
 
16,563.99*** 
 
20,225.9*** 
 
5,359.19*** 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Area under the ROC curve 0.838   0.794   0.825   0.776   
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Group 2 - Regional Model Group 3 - Regional Model   
  Main definition Alternative definition Main definition Alternative definition 
Earnings before taxes to total 
assets 
-0.677*** (-10.61) -1.248*** (-6.63) -0.547*** (-4.68) -3.092*** (-4.45) 
EBITDA to interest expenses -0.0000468*** (-9.82) -0.0000507*** (-5.21) -0.0000509*** (-4.55) 0.0000009 (0.03) 
Current liabilities to total assets 1.217*** (69.66) 1.126*** (26.39) 1.397*** (32.84) 1.204*** (3.21) 
Cash flow to current liabilities -0.650*** (-9.43) -1.111*** (-7.27) -0.314** (-2.64) -0.149*** (-0.68) 
Turnover to total liabilities -0.249*** (-30.41) -0.0925*** (-7.25) -0.175*** (-13.28) -0.0195 (-0.86) 
Size (ln(totals assets)) -0.107*** (-17.72) 0.462*** (35.44) -0.0754*** (-6.04) -0.1228 (-1.16) 
Dummy equal to 1 if shareholders 
are more than 2 
-0.324*** (-19.96) -0.368*** (-11.36) -0.347*** (-7.53) -0.229 (-1.15) 
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is 
located in urban area 
0.101*** (6.43) 0.0037 (0.10) 0.358*** (9.92) 0.354 (1.20) 
Loans granted to non-financial 
sector (% change) 
-3.378*** (-30.14) -4.482*** (-20.47) 
    
GDP growth (% change) 
    
-11.62*** (-22.52) 0.700 (0.11) 
FX rate (% change) -2276.6*** (-44.99) -808.86*** (-11.98) 
    
Unemployment 6.176*** (24.91) 6.709*** (9.16) 
    
Economic sentiment -0.0256*** (-21.08) -0.01888*** (-6.56) 
    
Balance of Payments (% GDP) -42.082*** (-16.28) -30.575*** (-35.61) 
    
FX rate volatility 
    
122.6*** (12.11) 308.32*** (4.85) 
10-year government bond yield 
    
25.43*** (14.63) 57.14* (2.85) 
Constant Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Duration Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm-year observations 1,741,707 
 
1,185,258 
 
178,618 
 
76,628 
 
Firms 429,978 
 
302,959 
 
48,470 
 
20,082 
 
Distressed firms 30,900 
 
6,338 
 
4,278 
 
378 
 
Pseudo R-squared 0.177 
 
0.127 
 
0.250 
 
0.214 
 
Log likelihood -127,673.50 
 
-32,418.66 
 
-15,147.90 
 
-1,247.08 
 
Wald test 55,783.8*** 
 
9,052.84*** 
 
8,083.9*** 
 
611.51 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Area under the ROC curve 0.848   0.847   0.879   0.816   
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Table 2.8 
Robustness Test with Different Estimation Techniques 
The models are estimated for 2000-2009 data with lagged yearly observations using the multi-period logit and Cox proportional hazard techniques. The 
data-set is limited to non-financial SMEs. Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-square values in parentheses. The Cox proportional hazard 
model makes different assumptions about the hazard function. We follow Laerkholm-Jensen et al. (2013) and estimate a fully parametric model with a 
constant baseline intensity, since the usual Cox semi-parametric model does not allow us to simultaneously identify the vector of macroeconomic 
coefficients as well as the time-varying baseline intensity. 
 
Overall Sample - Generic Model Group 1 - Regional Model 
  Logit Cox Logit Cox 
Earnings before taxes to total 
assets 
-0.770*** (-15.89) -0.496*** (-11.30) -1.077*** (-15.54) -0.719*** (-10.21) 
EBITDA to interest expenses -0.0000450*** (-14.49) -0.0000413*** (-13.79) -0.0000483*** (-11.31) -0.0000463*** (-11.11) 
Current liabilities to total assets 1.420*** (103.81) 1.197*** (94.38) 1.916*** (72.99) 1.653*** (69.97) 
Cash flow to current liabilities -0.485*** (-9.14) -0.667*** (-13.15) -0.196** (-3.16) -0.367*** (-4.69) 
Turnover to total liabilities -0.177*** (-36.08) -0.183*** (-37.28) -0.101*** (-14.07) -0.088*** (-12.91) 
Size (ln(totals assets)) -0.0940*** (-22.95) -0.084*** (-21.64) -0.00559 (-0.75) 0.01882** (2.95) 
Dummy equal to 1 if shareholders 
are more than 2 
-0.274*** (-21.99) -0.239*** (-20.17) -0.0812*** (-3.62) -0.0635** (-2.98) 
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is 
located in an urban area 
0.141*** (10.85) 0.096*** (7.95) 0.174*** (5.68) 0.122*** (4.24) 
FX rate (% change) -1,686.8 (-59.04) -1,445.2*** (-52.53) 
    
Unemployment 1.883*** (12.39) 3.084*** (21.66) 
    
Economic sentiment indicator -0.0259*** (-35.03) -0.0066*** (-8.46) 
    
Loans granted to non-financial 
sector (% change) 
-4.414*** (-58.29) -3.624*** (-53.55) -4.611*** (-25.53) -2.713*** (-19.34) 
Years to resolve insolvency 
proceedings 
0.0949*** (27.40) 0.0993*** (30.72) 
    
GDP growth (% change) 
    
-5.595*** (-9.44) -3.844*** (-7.45) 
Constant Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Duration Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm-year observations 2,721,861 
 
2,721,861 
 
801,536 
 
801,536 
 
Firms 644,234 
 
644,234 
 
165,786 
 
165,786 
 
Distressed firms 49,355 
 
49,355 
 
14,177 
 
14,177 
 
Log likelihood -204,638.50 
 
-91,145.41 
 
-60,538.70 
 
-25,643.69 
 
Wald test 84,259.5*** 
 97,333.98***  
20,225.9*** 
 
26,984.78***   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
52 
Table 2.8. Cont. 
 
Group 2 - Regional Model Group 3 - Regional Model   
  Logit Cox Logit Cox 
Earnings before taxes to total 
assets 
-0.677*** (-10.61) -0.421*** (-7.54) -0.547*** (-4.68) -0.304** (-2.86) 
EBITDA to interest expenses -0.0000468*** (-9.82) -0.0000413*** (-9.20) -0.0000509*** (-4.55) -0.0000451*** (-3.74) 
Current liabilities to total assets 1.217*** (69.66) 1.026*** (63.38) 1.397*** (32.84) 1.135*** (27.85) 
Cash flow to current liabilities -0.650*** (-9.43) -0.803*** (-13.08) -0.314** (-2.64) -0.416** (-3.26) 
Turnover to total liabilities -0.249*** (-30.41) -0.239*** (-30.81) -0.175*** (-13.28) -0.171*** (-12.25) 
Size (ln(totals assets)) -0.107*** (-17.72) -0.097*** (-17.41) -0.0754*** (-6.04) -0.0355** (-3.17) 
Dummy equal to 1 if shareholders 
are more than 2 
-0.324*** (-19.96) -0.302*** (-19.71) -0.347*** (-7.53) -0.283*** (-6.28) 
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is 
located in urban area 
0.101*** (6.43) 0.079*** (5.47) 0.358*** (9.92) 0.276*** (8.10) 
Loans granted to non-financial 
sector (% change) 
-3.378*** (-30.14) -4.178*** (-40.2) 
  
-10.25*** (-17.42) 
GDP growth (% change) 
    
-11.62*** (-22.52) -10.25*** (-17.42) 
FX rate (% change) -2276.6*** (-44.99) -2083.1*** (-42.22) 
    
Unemployment 6.176*** (24.91) 5.488*** (24.11) 
    
Economic sentiment -0.0256*** (-21.08) -0.0056*** (-4.15) 
    
Balance of Payments (% GDP) -42.082*** (-16.28) -7.644*** (-28.39) 
    
FX rate volatility 
    
122.6*** (12.11) 36.8** (2.97) 
10-year government bond yield 
    
25.43*** (14.63) 2.31 (0.92) 
Constant Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Duration Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm-year observations 1,741,707 
 
1,741,707 
 
178,618 
 
178,618 
 
Firms 429,978 
 
429,978 
 
48,470 
 
48,470 
 
Distressed firms 30,900 
 
30,900 
 
4,278 
 
4,278 
 
Log likelihood -127,673.50 
 
-59,226.49 
 
-15,147.90 
 
-5,004.10 
 
Wald test 55,783.8*** 
 
57,385.55*** 
 
8,083.9*** 
 
9,835.47*** 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                 
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Table 2.9 
Sub-periods’ Analysis (8 countries) 
Panel A. Estimation results 
The models are estimated over different sub-periods (five-year rolling windows for 2002-2009 data) with lagged yearly observations using the multi-period logit technique. Estimation results for the overall 
sample are also provided in the last two columns for comparison purposes (2000-2009 data). The data set includes non-financial SMEs from eight European economies. Parameter estimates are given first 
followed by chi-square values in parentheses. 
 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 2005-2009 2000-2009 
Earnings before taxes to total assets -0.819*** (-9.21) -0.764*** (-9.02) -0.824*** (-11.07) -0.757*** (-14.16) -0.763*** (-15.53) 
EBITDA to interest expenses -0.0000248*** (-5.91) -0.0000390*** (-9.78) -0.0000477*** (-12.25) -0.0000544*** (-15.24) -0.0000451*** (-14.58) 
Current liabilities to total assets 1.789*** (68.72) 1.684*** (74.63) 1.530*** (75.25) 1.379*** (92.63) 1.417*** (102.97) 
Cash flow to current liabilities -0.557*** (-5.66) -0.635*** (-6.49) -0.493*** (-5.87) -0.523*** (-9.10) -0.491*** (-9.16) 
Turnover to total liabilities -0.0900*** (-13.08) -0.0983*** (-14.83) -0.118*** (-18.17) -0.169*** (-31.22) -0.176*** (-35.56) 
Size (ln(totals assets)) -0.0980*** (-13.25) -0.0316*** (-4.85) 0.0446*** (7.34) -0.0188*** (-4.01) -0.0913*** (-22.14) 
Dummy equal to 1 if shareholders are more than 2 -0.245*** (-11.31) -0.279*** (-15.03) -0.246*** (-14.68) -0.277*** (-20.73) -0.272*** (-21.76) 
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is located in an urban area 0.125*** (4.93) 0.0757*** (3.53) 0.0959*** (5.24) 0.141*** (10.26) 0.144*** (11.01) 
FX rate (% change) -1,421.8*** (-29.32) -1,452.5*** (-33.02) -478.9*** (-13.02) -541.8*** (-14.16) -1,689.9*** (-59.01) 
Unemployment 2.117*** (4.38) -0.462 (-0.97) 2.082*** (6.89) 4.423*** (28.04) 1.914*** (12.58) 
Economic sentiment indicator -0.0169*** (-7.70) -0.0368*** (-20.08) -0.0106*** (-10.39) -0.00570*** (-6.75) -0.0258*** (-34.90) 
Loans granted to non-financial sector (% change) -6.238*** (-50.60) -5.288*** (-48.89) -2.347*** (-20.75) -4.202*** (-49.85) -4.407*** (-58.07) 
Years to resolve insolvency proceedings -0.0497*** (-5.03) 0.0520*** (8.94) 0.0981*** (23.87) 0.157*** (46.05) 0.0958*** (27.57) 
Industry 1 (Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing) 0.0628* (2.06) 0.0211 (0.80) 0.0915*** (3.75) 0.0712*** (3.82)   
Industry 2 (Utilities, Transportation, Communication) -0.186*** (-4.13) -0.0976** (-2.65) 0.0245 (0.75) 0.0112 (0.46) -0.0762*** (-3.56) 
Industry 3 (Construction) -0.193*** (-6.07) -0.0267 (-0.99) 0.179*** (7.32) 0.218*** (11.78) 0.0798*** (5.84) 
Industry 4 (Trade) -0.0571* (-1.99) -0.113*** (-4.56) -0.0202 (-0.88) 0.0265 (1.56) -0.0295* (-2.50) 
Industry 5 (Accommodation and Food) 0.264*** (5.57) 0.156*** (4.06) 0.190*** (5.82) 0.226*** (9.57) 0.212*** (10.18) 
Constant Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Duration Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm-year observations 1,079,429  1,367,406  1,704,810  2,056,890  2,721,861  
Firms 385,546  637,299  646,812  636,008  644,234  
Distressed firms 15,914  20,665  24,276  42,351  49,355  
Pseudo R-squared 0.200  0.158  0.150  0.125  0.171  
Log likelihood -58,989.5  -69,826.7  -91,025.0  -111,420.9  -204,538.30  
Wald test 23,784.5***  31,818.7***  39,646.7***  68,451.6***  84,526.8***  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
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Table 2.9. Cont.           
 2002-2006  2003-2007  2004-2008  2005-2009  2000-2009  
Panel B. Performance over next year 
Hosmer-Lemeshow decile 
1 to 5 8.05%  11.84%  11.94%  -  -  
8 14.43%  17.56%  13.18%  -  -  
9 19.67%  20.34%  18.99%  -  -  
10 44.06%  36.30%  40.75%  -  -  
8 to 10 78.15%  74.20%  72.93%  -  -  
Area under the ROC curve 0.818  0.783  0.796  -  -  
Panel C. Performance over last year (2009) 
Hosmer-Lemeshow decile 
1 to 5 12.80%  12.25%  11.94%  -  -  
8 16.34%  16.19%  13.18%  -  -  
9 18.45%  18.91%  18.99%  -  -  
10 35.86%  36.82%  40.75%  -  -  
8 to 10 70.65%  71.93%  72.93%  -  -  
Area under the ROC curve 0.780  0.783  0.796  -  -  
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2.8 Figures of Chapter 2 
 
Figure 2.1. Predicted and Observed Distress Rate. The figure plots the predicted distress rate 
based on models I to IV of Table 2.5, along with the observed distress rate, for the period 2000 to 
2011. Since we have financial but not distress information for year 2010 and for only a few firms 
for 2011, we do the following: (i) we use the estimated coefficients from 2000-2009 to predict 
the distress rate for 2000-2011; (ii) we use the in-sample observed distress rate for 2000-2009 
and we obtain the observed distress rate for 2010-2011 from Creditreform. The columns denote 
recession periods in the euro area, as indicated by OECD. The vertical dashed line separates in-
sample (2000-2009) and out-of-sample (2010-2011) periods. 
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Figure 2.2. Predicted and Observed Distress Rates for the 3 groups. The figure plots the 
predicted distress rates based on the regional and generic models of Table 2.6, along with the 
observed distress rate for each group. The predicted distress rate is the simple average of the 
probabilities of distress of all firms in each group and period. Since we have financial but not 
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distress information for 2010 and for only a few firms for 2011, we do the following: (i) use the 
estimated coefficients from 2000-2009 to predict the distress rate for 2000-2011; (ii)  use the in-
sample observed distress rate for 2000-2009 and obtain the observed distress rate for 2010-2011 
from Creditreform. Creditreform does not provide distress information for group 3. For groups 1 
and 2, the columns denote recession periods in the euro area, and for group 3, recession periods 
in the Czech Republic and Poland, as indicated by OECD. When present, the vertical dashed line 
separates in-sample (2000-2009) and out-of-sample (2010-2011) periods. 
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Figure 2.3. Macroeconomic variables 2000-2011. The figure plots the aggregate time series for 
four macroeconomic variables. The economic sentiment indicator and unemployment values are 
rolling annual averages at monthly frequency. Balance of payments values are rolling annual 
averages at quarterly frequency. Foreign exchange rate volatility values are rolling annual 
averages at daily frequency. 
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2.9 Appendices of Chapter 2 
 
Appendix 2.1. List of Systematic Variables 
The appendix provides a list of the systematic variables that we examine, and their expected 
signs, calculation methods, lags and data sources. 
Business cycle  
Change of the exchange rate (-) Raw data are daily. We calculate the average daily change of the USD/EURO (for 
Eurozone members) and of USD/national currency (for non-Eurozone members) for the year 
before the closing. We do not lag this variable as data are accessible on real time. Source: 
European Central Bank. 
Debt as a percentage of the 
GDP 
(+) Raw data are quarterly. We take the average percentage over a four quarter period before 
the closing. We lag this variable by two quarters. Source: Eurostat. 
Disposable income growth (-) Raw data are quarterly. We take the disposable income change between the four quarters 
before the closing and the corresponding four quarters of the previous year. We lag this 
variable by one quarter. In the Eurostat data, 2005 is used as the reference to measure 
disposable income at constant prices. Figures are also seasonally adjusted and adjusted by 
working days. Source: Eurostat. 
Economic sentiment (-) Raw data are monthly. This indicator is calculated by the Directorate General of 
Financial Affairs of the European Commission. It is calculated as an index with a mean 
value of 100, from answers to surveys conducted under the Joint Harmonized EU Program. 
We take the average of the twelve months before the closing. We lag this variable by one 
month. Source: Eurostat. 
GDP growth (-) Raw data are quarterly. We take the GDP percentage change between the four quarters 
before the closing and the corresponding four quarters of the previous year. We lag this 
variable by one quarter. In the Eurostat data, year 2005 is used as the reference to measure 
GDP at constant prices. Figures are also seasonally adjusted and adjusted by working days. 
Source: Eurostat. 
Inflation (+) Raw data are monthly. We take the annual rate of change of the Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP). Specifically, we calculate the change of the index between the 
closing month and the corresponding month of the previous year. We lag this variable by 
one month. Source: Eurostat 
Oil price (+) Raw data are monthly (historical close). We take the average of the one month forward 
prices of Brent crude oil for the twelve months before the closing. We do not lag this 
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variable as data are accessible on real time. Source: European Central Bank. 
Surplus/deficit as a 
percentage of the GDP 
(-) Raw data are quarterly. We take the average percentage over a four quarter period before 
the closing. We lag this variable by two quarters. Source: Eurostat. 
Unemployment (+) Raw data are monthly. We take the average harmonized unemployment rate 
(International Labor Organization definition) over a twelve month period before the closing. 
We lag this variable by one month. Source: Eurostat. 
Volatility of the exchange 
rate 
(+) Raw data are daily. We calculate the volatility of the daily change of the USD/EUR (for 
Eurozone members) and of USD/national currency (for non-Eurozone members) for the year 
before the closing. We do not lag this variable as data are accessible on real time. Source: 
European Central Bank. 
Credit conditions  
10-year government bond 
yield change 
(+) Raw data are monthly. We take the annualized 10-year government bond yield 
(Maastricht definition) of the closing month. We do not lag this variable as data are 
accessible on real time. Source: Eurostat. 
Bank lending to the non-
financial sector 
(-) Raw data are monthly. We take the percentage change between the closing month and the 
corresponding month of the previous year. We lag this variable by one month. Source: 
Datastream. 
Financial market  
Stock index return (-) Raw data are monthly. We take the one year return of the national stock market index 
(change between the closing month and the corresponding month of the previous year). We 
do not lag this variable as data are accessible in real time. Source: Eurostat. 
Insolvency codes  
Recovery rate (-) Raw data are annual. This indicator is calculated by the World Bank under the “Doing 
Business” project and measures the percentage that claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and 
employees) recover from an insolvent firm for each country. We lag this variable by one 
year. Source: World Bank. 
Time to resolve insolvency 
proceedings 
(+) Raw data are annual. This indicator is calculated by the World Bank under the “Doing 
Business” project and measures the number of years from the filing for insolvency in court 
until the resolution of distressed assets for each country. We lag this variable by one year. 
Source: World Bank. 
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Appendix 2.2. Insolvency Regimes 
The appendix provides an overview of the insolvency regimes in the countries of our study. 
The first column gives the average percentage that claimants recover form an insolvent firm 
in the 2000-2009 period, the second column measures the average years from the insolvency 
filing until the resolution of assets and the third column is the ratio of the two previous 
columns. Data are from the World Bank and the authors’ calculations. 
 Recovery rate 
(%) 
Years to resolve insolvency Recovery rate per year 
(%) 
Italy 48.22 1.80 26.79 
Portugal 73.23 2.00 36.62 
Spain 72.90 1.50 48.60 
France 46.19 1.90 24.31 
Germany 82.32 1.20 68.60 
United Kingdom 85.31 1.00 85.31 
Czech Republic 17.23 8.39 2.05 
Poland 32.31 3.00 10.77 
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Appendix 2.3 
Distress Statistics using Main and Alternative Distress Definitions 
The appendix summarizes the properties of our main and alternative distress indicators for the overall sample, the three regional sub-samples and the 
eight countries. It gives the number of total SMEs and distressed SMEs and the distress rate. According to our main distress definition, a firm-year is 
distressed if the following two conditions are both met: (i) it is the last firm-year for which we have available financial statements before the firm 
leaves the sample; (ii) the firm (a) is either in default, in receivership, bankrupt, or in liquidation or (b) it has no updated status information and 
disappears from the sample before 2010 with negative equity in the last year. In our alternative distress definition, we exclude all firms that 
disappear from the sample before 2010 without updated status situation. Under our alternative distress definition, the sample decreases by 41% and 
includes only distress incidents that are strictly linked with a legal insolvency procedure. 
 
Firm-years Firms Distressed (%) firm-years (%) firms 
  Main Alternative Main Alternative Main Alternative Main Alternative Main Alternative 
Panel A. Overall sample and regional subsamples                
Overall sample 2,721,861 1,594,433 644,234 389,347 49,355 12,362 1.81 0.78 7.66 3.18 
Group 1 801,536 332,547 165,786 66,306 14,177 5,646 1.77 1.70 8.55 8.52 
Group 2 1,741,707 1,185,258 429,978 302,959 30,900 6,338 1.77 0.53 7.19 2.09 
Group 3 178,618 76,628 48,470 20,082 4,278 378 2.40 0.49 8.83 1.88 
Panel B. Countries                     
Germany 21,681 5,322 5,954 1,326 319 8 1.47 0.15 5.36 0.60 
France 724,060 309,230 145,918 61,030 12,222 5,353 1.69 1.73 8.38 8.77 
United Kingdom 55,795 17,995 13,914 3,950 1,636 285 2.93 1.58 11.76 7.22 
Italy 278,630 209,924 89,666 71,348 2,257 219 0.81 0.10 2.52 0.31 
Portugal 487,664 402,898 148,645 123,193 10,396 3,702 2.13 0.92 6.99 3.01 
Spain 975,413 572,436 191,667 108,418 18,247 2,417 1.87 0.42 9.52 2.23 
Czech Republic 119,677 59,856 33,305 16,804 3,014 244 2.52 0.41 9.05 1.45 
Poland 58,941 16,772 15,165 3,278 1,264 134 2.14 0.80 8.33 4.09 
63 
Chapter 3 Pricing Default Risk: The Good, The Bad, and The Anomaly 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Finance theory suggests that if default risk is systematic (and thus non-diversifiable) it should be 
positively correlated with stock returns in the cross-section of firms. However, in the empirical 
literature there are two main strands that deliver contradictory findings regarding the sign and 
significance of this relationship. On the one hand, Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Chava and 
Purnanandam (2010) document a positive relationship between default risk and stock returns in 
the US and Aretz, Florackis and Kostakis (2014), in a recent working paper, report similar 
findings using an international sample. On the other hand, several studies find a negative 
relationship between default risk and returns, the so-called “default anomaly”. Examples are 
Dichev (1998), Griffin and Lemmon (2002), Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008), Garlappi, 
Shu and Yan (2008), Avramov et al. (2009), Da and Gao (2010), Garlappi and Yan (2011), and 
Conrad, Kapadia, and Xing (2012) in the US, Bauer and Agarwal (2014) in the UK and Gao, 
Parsons and Shen (2013) internationally.
8
 
                                                          
8
 Some of the explanations offered for this puzzling evidence are: (i) violations of the absolute priority rule 
(Garlappi, Shu and Yan, 2008; Garlappi and Yan, 2011): higher shareholder bargaining power reduces the risk of 
the shareholders’ residual claim, thus returns close to default; (ii) long-run risk (Avramov, Cederburg, and Hore, 
2011): firms close to default are less exposed to long-run risk because they are not expected to survive for  long, and 
hence have lower returns; (iii) glory (Conrad, Kapadia, and Xing, 2012): firms with high default risk are glory 
stocks that realize high returns in the future, so their current low returns are not a good estimate of their future 
returns. (iv) psychological reasons (Gao, Parsons and Shen, 2013): investors are overconfident about high default 
risk stocks, keeping their prices high and subsequently leading to sudden corrections and low returns; (v) neglected 
64 
These literature strands focus on the firm’s physical probability of default (PD) as a measure 
of default risk. In most cases, they use either market-based PDs (calculated under Merton’s 
(1974) framework) or accounting-based PDs (such as Altman’s Z-score, Ohlson’s O-score, and 
the popular measure used by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008)). Hence, these studies 
implicitly assume that physical PDs are monotonically related to risk-neutral PDs and that, as 
physical PDs increase, so does the exposure to aggregate default risk. However, George and 
Hwang (2010) argue that a firm’s physical PD does not necessarily reflect its systematic risk. In 
a theoretical model, they show that firms with high SDR exposure choose low leverage levels, 
which in turn lowers their physical PDs, therefore creating a negative relationship between PDs 
and returns. In the same spirit, Kapadia (2011) finds that firms with high physical PDs do not co-
vary with aggregate distress, suggesting that the low returns of high PD stocks are not due to 
exposure to aggregate distress. Similarly, Avramov, Cederburg and Hore (2011) show that firms 
with high idiosyncratic volatility (often identified as firms with high PDs) have low SDR 
exposure and low returns, thus suggesting a link between idiosyncratic volatility and default 
anomalies.
9
 
Following George and Hwang’s (2010) and Kapadia’s (2011) influential work, many recent 
working papers use proxies of risk-neutral PDs instead of physical PDs to measure default risk, 
and most document a positive relationship between default risk and returns. Examples are Chan-
Lau (2006), Nielsen (2013) and Friedwald, Wagner and Zechner (2014), who use credit default 
swap (CDS) spreads, and Anginer and Yildizhan (2014), who calculate credit risk premia from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
profitability (Bauer and Agarwal, 2014): distress risk without profitability related information is not relevant in 
pricing. 
9
 Other studies that document a negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns (the IV 
anomaly) include Ang et al. (2006) and Barinov (2012). 
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corporate bond spreads to proxy for risk-neutral PDs. The disadvantage of these studies is that 
they can only calculate risk-neutral PDs for firms that have CDS or bond information available. 
These firms constitute a small fraction of total firms and are usually the largest ones. For 
example, Ozdagli (2013) argues that CDS data are available for only about 20% of US public 
firms (and are reliable only after 2004). 
Of the above studies that focus either on CDS or bond data, only Anginer and Yildizhan 
(2014) extend their analysis to a larger sample of firms for robustness purposes. To do this, they 
use physical PDs of US firms with CRSP-COMPUSTAT data available and calculate 
sensitivities of these PDs to the median PD in their sample, which they use as a proxy for 
aggregate default risk. Interestingly, they document a positive relationship between these 
sensitivities and stock returns. Our study is close to their analysis. Specifically, we build on this 
methodology, which was introduced by Hilscher and Wilson (2013), and extend Anginer and 
Yildizhan (2014) in three ways that we describe below. 
First, we use as a measure for aggregate default risk the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) 
instead of the median PD. VIX is a good proxy for aggregate default risk since it is positively 
correlated with credit spreads, as documented in the literature on CDS (Pan and Singleton, 2008 
(distress risk premium)) and corporate bonds (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001; 
Schaefer and Strebulaev, 2008). Moreover, VIX is strongly correlated with European volatility 
indices (correlations higher than 0.90), which are generally available only from 2000 onwards. 
Several studies also connect VIX with stock returns. Ang et al. (2006) calculate the sensitivity of 
individual returns to changes in VIX, and show that firms that perform well when VIX increases 
experience low average returns because they are a hedge against market downside risk. Barinov 
(2012) additionally shows that both firms with very negative and very positive return 
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sensitivities to VIX changes are smaller and have higher BM ratios. In unreported results, we 
also use the median PD as an alternative proxy for aggregate default risk and all our results 
remain robust. However, in our large sample of very heterogeneous countries, the median PD is a 
rather noisy measure and demonstrates higher auto-correlation than monthly VIX. Thus, we 
believe VIX is a more appropriate measure and further motivates its use in Section 3.4. 
Second, instead of focusing on the US market, which has already been largely explored, we 
study a comprehensive sample of European firms from 22 countries, which notably also includes 
smaller firms. These firms are often neglected, but constitute the vast majority of firms listed on 
European exchanges. This heterogeneity is important as previous work has often associated 
default risk to other firm characteristics (such as size and book-to-market ratios). Thus, the 
inclusion of small stocks allows us to reconcile our findings with these earlier results. 
Finally, we break down the physical PDs into systematic and idiosyncratic components and 
study the relationship between returns and the two components of physical PD separately. This 
enables us to detect the origin of the default anomaly. We refer to the systematic component as 
systematic default risk (SDR) beta and to the idiosyncratic component as idiosyncratic default 
risk (IDR) alpha. Specifically, we sort the stocks in our sample on both SDR betas and IDR 
alphas instead of only SDR betas (as Anginer and Yildizhan do) and perform several double-
sorts in order to better identify the source of the anomaly and enforce our statements. 
Our study is also close to Gao, Parson and Shen (2013) and Aretz, Florackis and Kostakis 
(2014), who study the relationship between default risk and stock returns in international 
samples. Gao, Parson and Shen (2013) study 39 countries and document a negative relationship 
between stock returns and default risk, as measured by Moody’s Expected Default Frequency 
(EDF) measure. They provide a behavioral explanation for the anomaly that sees investors being 
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overconfident about high default risk stocks, keeping their prices high and subsequently leading 
to sudden corrections and low returns. Contrary to their findings, Aretz, Florackis and Kostakis 
(2014) study 14 developed markets using the accounting-based measure of Campbell, Hilsher 
and Szilagy (2008) and document a positive relationship between stock returns and default risk. 
Thus, Gao, Parson and Shen (2013) use market-based PDs and Aretz, Florackis and Kostakis 
(2014) use accounting-based PDs to proxy for SDR exposure. But, as we already discuss above, 
these physical PDs are not necessarily good measures of such exposure. Our study differs from 
the these two as we use the simple and intuitive method described above to break these physical 
PDs down into systematic and idiosyncratic components. We then study the relationship between 
returns and these two components separately in order to better capture how exposure to 
aggregate default risk is priced. 
Our main hypothesis, which we confirm empirically, is that stocks with high sensitivities of 
their PDs to VIX (not necessarily high PDs per se) will have higher average returns, because 
investors will require a premium for holding such stocks. Therefore, the documented default 
anomaly in the literature is only the result of incorrect measurement of the exposure to aggregate 
default risk. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section 
3.3 studies the relationship between the physical PDs and stock returns. Section 3.4 first 
describes the method to break down the physical PDs into systematic and idiosyncratic 
components, and then discusses the relationship between these different components and stock 
returns. Section 3.5 performs further tests to support the explanation of the default anomaly. 
Finally, Section 3.6 concludes. 
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3.2 The Data 
Our study covers publicly listed firms from 22 European countries, during the period January 
1990 to December 2012. We use Thomson Reuters' Datastream for market data and Thomson 
Reuters’ Worldscope database for the firms’ accounting information. 
To guarantee a certain level of market exchange activity, we include in our analysis only the 
22 European countries that had established exchanges on or before 1980 (for a total of 34 
exchanges). We exclude years 1980-1989 due to the limited number of companies with available 
data. We also follow previous studies in the field and exclude financial firms (ICB
10
 8000 
Financials) and firms with negative BM ratios. To reduce the influence of outliers and account 
for measurement errors, we exclude firms with a market capitalization below the 1
st
 percentile 
for all observations. This essentially leaves in our sample firms with a market capitalization 
above roughly one million euros.
11
 Moreover we only retain firms that have at least two years of 
data available, that is sufficient historical data for the calculation of physical PDs. To avoid 
duplicate observations, we do the following: for firms that are traded on more than one European 
exchange, we keep data from the market where the firm has been traded for the longest period, 
this is almost always the home market, and; if a firm has issued more than one type of common 
share, we use data of the share type that constitutes the majority of common equity. 
An important feature of our database is the compiled information on default events. As the 
reason for delisting is not usually available in Datastream, we manually track the status of the 
delisted firms from other sources (such as Amadeus and Orbis Europe databases), as well as 
                                                          
10
 The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is an industry classification taxonomy launched by Dow Jones and 
FTSE in 2005. 
11 US studies usually exclude stocks with prices below 5 USD, but such a condition is inappropriate for our 
European sample (i.e. in Europe, the median stock price is approximately 5 EUR). 
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various public internet sources. Therefore, we are able to identify if the delisting of a security is 
due to default (bankruptcy or liquidation) or other reasons (i.e. mergers). To illustrate this point, 
Table 3.1 reports the average number of active firms per year, as well as the number of firms that 
were delisted due to default each year. 
Nonetheless, information on delisting is also not available in Datastream. Thus we follow 
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) and use the last available full-month return, assuming 
that our portfolios sell stocks that are delisted at the end of the month before delisting. This 
approach gives a conservative estimate of the default anomaly. Results are qualitatively the same 
if we follow Vassalou and Xing (2004) and set delisting returns for stocks that default equal to -
100 percent (assuming a zero recovery rate). 
After applying the filters described above and merging different data sources, we are able to 
calculate physical PDs and draw results for a final sample of 806,157 firm-months 
(corresponding to 8,439 firms) across the 22 European countries. Table 3.2 characterizes this 
final sample with respect to the distribution of firms across size classes and countries. The 
average size in our sample is lower than previous US studies, because small stocks constitute the 
majority of traded firms in European exchanges. In terms of international breakdown, the 
representativeness of the different countries in our sample seems to be in line with the literature 
(e.g. Gao, Parsons, and Shen, 2013). Unsurprisingly, more developed markets contribute a 
greater share of observations to the sample, with the U.K. (32.54%), France (13.34%) and 
Germany (13.08%) collectively comprising more than half. 
We also resort to various other public data sources. Regarding aggregate default risk proxies, 
we use the CBOE VIX, as well as the European volatility indices VSTOXX, VFTSE and VDAX 
(for EUROSTOXX 50, FTSE 100 and DAX respectively) and the European credit default swap 
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index iTraxx. We focus on VIX in the main analysis, as it is the only index available from 
January 1990 onwards. The Fama-French factors SMB and HML and the market factor EMKT 
for Europe are obtained from Kenneth French’s web page. For the risk-free rate, we use monthly 
observations of the 1-year T-bill, available from the Federal Reserve Board Statistics.
12
 
 
3.3 The Physical Probabilities of Default and Stock Returns 
3.3.1 Calculating Physical PDs 
We follow Vassalou and Xing (2004) in calculating our main physical PD measure. As their 
methodology is based on the Merton model, we also refer to the estimated physical PD as the 
Merton measure. In order to calculate monthly PDs under this approach, we use data on current 
and long-term debt, as well as market capitalization for all the firms in our sample. We perform 
all calculations for the individual monthly PDs in local currency to minimize the effect of 
exchange rate volatility. Appendix 3.1 presents more details on the Merton measure, its 
calculation and overall performance. 
Table 3.3 shows descriptive statistics for the estimated Merton measure by country. Since 
other firm characteristics (such as size and BM ratios) have been associated with default risk in 
the literature, Table 3.3 also includes descriptive statistics for these variables (along with raw 
average returns). Overall the results show that there is significant heterogeneity among European 
countries in terms of PDs, size, and BM. Markets such as Romania (16.69%) and Bulgaria 
(14.29%) have the highest average PDs, while other countries such as Switzerland (3.13%) and 
the Netherlands (3.42%) have very low average PDs. 
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 We use a US risk-free rate since we do not have a sufficiently long time series of data for the German equivalent. 
Similarly, Kenneth French calculates the European factors using a US risk-free rate. 
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Although the performance results in Appendix 3.1 suggest that the Merton measure is indeed 
a good default predictor, we also calculate an alternative default measure for robustness 
purposes. In particular, we follow Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) in calculating a 
physical PD measure using a multi-period logit regression framework. We refer to this 
alternative PD as the CHS measure. We are able to calculate the CHS measure for 755,243 firm-
months (7,980 firms). For more details on the methodology, please refer to Appendix 3.2. 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the results. In Panel A, we plot the monthly aggregate Merton and 
CHS measures for firms in the overall sample (defined as simple averages of the values of all 
firms). The two PD measures have a very high correlation of 0.92, but their magnitude is 
different since the CHS measure produces lower PDs than the Merton measure. The columns in 
the plot denote recession periods in the euro area (as indicated by the OECD), so we can also 
observe that both measures vary greatly with the business cycle and increase during downturns. 
Panel B plots the monthly aggregate Merton measure and values of the volatility index VIX at 
the end of each month. It is again apparent that Merton PDs and VIX co-move closely together 
throughout the economic cycle. Both are higher during recessions, when economic theory 
suggests that the stochastic discount factor is high. This finding provides initial evidence that 
VIX captures aggregate default risk information. 
For reasons of brevity and given the high time-series and cross-sectional correlations 
between the two PD measures, we present results only with the estimated Merton measure. We 
justify this choice in two ways. Firstly, the CHS measure may suffer from an in-sample bias, 
since we use data from the whole sample period to estimate PDs. Secondly, we are able to 
estimate the CHS measure for a smaller sample of firms compared to the Merton case. 
Nonetheless, all our results are robust to the choice of physical PD measure. 
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3.3.2 The Default Anomaly: Physical PDs and Stock Returns 
As a first part of our analysis, we study the possible existence of a default anomaly in Europe. In 
particular, we explore the cross-sectional relationship between stock returns and default risk by 
conducting portfolio sorts on the physical PDs. 
Each month, from January 1990 to December 2012, we use the most recent PD for each firm 
and sort the stocks into five portfolios.
 13
 To account for possible country effects (concentration 
of risky stocks in certain countries and/or accounting differences), we follow an approach similar 
to Lewellen (1999) and Barry et al. (2002): at the beginning of each month, we adjust the 
available PDs from stocks in the overall sample by the average country PD for this month. Then 
we sort all stocks into portfolios based on the adjusted PDs. We perform similar adjustments for 
all the tests that follow but our results remain robust if we do not adjust for country averages. If 
the integration amongst European markets is high, it is not necessary to perform such 
adjustments. Nevertheless, our sample consists of 22 European countries, of which three are not 
members of the European Union, thus it is not very plausible to assume a very high degree of 
integration. 
Table 3.4 displays the results. In Panel A, we report both equally and value-weighted 
monthly raw returns and alphas (excess risk-adjusted returns) of the five portfolios. We also 
construct high-low portfolios (which are long the highest PD stock quintile and short the lowest 
PD stock quintile) and report raw returns and alphas for these portfolios (the alphas are obtained 
using the factor-mimicking portfolios for Europe available on Kenneth French’s website). The 
results show that the difference in returns between high and low PD stocks is almost always 
                                                          
13 All results are qualitatively similar using ten portfolios instead of five. 
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negative, in line with the literature that documents a possible default anomaly. This relationship 
is almost monotonic, but differences are not always significant. Thus, there is weak evidence that 
the high PD stocks earn on average lower returns than the low PD stocks, though this under-
performance does not demonstrate significance. 
In Panel B of Table 3.4, we report the estimated factor loadings for excess, equally and 
value-weighted returns on the four Fama-French-Carhart factors. We find that high PD portfolios 
have higher loadings on the market factor (EMKT), the size factor (SMB) and the value factor 
(HML). This shows the prevalence of small and value stocks in the high PD portfolios. To 
complement this analysis, in Panel C we report some relevant characteristics of the five 
portfolios. Average size decreases monotonically across the portfolios, and average BM 
increases monotonically, again reflecting the dominance of small and high BM firms among the 
high PD stocks. The high PD stocks also have high leverage ratios (LRs) and, in accordance with 
Chen and Zhang (2010), low return on assets (ROAs) ratios. 
 
3.4 Understanding Default Effects 
3.4.1 Decomposing the Physical PDs into Systematic and Idiosyncratic Components 
Our findings in the previous section appear to support the existence of a default anomaly, since 
an investing strategy that buys the highest PD stocks and shorts the lowest PD stocks has, on 
average, negative returns. At first glance, these results suggest that default risk is, at best, not 
priced into the cross-section of stock returns. However finance theory suggests that, only if 
default risk is systematic and thus non-diversifiable, it should be positively correlated with 
expected stock returns. In other words, investors demand a premium to hold the stocks of firms 
with high exposure to aggregate default risk, not necessarily firms with high physical PDs. In 
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fact, George and Hwang (2010) argue that a firm’s physical PD does not necessarily reflect its 
SDR exposure. Therefore in this part, we break down the physical PDs into systematic and 
idiosyncratic components, and investigate empirically if the physical PDs are a good measure of 
firm exposure to aggregate default risk. 
 
3.4.2 The Methodology 
To calculate SDR exposure, we follow an approach similar to Hilscher and Wilson (2013) and 
Anginer and Yildizhan (2014), by assuming that a firm’s PD is exposed to a single common 
factor. This factor is the aggregate default risk. Therefore the firm’s SDR exposure is measured 
as the sensitivity of its PD to this factor (we refer to this sensitivity as the SDR beta). To 
compute monthly SDR betas for all firms in our sample we estimate the following regression for 
each firm over 24-months rolling windows: 
𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐼𝐷𝑅 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,        (1) 
where 𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the physical PD for firm 𝑖 in month 𝑡, 𝑋𝑡 is the aggregate default risk measure, 
𝛼𝑖
𝐼𝐷𝑅 is the IDR alpha and 𝛽𝑖
𝑆𝐷𝑅 is the SDR beta for firm 𝑖 in month 𝑡, obtained from the rolling 
regressions method.
14
 To avoid auto-correlation concerns we estimate our regressions using both 
changes and levels, and results remain robust. We are able to calculate SDR betas and IDR 
alphas for 624,084 firm-months (7,140 firms) for the period from January 1992 to December 
                                                          
14 
The specification in (1) does not of itself constrain the PD to lie between zero and one. Hilscher and Wilson 
(2013) argue that this is not a problem, as long as most of the estimated PDs are small (so that 𝑃(1 − 𝑃) ≈ 𝑃). Our 
estimated PDs satisfy this condition. Also, since the percentage of the variability explained by the residuals in our 
regressions is small, our results do not change if we include the error term in the idiosyncratic component of default 
risk. 
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2012. The sample is smaller than before because we need two years of PD history for the 
estimation. Essentially, we cannot calculate SDR betas for January 1990 to December 1991. 
 
3.4.3 VIX and Aggregate Default Risk 
As a proxy for aggregate default risk, we use the volatility index VIX. Several authors study the 
relationship of equity returns and VIX (Chira et al., 2013). We are also not the first to link 
default risk with VIX. Numerous studies find VIX to be an important indicator of credit spreads, 
as shown in the literature on CDS (Pan and Singleton, 2008) and on corporate bonds (Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001; Schaefer and Strebulaev, 2008). Table 3.5 motivates 
further the use of VIX in our empirical analysis. Panel A presents summary statistics for VIX 
and its monthly change, ∆mVIX. Panel B reports the highly positive correlation coefficients 
between VIX and three European volatility indices, which suggests that VIX successfully 
captures aggregate volatility in Europe. Panel C reports the negative correlation coefficients 
between ∆mVIX and the monthly change of two widely used European stock indices, 
EUROSTOXX 50 and MSCI Europe. This finding is in line with the theoretical model of Bansal 
et al. (2014), according to which stock returns have, on average, negative volatility betas. Panel 
D reports the negative correlation coefficients of ∆mVIX with EMKT and SMB, which is in 
accordance with Ang et al. (2006). For HML, the correlation is very low. Lastly, the regression 
results of Panel E show that VIX can explain a substantial portion of time-variation in both the 
aggregate and the median physical PD. In unreported results, we follow the US studies of 
Hilscher and Wilson (2013) and Anginer and Yıldızhan (2014) and use the median PD as an 
alternative proxy for aggregate default risk. Hilscher and Wilson (2013) find that the median PD 
is highly correlated with the first principal component which explains the majority of variation in 
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PDs across ratings. All results remain robust, however, in our large sample of very 
heterogeneous countries, the median PD is a rather noisy measure. It also demonstrates higher 
auto-correlation than monthly VIX. 
 
3.4.4 Physical PDs, Systematic Betas, and Idiosyncratic Alphas 
In Panel C of Table 3.4, we show that stocks in the highest PD quintile have relatively low SDR 
betas, whereas their IDR alphas are very high. This empirical finding is in accordance with the 
theoretical model of George and Hwang (2010) and suggests that the physical PDs may not be a 
good measure of firm exposure to aggregate default risk. We now turn to the analysis of the 
relationships between stocks returns and the two components of the PD separately. 
 
3.4.4.1 SDR Betas and Stock Returns: A Premium on Exposure to Aggregate Default Risk  
To examine if exposure to aggregate default risk are rewarded in the cross-section of stock 
returns, we repeat the portfolio analysis of Section 3.3. using the SDR betas as the sorting 
variable. Each month, from January 1992 to December 2012, we use the most recent SDR beta 
for each firm and sort the stocks into five portfolios. As before, we adjust monthly SDR betas by 
their monthly country average. Table 3.6 reports the results. 
Panel A shows that the difference in returns between high and low SDR beta stocks is now 
always positive for both equally and value-weighted returns and significant in the case of 
equally-weighted returns. A portfolio strategy buying the highest SDR beta quintile and shorting 
the lowest SDR beta quintile of stocks gives an equally-weighted four-factor alpha of 0.33 
percent monthly (4.01 percent annually), significant at a five percent level. The positive 
relationship between returns and SDR betas is almost always monotonic. Thus, when we use an 
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SDR measure to sort the stocks, there is evidence of a positive relationship between default risk 
and returns, in line with theoretical models. 
In Panel B, we see that factor loadings on the market factor (EMKT) and the size factor 
(SMB) do not decrease monotonically along the SDR beta portfolios. Specifically, both high and 
low SDR beta stocks have higher loadings than medium SDR beta stocks. This indicates that 
small stocks are not homogeneous with respect to their SDR exposure. The factor loadings on the 
value factor (HML) are mostly insignificant. These results suggest that our SDR measure 
conveys information that is not captured by traditional risk factors. 
Panel C reports some characteristics of the portfolios. First, SDR betas exhibit large cross-
sectional dispersion, ranging from -0.62 to 0.89, indicating that the effect of aggregate default 
risk varies substantially across stocks. In accordance with Barinov (2012), negative SDR betas 
indicate that these portfolios are indeed a hedge against increases in VIX, which justifies their 
low returns. Second, we find interesting non-monotonic patterns across the beta portfolios: (i) 
both high and low SDR beta stocks have higher PDs than medium SDR beta stocks; (ii) they also 
have higher LRs and lower ROAs; (iii) they are also, on average, smaller in size and have higher 
BM ratios (which is consistent with the results from portfolio sorts on credit risk premia 
estimated from CDS spreads by Friedwald, Wagner and Zechner, 2014). Therefore the SDR beta 
conveys information that is different from that incorporated in other common default risk 
measures and stock characteristics. Finally, we find a negative relationship between SDR betas 
and IDR alphas, as the idiosyncratic component of the PD increases almost monotonically across 
the SDR beta portfolios. This is in accordance with Avramov et al. (2013), who document a 
negative cross-sectional relationship between exposure to systematic and firm-specific risks. 
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In unreported results, we also test for return persistence in our SDR beta sorted portfolios. Da 
and Gao (2010) argue that the high returns of risky stocks do not compensate for SDR, but the 
result of short-term return reversal caused by price pressure in the month of portfolio formation. 
Thus, in accordance with the default anomaly literature, they find that risky stocks deliver low 
returns if the second month after portfolio formation is used instead. We find no evidence of 
return reversal: the return of the highest and lowest SDR beta quintiles differ 8 months before 
portfolio formation, the difference is maximized in the portfolio formation month, and persists 
for almost 8 months after portfolio formation (even if we assume zero recovery of firms 
suffering default). 
To conclude, the findings in this section show that SDR betas, measured as sensitivities of 
the physical PDs to a common aggregate default risk factor (here VIX) are positively related to 
stock returns and that high PD stocks can have quite different SDR betas among them. 
 
3.4.4.2 IDR Alphas and Stock Returns: A negative relationship  
We now sort stocks based on the IDR alphas.
15
 Each month, from January 1992 to December 
2012, we use the most recent IDR alpha for each firm and sort the stocks into five portfolios. As 
before, we adjust monthly IDR alphas by their monthly country average. Table 3.7 reports the 
results. 
Panel A shows that the difference in returns between high and low IDR alpha stocks is 
negative for both equally and value-weighted returns, as in the case of PDs. It is also significant 
at a five percent level for value-weighted returns and CAPM alphas. In Panel B, we see that 
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 Our results are robust if we measure the idiosyncratic component of default risk as the sum of IDR alphas and 
residuals from regression (1). 
79 
factor loadings on the market factor (EMKT) and the size factor (SMB) do not decrease 
monotonically along the IDR alpha portfolios, but they follow the same patterns as for SDR beta 
portfolios. Specifically, both high and low IDR alpha stocks have higher loadings than medium 
IDR alpha stocks. As before, the factor loadings on the value factor (HML) are not significant. 
Panel C reports some characteristics of the portfolios. IDR alphas exhibit large cross-sectional 
dispersion, ranging from -8.5594 to 22.5424. In accordance with our previous findings on SDR 
beta portfolios, both high and low IDR alpha stocks have higher PDs, are smaller, have higher 
BM and LRs, and lower ROA than medium IDR alpha stocks. As before, we document a 
negative relationship between SDR betas and IDR alphas. Therefore, stocks that have low 
exposure to aggregate default risk are associated with high firm-specific risks. These results are 
initial evidence that the default anomaly can be explained by the non-monotonic relationship 
between the physical PD and its systematic and idiosyncratic components. 
In Tables 3.6 and 3.7, we notice that for stocks sorted on SDR betas, the equally-weighted 
positive returns are significant, whereas for stocks sorted on IDR alphas, the value-weighted 
negative returns are significant. In the case of SDR beta sorted portfolios (Table 3.6), the smaller 
stocks in the highest SDR beta quintile have, on average, higher returns and SDR betas, 
compared to the relatively larger stocks in the same portfolio. In the case of IDR alpha sorted 
portfolios, the smaller stocks in the highest IDR alpha portfolio have, on average, higher returns 
and lower IDR alphas, compared to the relatively larger stocks in this portfolio. These findings 
are consistent with the notion that the size effect is a proxy for default risk. They can also 
provide some evidence why Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) and other studies that have 
relatively larger stocks in their samples and calculate only value-weighted returns document a 
significant default anomaly.  
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3.5 Explaining the Default Anomaly 
This section sheds more light on the relationship between default risk and stock returns. Our 
main focus is to understand what the main drivers of the default anomaly are, and therefore we 
apply a sequential two-sort procedure to investigate it. We use tertiles instead of quintiles to 
guarantee an adequate number of stocks in each portfolio (at least twenty each month). For 
brevity, we report value-weighted returns but results remain qualitatively similar for equally-
weighted returns. 
Table 3.8 examines the default anomaly in SDR beta-sorted portfolios. Specifically, each 
month, we first sort stocks into three portfolios based on their country-adjusted SDR beta and, 
within each SDR beta portfolio, we further sort stocks in three portfolios, based on the country-
adjusted PD. Panel A shows the time-series monthly average of the value-weighted returns and 
alphas, as well as average monthly returns and alphas for portfolios that are long the highest PD 
tertile and short the lowest PD tertile of stocks. As expected, the default anomaly is no longer 
significant when we control for exposure to aggregate default risk. Panel B reports various 
characteristics of each portfolio. Both stocks in the highest and lowest SDR beta tertiles have 
higher PDs than stocks in the medium SDR beta tertiles. Still, low SDR beta stocks have lower 
PD levels than high SDR beta stocks. They also differ in terms of their IDR alphas. While stocks 
in the highest SDR beta tertiles have, on average, negative IDR alphas, stocks in the lowest SDR 
beta tertiles have high IDR alphas. These stocks are a hedge against aggregate default risk 
(which explains their low returns). Finally, size and ROA decrease and BM and LR increase 
monotonically as PD increases in all three SDR beta tertiles, indicating that stocks with high PDs 
are, on average small, value stocks, with high leverage and low profitability. 
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Table 3.9 examines the default anomaly in IDR alpha-sorted portfolios. The double-sorting 
procedure is similar to the one we describe above. Interestingly, Panel A shows that the default 
anomaly is significant only for stocks in the highest IDR alpha tertile, but it is absent in the other 
two IDR alpha tertiles. Thus, the difference in returns between high and low PD portfolios is 
negative and significant only when the idiosyncratic component of the PD is very high. Panel B 
of Table 3.9 shows very similar patterns to Table 3.8. High IDR alpha stocks have, on average, 
negative exposure to aggregate default risk, thus constituting a hedge against bad market 
conditions. Moreover, among high IDR alpha stocks, this hedging ability increases as PD 
increases (i.e. the SDR betas become more negative). Another interesting finding is that, in the 
lowest IDR alpha tertile, as PD increases, SDR betas rise and IDR alphas fall. This shows that, 
for stocks with low idiosyncratic risk, the physical PD is a better proxy than exposure to 
aggregate default risk. 
Overall, the results above show that (i) the so-called “default anomaly” loses its significance 
when we control for exposure to aggregate default risk (SDR beta), (ii) it is only found in firms 
with high idiosyncratic risk when we control for IDR alpha, and (iii) it is not an “anomaly”, in 
the sense that the negative returns on the High-Low PD portfolios are compensated for by their 
ability to hedge. 
Finally, Table 3.10 examines the relationship between SDR betas and returns in PD sorted 
portfolios. Each month, we first sort stocks into three portfolios based on their country-adjusted 
PD and, within each PD portfolio, we further sort stocks into three portfolios, based on the 
country-adjusted SDR beta. As mentioned above, there is a link between the negative PD - return 
relationship and the negative IDR alpha - return relationship. Therefore, controlling for the PD, 
helps uncovering the positive relationship between SDR betas and returns and illustrates better 
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the difference between SDR betas and PDs. In Panel A of Table 3.10, we find that the difference 
in returns between high and low SDR beta stocks is positive and significant in the tertile of 
stocks with the lowest PD. In the other two PD tertiles, there is no particular relationship 
between SDR beta and returns. This may happen because stocks with very high PDs are subject 
to market imperfections that can influence their returns, such as large arbitrage costs (Cambell, 
Hilsher and Svilagyi, 2008) and the divergence of opinions (Miller, 1977). Thus, exposure to 
aggregate default risk is significantly rewarded for stocks with low PDs, which are stocks with 
low market imperfections. In Panel B, we see that stocks in the lowest PD tertile (where 
exposure to aggregate default risk is significantly rewarded) have lower IDR alphas, are larger, 
have lower BM and LRs (in accordance with George and Hwang, 2010) and higher ROAs (in 
accordance with Chen and Zhang, 2010) compared to stocks in the other two PD tertiles. 
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we shed more light on the recent contradictory literature that explores the 
relationship between default risk and stock returns. We follow a simple and intuitive approach to 
break down physical PDs into systematic and idiosyncratic components, use the VIX as a 
measure of aggregate default risk and provide European evidence to study the default anomaly. 
Initially, we sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on their physical PDs and, in line with 
the literature that documents a default anomaly, we find that the difference in returns between 
high and low PD stocks is negative and that the returns almost monotonically decrease as the PD 
increases. However, a closer look shows that the physical PD is usually a poor measure of 
exposure to aggregate default risk. In accordance with George and Hwang (2010), we find that 
stocks in the highest PD quintile have relatively low SDR exposure. We then sort stocks into 
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quintile portfolios based on their SDR betas instead; as expected, we find a positive and 
significant relationship between this measure of default risk and returns. In other words, 
investors indeed require a premium to hold stocks that are riskier when aggregate default risk is 
higher. Interestingly, there are non-monotonic patterns across the SDR beta portfolios. On 
average, the firms in the low and high SDR beta portfolios are smaller, have higher BM, and 
higher physical PDs than the firms in medium SDR beta portfolios. We find that the SDR betas 
are negatively related to the idiosyncratic component (measured by the IDR alphas). Therefore it 
is the idiosyncratic (not the systematic part) driving the default anomaly. We confirm this 
conjecture by showing that stocks sorted on IDR alphas have, on average, lower returns. 
Investors do not require compensation to hold stocks with high firm-specific risk because these 
stocks are a source of portfolio risk diversification. Further analysis with double-sorted portfolios 
helps us confirm these statements. 
Our results suggest that riskier stocks, as measured by the physical PDs, will tend to under-
perform because they have, on average, lower exposure to aggregate default risk. Their riskiness 
is mostly idiosyncratic and can be diversified away, thus providing an explanation for the default 
anomaly typically found in the literature. On the contrary, it is the systematic component of 
default risk, measured by the SDR betas, that requires a return premium. 
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3.7 Tables of Chapter 3 
 
Table 3.1 
Defaulted Firms as a Percentage of Total Firms 
The table lists the total number of active firms and delistings due to default 
(bankruptcy or liquidation) for every year of our sample period. The number of 
active firms is the average number of firms across all months of the year. The 
number of firms that were delisted due to default is hand-collected data from 
various public sources. 
Year Active Firms Defaults (%) 
1990 1,244 1 0.08 
1991 1,681 4 0.24 
1992 2,072 12 0.58 
1993 2,242 6 0.27 
1994 2,322 9 0.39 
1995 2,374 11 0.46 
1996 2,398 14 0.58 
1997 2,471 10 0.40 
1998 2,526 19 0.75 
1999 2,815 20 0.71 
2000 2,912 20 0.69 
2001 2,985 41 1.37 
2002 3,150 41 1.30 
2003 3,434 37 1.08 
2004 3,548 34 0.96 
2005 3,487 39 1.12 
2006 3,378 24 0.71 
2007 3,406 26 0.76 
2008 3,521 83 2.36 
2009 3,700 55 1.49 
2010 3,906 42 1.08 
2011 3,904 39 1.00 
2012 3,705 11 0.30 
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Table 3.2 
Characteristics of the Final Sample: Breakdown by Size and Country 
This table presents details on the characteristics of our final sample. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the 
distribution of firms and firm-months across size classes. # of firms is the available number of firms for all years. # of 
firm-months is the number of observations. We provide also the relative fractions of total firms and firm-months that 
each size class represents. Finally, the column "Total MC" shows the total market capitalization of each size class 
averaged across the years of the study. We measure market capitalization in millions of euros. Panel B presents the 
breakdown of firms and firm-months by country, with corresponding percentages. Start date is the date at which the 
information on firms of a given country starts to be available; the end date in our sample, December 2012, is the same 
for all countries. 
Panel A. Breakdown by Size 
Segment Size # of firms (%) # of firm-months (%) Total MC (%) 
Nano cap < 10 mio 1,419 16.81 106,570 13.22 7,401 0.11 
Micro cap < 50 mio 2,631 31.18 219,273 27.20 68,153 1.03 
Small cap < 150 mio 1,678 19.88 158,265 19.63 150,178 2.27 
Mid cap < 1 bio 1,855 21.98 205,855 25.54 735,025 11.11 
Large cap < 50 bio 839 9.94 112,526 13.96 4,239,777 64.07 
Mega cap ≥ 50 bio 17 0.20 3,668 0.45 1,417,300 21.42 
Overall sample 
 
8,439 
 
806,157 
 
6,617,834 
 
Panel B. Breakdown by Country 
Country  Start date # of firms (%) # of firm-months (%)   
Austria Jan-90 112 1.33 11,676 1.45   
Belgium Jan-90 151 1.79 17,842 2.21   
Bulgaria Mar-08 130 1.54 4,009 0.50   
Czech Republic Mar-98 71 0.84 3,679 0.46   
Denmark Jan-90 195 2.31 24,151 3.00   
Finland Jan-90 146 1.73 18,589 2.31   
France Jan-90 1,126 13.34 111,829 13.87   
Germany Jan-90 1,104 13.08 112,428 13.95   
Greece Oct-90 315 3.73 35,558 4.41   
Hungary Mar-95 45 0.53 3,558 0.44   
Ireland Jan-90 68 0.81 8,549 1.06   
Italy Jan-90 340 4.03 37,353 4.63   
Netherlands Jan-90 213 2.52 28,940 3.59   
Norway Jan-90 290 3.44 24,632 3.06   
Poland Mar-95 249 2.95 10,620 1.32   
Portugal Oct-90 94 1.11 10,002 1.24   
Romania Mar-02 65 0.77 2,690 0.33   
Serbia Jan-12 47 0.56 445 0.06   
Spain Jan-90 175 2.07 22,619 2.81   
Sweden Jan-90 525 6.22 42,856 5.32   
Switzerland Jan-90 232 2.75 31,695 3.93   
United Kingdom Jan-90 2,746 32.54 242,437 30.07   
Overall Sample   8,439 100.00 806,157 100.00   
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Table 3.3 
The Merton Measure and Other Firm Characteristics 
The table presents descriptive statistics for the average Merton measure, monthly returns, size and BM ratio over the period January 1990 to December 2012. The sample spans 22 European countries. Monthly return is the 
time-series average of the cross-sectional average returns within each country. We measure returns in euros and express them in percent. Merton measure, size and BM are the time-series averages of the cross-sectional 
average Merton measures, market capitalization and BM ratios. We express the Merton measure in percentage terms (as it is a probability) and market capitalization in millions of euros. 
       Merton measure                     Monthly Returns Size  BM  
Country  Mean Median St. Dev.  Mean Median St. Dev.  Mean Median St. Dev.  Mean Median St. Dev.  
Austria  4.36 3.08 3.42  0.55 0.58 5.21   541.11 313.22 389.08  0.80 0.78 0.27  
Belgium  4.70 3.96 2.88  0.63 0.90 4.16   963.20 889.92 492.07  0.84 0.81 0.18  
Bulgaria  14.29 12.99 8.46  -0.64 0.28 8.18   33.02 25.84 22.61  1.74 1.83 0.35  
Czech Republic  3.31 1.25 3.87  1.28 1.33 4.38   481.78 505.48 297.82  1.72 1.47 0.68  
Denmark  4.09 2.76 3.10  0.69 0.78 4.64   580.10 489.44 337.62  0.90 0.93 0.23  
Finland  4.11 2.63 4.63  0.95 0.52 6.22   1,247.22 1,129.59 848.93  0.74 0.69 0.25  
France  5.00 4.28 2.53  0.77 0.94 4.63   1,557.86 1,619.24 576.00  0.82 0.81 0.18  
Germany  4.67 3.76 3.07  0.55 0.79 3.93   1,457.07 1,443.94 431.23  0.70 0.64 0.23  
Greece  6.71 4.61 5.79  1.01 -0.04 10.71   197.65 176.01 137.97  1.12 0.83 0.81  
Hungary  9.14 8.76 5.24  1.62 1.15 9.39   82.84 83.77 39.55  1.33 1.33 0.48  
Ireland  5.56 4.64 3.13  1.09 1.21 6.48   784.02 799.62 512.20  0.93 0.82 0.35  
Italy  6.42 5.72 3.23  0.31 0.22 6.40   1,492.03 1,476.92 930.09  1.00 0.98 0.30  
Netherlands  3.42 2.91 2.21  0.58 0.86 4.93   1,832.05 1,866.32 920.79  0.75 0.72 0.21  
Norway  7.37 6.85 4.23  1.11 1.43 6.83   508.20 426.60 262.46  0.89 0.86 0.32  
Poland  10.27 8.57 9.51  1.31 0.69 10.82   69.94 38.80 58.53  1.27 1.04 0.76  
Portugal  7.31 6.69 4.04  0.85 0.20 5.70   659.05 635.25 453.15  1.15 1.11 0.30  
Romania  16.69 13.03 10.09  2.02 1.33 9.11   87.34 39.06 87.19  2.15 2.12 0.53  
Serbia  12.89 13.26 3.19  0.59 0.45 5.02   17.20 16.96 2.34  3.21 3.19 0.19  
Spain  4.16 3.96 2.65  0.68 0.78 5.81   2,142.53 1,995.74 1,246.68  0.89 0.84 0.36  
Sweden  6.64 6.21 4.13  1.02 0.91 7.05   1,084.76 886.09 681.68  0.77 0.74 0.28  
Switzerland  3.13 2.34 2.41  0.75 0.95 4.54   2,187.33 2,356.76 961.16  0.88 0.83 0.26  
United Kingdom  4.27 3.88 2.00  0.81 1.15 5.54   1,288.24 1,367.40 559.96  0.86 0.82 0.23  
Overall Sample  5.84 4.44 5.10  0.86 0.82 6.50   1,006.23 765.26 896.78  0.99 0.86 0.50  
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Table 3.4 
Portfolios sorted on the Physical PD 
From January 1990 to December 2012, at the beginning of each month, we sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on 
their adjusted physical PD in the previous month. We adjust by dividing the physical PDs by the country average for this 
month. We report results with the Merton measure as a measure of physical PDs. Portfolio 1 is the portfolio with the 
lowest physical PD and portfolio 5 is the portfolio with the highest physical PD. The portfolios are held for one month and 
are then rebalanced. Panel A shows the time-series monthly average of the equally and value-weighted portfolio returns 
and alphas. EMKT is the excess market return, SMB is the return difference between small stocks and big stocks, HML is 
the return difference between value stocks and growth stocks, and WML is the return difference between winning stocks 
and losing stocks. The column "High-Low" shows average monthly raw returns and alphas (excess risk-adjusted returns) 
for portfolios that are long the highest physical PD stock quintile and short the lowest physical PD stock quintile. We 
denominate returns in euros and express them in percentage terms. Panel B shows loadings on the four factors from 
regressions of the equally and value-weighted excess returns. We calculate the t-statistics in parentheses from Newey-
West (1987) standard errors. ** denotes significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. Panel C reports PDs, size (in 
millions of euros), book-to-market ratios (BM), leverage ratios (LR) and return-on-assets (ROA) for each portfolio. SDR 
betas and IDR alphas are also reported and will be analyzed in further detail in the following tables. 
Portfolios High PD 5 4 3 2 Low PD 1 High-Low t-stat 
Panel A. Portfolio Returns 
Equally-weighted 
       
Return 0.5776 0.5195 0.5985 0.6502 0.6436 -0.0660 (-0.25) 
CAPM α 0.2379 0.1644 0.2569 0.3290 0.3453 -0.1075 (-0.44) 
3-factor α 0.2269 0.1534 0.2386 0.3130 0.3296 -0.1027 (-0.48) 
4-factor α 0.3575 0.2195 0.2922 0.3219 0.3197 0.0378 (0.16) 
Value-weighted 
       
Return 0.2062 0.4758 0.4570 0.4597 0.6965 -0.4904 (-1.08) 
CAPM α -0.1955 0.0845 0.1014 0.1216 0.3982 -0.5936 (-1.40) 
3-factor α -0.2704 0.0450 0.1053 0.1518 0.4128 -0.6832 (-1.84)* 
4-factor α -0.1777 0.1973 0.1828 0.1890 0.4675 -0.6452 (-1.63)* 
Panel B. Four-Factor Regression Coefficients 
Equally-weighted   
      
EMKT 0.238 0.245 0.205 0.167 0.133 
  
 
(3.00)** (3.66)** (3.35)** (3.08)** (3.12)** 
  
SMB 1.036 0.961 0.848 0.699 0.524 
  
 
(6.51)** (6.60)** (7.00)** (6.57)** (6.25)** 
  
HML 0.121 0.132 0.143 0.134 0.115 
  
 
(0.86) (1.07) (1.33) (1.37) (1.46) 
  
WML -0.011 0.025 0.026 0.052 0.049 
  
 
(-0.14) (0.35) (0.41) (0.86) (1.02) 
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Value-weighted               
EMKT 0.286 0.296 0.248 0.177 0.090 
  
 
(3.28)** (3.56)** (2.91)** (2.52)** (2.09)** 
  
SMB 1.345 1.175 1.001 0.716 0.451 
  
 
(6.79)** (6.65)** (6.69)** (5.55)** (5.24)** 
  
HML 0.336 0.204 0.088 0.005 0.013 
  
 
(1.83) (1.31) (0.62) -0.05 -0.15 
  
WML 0.016 -0.034 0.008 0.035 0.021 
  
  -0.14 (-0.35) (0.09) (0.43) (0.31)     
Panel C. Portfolio Characteristics 
Average PD 22.5600 1.7749 0.1614 0.0096 0.0000 
  
Average Size 286.42 530.43 1,000.41 1,707.40 2,674.78 
  
Average BM 1.4545 1.0046 0.7706 0.6097 0.4949 
  
Average LR 4.0889 1.7436 1.0925 0.7103 0.4025 
  
Average ROA -0.0623 -0.0045 0.0177 0.0297 0.0369     
Average SDR β 0.0590 0.1574 0.0770 0.0327 0.0060   
Average IDR α 14.3208 0.7767 -0.0892 -0.0567 0.1510   
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Table 3.5 
Summary Statistics on VIX 
In this table, VIX is the CBOE volatility index and ∆mVIX is the monthly change in VIX. Mean, Std, Skew, and Kurt refer to 
the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis, respectively. VSTOXX, VFTSE and VDAX are the EUROSTOXX 50, 
FTSE 100 and DAX volatility indices, which follow the VIX methodology for the European, UK, and German markets 
respectively. ∆mEurostoxx50 is the monthly change in EUROSTOXX 50 and ∆mMSCIEurope is the monthly change in MSCI 
Europe. EMKT is the value-weighted excess return on the European market portfolio over the risk-free rate and SMB and 
HML are the Fama-French factors for Europe. Aggregate PD is the monthly average and Median PD is the monthly median 
of the Merton measure values of all firms. We calculate the t-statistics from Newey-West (1987) standard errors (up to five 
lags). 
Panel A. Summary Statistics on VIX and VIX Monthly Changes (∆mVIX) 
  Mean Std Skew Kurt 
VIX 20.1978 8.0533 2.0133 10.1303 
∆mVIX -0.0267 4.2391 0.8229 8.1017 
Panel B. Correlation between VIX and Other Volatility Indices 
  VSTOXX VFTSE VDAX   
VIX 0.9100 0.9449 0.9492 
 
Panel C. Correlation between ∆mVIX and European Stock Indices 
  ∆mEUROSTOXX50 ∆mMSCIEurope     
∆mVIX -0.6335 -0.5835 
  
Panel D. Correlation between ∆mVIX and Other Factors 
  EMKT SMB HML   
∆mVIX -0.1743 -0.1670 -0.0623   
Panel E. Time-Series Regression of the Aggregate and Median Merton measure on VIX 
  Constant VIX R-squared  
Aggregate PD 1.8060 0.1534 0.2686  
 
(5.43) (10.07) 
 
 
Median PD -0.4676 0.0026 0.3112  
  (-8.30) (11.17)     
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Table 3.6 
Portfolios sorted on the SDR Beta 
From January 1992 to December 2012, at the beginning of each month, we sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on 
their adjusted SDR beta in the previous month. We adjust the SDR betas by dividing them by the country average for this 
month. We report results with the VIX SDR beta, which we measure as the coefficient (sensitivity) from 24-months 
rolling regressions of the PD on VIX. Portfolio 1 is the portfolio with the lowest SDR beta and portfolio 5 is the portfolio 
with the highest SDR beta. The portfolios are held for one month and are then rebalanced. Panel A shows the time-series 
monthly average of the equally and value-weighted portfolio returns and alphas. EMKT is the excess market return, SMB 
is the return difference between small stocks and big stocks, HML is the return difference between value stocks and 
growth stocks, and WML is the return difference between winning stocks and losing stocks. The column "High-Low" 
shows average monthly raw returns and alphas (excess risk-adjusted returns) for portfolios that are long the highest SDR 
beta stock quintile and short the lowest SDR beta stock quintile. We denominate returns in euros and express them in 
percentage terms. Panel B shows loadings on the four factors from regressions of the equally and value-weighted excess 
returns. We calculate the t-statistics in parentheses from Newey-West (1987) standard errors. ** denotes significance at a 
5% level and * at a 10% level. Panel C reports PDs, SDR betas, IDR alphas, sizes (in millions of euros), BM, LR and 
ROA ratios for each portfolio. 
Portfolios High β 5 4 3 2 Low β 1 High-Low t-stat 
Panel A. Portfolio Returns 
Equally-weighted 
       
Return 0.8924 0.7232 0.7175 0.7041 0.5985 0.2939 (1.80)* 
CAPM α 0.5249 0.3922 0.3889 0.3777 0.2700 0.2549 (1.80)* 
3-factor α 0.4577 0.3070 0.3014 0.3317 0.1835 0.2742 (1.89)* 
4-factor α 0.4460 0.2883 0.2750 0.2697 0.1117 0.3343 (1.97)** 
Value-weighted 
       
Return 0.8066 0.6384 0.5877 0.5687 0.4391 0.3675 (1.24) 
CAPM α 0.4162 0.3016 0.2814 0.2720 0.0859 0.3302 (1.14) 
3-factor α 0.3149 0.3152 0.2153 0.2297 0.0985 0.2164 (0.76) 
4-factor α 0.4035 0.3061 0.1989 0.1854 0.0527 0.3508 (1.19) 
Panel B. Four-Factor Regression Coefficients 
Equally-weighted 
       
EMKT 0.266 0.182 0.182 0.191 0.191 
  
 
(3.63)** (3.16)** (3.72)** (3.53)** (3.71)** 
  
SMB 0.979 0.715 0.767 0.726 0.771 
  
 
(6.28)** (5.66)** (7.02)** (6.67)** (6.30)** 
  
HML 0.148 0.197 0.204* 0.118 0.216 
  
 
(1.16) (1.86) (2.05)** (1.21) (2.16)** 
  
WML 0.009 0.015 0.021 0.050 0.058 
  
 
(0.13) (0.23) (0.37) (0.81) (0.91) 
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Value-weighted               
EMKT 0.287 0.214 0.137 0.133 0.250 
  
 
(3.60)** (3.82)** (2.54)** (2.45)** (2.38)** 
  
SMB 1.060 0.763 0.652 0.683 0.770 
  
 
(5.68)** (5.04)** (6.28)** (6.81)** (4.55)** 
  
HML 0.196 -0.040 0.152 0.104 -0.026 
  
 
(1.37) (-0.36) (1.47) (1.08) (-0.19) 
  
WML -0.071 0.007 0.013 0.036 0.037 
  
  (-0.72) (0.09) (0.17) (0.47) (0.43)     
Panel C. Portfolio Characteristics 
Average PD 10.7144 1.6788 0.5810 0.6172 8.7870 
  
Average SDR β 0.8881 0.0516 0.0081 -0.0025 -0.6166 
  
Average IDR α -5.9819 0.3573 0.3122 0.5973 18.7048 
  
Average size 708.81 1,691.08 1,957.37 1,964.43 1,044.72 
  
Average BM 1.1773 0.7985 0.6703 0.6806 1.0280 
  
Average LR 2.8791 1.2538 0.8418 0.8740 2.2675 
  
Average ROA -0.0251 0.0144 0.0272 0.0256 -0.0093     
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Table 3.7 
Portfolios sorted on the IDR Alpha 
From January 1992 to December 2012, at the beginning of each month, we sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on 
their adjusted IDR alpha in the previous month. We adjust the IDR alphas by dividing them by the country average for 
this month. We report results with the IDR alpha, which we measure as the constant from 24-months rolling regressions of 
the PD on VIX. Portfolio 1 is the portfolio with the lowest IDR alpha and portfolio 5 is the portfolio with the highest IDR 
alpha. The portfolios are held for one month and are then rebalanced. Panel A shows the time-series monthly average of 
the equally and value-weighted portfolio returns and alphas. EMKT is the excess market return, SMB is the return 
difference between small stocks and big stocks, HML is the return difference between value stocks and growth stocks, and 
WML is the return difference between winning stocks and losing stocks. The column "High-Low" shows average monthly 
raw returns and alphas (excess risk-adjusted returns) for portfolios that are long the highest IDR alpha stock quintile and 
short the lowest IDR alpha stock quintile. We denominate returns in euros and express them in percentage terms. Panel B 
shows loadings on the four factors from regressions of the equally and value-weighted excess returns. We calculate the t-
statistics in parentheses from Newey-West (1987) standard errors. ** denotes significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% 
level. Panel C reports PDs, SDR betas, IDR alphas, sizes (in millions of euros), BM, LR and ROA ratios for each 
portfolio. 
Portfolios High α 5 4 3 2 Low α 1 High-Low t-stat 
Panel A. Portfolio Returns 
Equally-weighted 
       
Return 0.6686 0.5484 0.7229 0.8372 0.8545 -0.1858 (-1.17) 
CAPM α 0.3437 0.2203 0.3940 0.5016 0.4904 -0.1467 (-1.04) 
3-factor α 0.2648 0.1605 0.3193 0.4281 0.4049 -0.1401 (-0.93) 
4-factor α 0.1907 0.0888 0.2933 0.3885 0.4263 -0.2357 (-1.32) 
Value-weighted 
       
Return 0.4450 0.4243 0.5613 0.6981 0.9573 -0.5124 (-1.97)** 
CAPM α 0.0847 0.1073 0.2678 0.3691 0.5894 -0.5046 (-2.00)** 
3-factor α 0.0675 0.0905 0.2106 0.3434 0.5682 -0.5007 (-1.86)* 
4-factor α 0.0504 0.0209 0.2197 0.3058 0.6456 -0.5952 (-1.81)* 
Panel B. Four-Factor Regression Coefficients 
Equally-weighted 
       
EMKT 0.192 0.192 0.184 0.199 0.245 
  
 
(3.53)** (4.10)** (3.25)** (3.65)** (3.35)** 
  
SMB 0.851 0.706 0.740 0.756 0.903 
  
 
(6.40)** (5.95)** (6.73)** (6.60)** (6.18)** 
  
HML 0.198 0.154 0.174 0.175 0.182 
  
 
(1.93) (1.68) (1.69) (1.69) (1.42) 
  
WML 0.060 0.058 0.021 0.032 -0.017 
  
 
(0.88) (1.02) (0.32) (0.52) (-0.24) 
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Value-weighted               
EMKT 0.265 0.174 0.110 0.196 0.260 
  
 
(2.51)** (3.51)** (2.01)** (3.33)** (3.27)** 
  
SMB 0.975 0.608 0.622 0.738 0.978 
  
 
(5.50)** (5.47)** (6.37)** (5.85)** (5.23)** 
  
HML 0.032 0.053 0.123 0.062 0.011 
  
 
(0.24) (0.52) (1.22) (0.61) (0.08) 
  
WML 0.014 0.056 -0.007 0.030 -0.062 
  
  (0.13) (0.79) (-0.10) (0.38) (-0.61)     
Panel C. Portfolio Characteristics 
Average PD 14.1359 0.9728 0.3755 0.9788 5.9189 
  
Average SDR β -0.5192 0.0186 0.0159 0.0586 0.7511 
  
Average IDR α 22.5424 0.4605 0.0017 -0.3840 -8.5594 
  
Average size 685.71 1,731.89 2,058.58 1,792.29 1,096.63 
  
Average BM 1.2175 0.7378 0.6510 0.7336 1.0144 
  
Average LR 3.3213 1.0551 0.7350 1.0685 1.9494 
  
Average ROA -0.0328 0.0195 0.0291 0.0203 -0.0036     
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Table 3.8 
Portfolios sorted on the Physical PD controlled by the SDR beta 
From January 1992 to December 2012, at the beginning of each month, we sort stocks into three portfolios based 
on their SDR beta in the previous month. Within each portfolio, we further sort the stocks into three portfolios, 
based on their past month's PD. We adjust both SDR betas and PDs by the country average for this month. The 
sequential two-sort procedure produces nine portfolios in total. The portfolios are held for one month and are then 
rebalanced. Panel A shows the time-series monthly average of the value-weighted returns for the nine portfolios 
as well as average monthly raw returns and alphas (excess risk-adjusted returns) for portfolios that are long the 
highest PD stock portfolio and short the lowest PD stock portfolio for all three SDR beta tertiles. We denominate 
returns in euros and express them in percentage terms. We calculate t-statistics in parentheses from Newey-West 
(1987) standard errors. ** denotes significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. Panel B reports PDs, SDR 
betas, IDR alphas, sizes (in millions of euros), BM, LR and ROA ratios for each portfolio. 
 
High PD Medium PD Low PD High-Low t-stat 
Panel A. Portfolio Returns 
Return      
High β 0.5417 0.5244 0.7706 -0.2289 (-0.52) 
Medium β 0.4619 0.5882 0.7573 -0.2954 (-0.92) 
Low β 0.3950 0.4577 0.5273 -0.1323 (-0.43) 
CAPM α      
High β 0.1583 0.1259 0.4206 -0.2622 (-0.60) 
Medium β 0.1106 0.2710 0.4666 -0.3560 (-1.19) 
Low β 0.0219 0.1123 0.2382 -0.2163 (-0.74) 
3-factor α      
High β -0.0891 0.0599 0.4366 -0.5256 (-1.52) 
Medium β 0.0302 0.2105 0.4493 -0.4191 (-1.63) 
Low β -0.1291 0.0557 0.2529 -0.3820 (-1.53) 
4-factor α      
High β -0.1206 0.1737 0.4320 -0.5525 (-1.56) 
Medium β 0.1028 0.1532 0.4304 -0.3276 (-1.14) 
Low β -0.2094 -0.0754 0.2392 -0.4486 (-1.54) 
Panel B. Portfolio Characteristics 
Average Probability of Default      
High β 19.1166 2.2405 0.3490   
Medium β 1.9067 0.0481 0.0016   
Low β 16.2516 0.3921 0.0012   
Average SDR Beta      
High β 1.0535 0.4216 0.2041   
Medium β 0.0176 0.0099 0.0023   
Low β -0.8949 -0.1651 -0.0532   
Average IDR Alpha      
High β -3.5759 -4.3234 -2.4638   
Medium β 1.1159 -0.0774 -0.0148   
Low β 28.3705 4.6544 1.4518   
Average Size      
High β 362.54 845.58 2,020.93   
Medium β 853.24 1,942.74 3,026.05   
Low β 396.84 1,126.23 2,683.99   
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Average Book-to-Market      
High β 1.4525 0.9930 0.6714   
Medium β 0.9187 0.6279 0.4913   
Low β 1.3291 0.8114 0.5432   
Average Leverage Ratio      
High β 4.2396 1.7275 0.8601   
Medium β 1.4752 0.7502 0.4095   
Low β 3.4413 1.2164 0.5498   
Average Return-on-Assets      
High β -0.0529 -0.0029 0.0236   
Medium β 0.0089 0.0308 0.0378   
Low β -0.0393 0.0164 0.0349   
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Table 3.9 
Portfolios sorted on the Physical PD controlled by the IDR alpha 
From January 1992 to December 2012, at the beginning of each month, we sort stocks into three portfolios based 
on their IDR alpha in the previous month. Within each portfolio, we further sort the stocks into three portfolios, 
based on their past month's PD. We adjust both IDR alphas and PDs by the country average for this month. The 
sequential two-sort procedure produces nine portfolios in total. The portfolios are held for one month and are then 
rebalanced. Panel A shows the time-series monthly average of the value-weighted returns for the nine portfolios 
as well as average monthly raw returns and alphas (excess risk-adjusted returns) for portfolios that are long the 
highest PD stock portfolio and short the lowest PD stock portfolio for all three IDR alpha tertiles. We denominate 
returns in euros and express them in percentage terms. We calculate t-statistics in parentheses from Newey-West 
(1987) standard errors. ** denotes significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. Panel B reports PDs, SDR 
betas, IDR alphas, sizes (in millions of euros), BM, LR and ROA ratios for each portfolio. 
  High PD Medium PD Low PD High-Low t-stat 
Panel A. Portfolio Returns 
Return           
High α -0.1105 0.2944 0.6686 -0.7791 (-1.90)* 
Medium α 0.6117 0.4217 0.6185 -0.0068 (-0.03) 
Low α 0.8658 0.8218 0.8121 0.0537 (0.15) 
CAPM α           
High α -0.4474 -0.0749 0.3600 -0.8074 (-2.03)** 
Medium α 0.2514 0.1110 0.3369 -0.0855 (-0.34) 
Low α 0.4839 0.4371 0.4807 0.0032 (0.01) 
3-factor α           
High α -0.5367 -0.2476 0.3854 -0.9221 (-2.45)** 
Medium α 0.1781 0.0852 0.3037 -0.1256 (-0.61) 
Low α 0.3494 0.3890 0.4682 -0.1188 (-0.43) 
4-factor α 
     
High α -0.6182 -0.3495 0.3408 -0.9591 (-2.36)** 
Medium α 0.2728 0.0637 0.2931 -0.0204 (-0.08) 
Low α 0.3286 0.4680 0.4682 -0.1397 (-0.51) 
Panel B. Portfolio Characteristics 
Average Probability of Default 
     
High α 24.7076 2.0970 0.0269 
  
Medium α 1.4230 0.0179 0.0002 
  
Low α 10.9104 0.9728 0.1867     
Average SDR Beta           
High α -0.6487 -0.1936 -0.0710 
  
Medium α 0.0488 0.0079 0.0017 
  
Low α 1.0079 0.2979 0.1347     
Average IDR Alpha           
High α 30.4494 8.2601 2.6320 
  
Medium α 0.0790 -0.0522 -0.0042 
  
Low α -10.3704 -3.8171 -1.8405     
Average Size           
High α 304.65 695.78 2,305.09 
  
Medium α 869.65 1,964.63 3,044.43 
  
Low α 525.11 1,205.18 2,337.58     
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Average Book-to-Market           
High α 1.4969 0.9854 0.6060 
  
Medium α 0.8975 0.6193 0.4949 
  
Low α 1.2925 0.8516 0.5959     
Average Leverage Ratio           
High α 4.7897 1.8378 0.7441 
  
Medium α 1.3513 0.6996 0.3793 
  
Low α 2.8937 1.3207 0.6827     
Average Return-on-Assets 
     
High α -0.0606 -0.0063 0.0274 
  
Medium α 0.0104 0.0318 0.0392 
  
Low α -0.0303 0.0138 0.0315     
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Table 3.10 
Portfolios sorted on the SDR beta controlled by the physical PD 
From January 1992 to December 2012, at the beginning of each month, we sort stocks into three portfolios based on 
their PD in the previous month. Within each portfolio, we further sort the stocks into three portfolios, based on their 
past month's SDR beta. We adjust PDs and SDR betas by the country average for this month. The sequential two-sort 
procedure produces nine portfolios in total. The portfolios are held for one month and are then rebalanced. Panel A 
shows the time-series monthly average of the value-weighted returns, respectively, for the 9 portfolios as well as 
average monthly raw returns and alphas (excess risk-adjusted returns) for portfolios that are long the highest SDR beta 
stock portfolio and short the lowest SDR beta stock portfolio for all three PD tertiles. We denominate returns in euros 
and express them in percentage terms. We calculate t-statistics in parentheses from Newey-West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. ** denotes significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% 
level. Panel B reports PDs, SDR betas, IDR alphas, sizes (in millions of euros), BM, LR and ROA ratios for each 
portfolio. 
  High β Medium β Low β High-Low t-stat 
Panel A. Portfolio Returns 
Return           
High PD 0.4605 0.4083 0.4810 -0.0204 (-0.06) 
Medium PD 0.5666 0.4726 0.5833 -0.0168 (-0.09) 
Low PD 0.8064 0.6782 0.4111 0.3953 (2.63)** 
CAPM α           
High PD 0.0607 0.0277 0.1303 -0.0696 (-0.21) 
Medium PD 0.1960 0.1172 0.2209 -0.0248 (-0.12) 
Low PD 0.5002 0.3909 0.1221 0.3781 (2.49)** 
3-factor α           
High PD -0.0488 -0.1139 -0.0246 -0.0242 (-0.07) 
Medium PD 0.1393 0.0625 0.1728 -0.0334 (-0.16) 
Low PD 0.5147 0.3431 0.1201 0.3946 (2.35)** 
4-factor α 
     
High PD -0.0637 0.0353 -0.0020 -0.0616 (-0.19) 
Medium PD 0.1528 0.0401 0.1838 -0.0310 (-0.14) 
Low PD 0.4314 0.2986 0.0712 0.3602 (1.94)* 
Panel B. Portfolio Characteristics 
Average Probability of Default 
     
High PD 16.9449 6.3173 16.4642 
  
Medium PD 0.2626 0.1492 0.1530 
  
Low PD 0.0016 0.0012 0.0016     
Average SDR Beta           
High PD 1.1806 0.0673 -0.9207 
  
Medium PD 0.3340 0.0172 -0.1212 
  
Low PD 0.0717 0.0022 -0.0374     
Average IDR Alpha           
High PD -6.5717 2.8973 28.8355 
  
Medium PD -3.9248 -0.4568 3.6604 
  
Low PD -0.8194 -0.0064 1.1237     
Average Size           
High PD 391.39 540.80 374.53 
  
Medium PD 1,205.64 1,300.03 1,138.04 
  
Low PD 2,703.03 2,878.01 2,725.56     
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Average Book-to-Market           
High PD 1.3957 1.1714 1.3493 
  
Medium PD 0.8010 0.7462 0.7814 
  
Low PD 0.5462 0.5162 0.5311     
Average Leverage Ratio           
High PD 3.9661 2.3535 3.4811 
  
Medium PD 1.2367 1.0154 1.0950 
  
Low PD 0.5651 0.4552 0.4941     
Average Return-on-Assets 
     
High PD -0.0476 -0.0175 -0.0401 
  
Medium PD 0.0144 0.0227 0.0191 
  
Low PD 0.0329 0.0373 0.0361     
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3.8 Figures of Chapter 3 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 3.1. Merton Measure, Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi Measure and Volatility Index. The figure plots the monthly 
aggregate Merton (left scale) and CHS (right scale) measures for firms in the overall sample (Panel A) and the monthly aggregate 
Merton measure (left scale) and monthly VIX (right scale) values (Panel B). The columns denote recession periods in the euro 
area, as indicated by the OECD.  
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3.9 Appendices of Chapter 3 
 
Appendix 3.1 The Merton Measure 
Following Vassalou and Xing (2004), we allow only equity and debt in the capital structure of 
the firm. In Merton’s model, equity can be viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets with a 
strike price equal to the value of debt. The reason is that equity is a residual claim, i.e. equity 
holders lay claim to all the cash flows left over only after all the debt holders have been satisfied.  
The market value of the firm’s assets follow a geometric Brownian motion as below: 
𝑑𝑉𝐴 = 𝜇𝑉𝐴𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑑𝑊,         (A.1) 
where 𝑉𝐴 is the market value of the firm’s assets, with an instantaneous drift 𝜇, and instantaneous 
volatility 𝜎𝐴. 𝑊 is a standard Wiener process. 
The market value of the firm’s equity is given by the Black and Scholes (1973) formula for 
call options: 
𝑉𝐸 = 𝑉𝐴𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑋𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2),          (A.2) 
𝑑1 =
ln(
𝑉𝐴
𝑋
)+(𝑟+
𝜎𝐴
2
2
)𝑇
𝜎𝐴√𝑇
, 𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝐴√𝑇,       (A.3) 
where 𝑉𝐸 is the market value of firm’s equity, 𝑋 is the book value of debt that has a maturity 
equal to 𝑇, 𝑟 is the risk-free rate, and 𝑁 is the cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution. 
First, we calculate the volatility of equity 𝜎𝐸 from the daily data of the past 12 months and 
use it as the initial value for the estimation of 𝜎𝐴. Then, from (A.2) and (A.3), we compute 𝑉𝐴 for 
each trading day of the past 12 months using 𝑉𝐸 of that day and 𝑋. As Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
and KMV do, we use current liabilities (WC03101) plus half the long-term debt (WC03251) to 
102 
calculate the book value of debt X. Also, to account for reporting delays that may influence data 
availability, we use the book value of debt at the fiscal year end, only after 4 months have passed 
from the fiscal year end. From the daily values of 𝑉𝐴 we calculate 𝜎𝐴 for the next iteration. We 
repeat this process until the values of 𝜎𝐴 from two consecutive observations converge. Once we 
obtain a converged value of 𝜎𝐴, we use it to find 𝑉𝐴 from (A.2) and (A.3). We repeat the process 
at the end of every month and obtain monthly values for 𝜎𝐴. We use the 1-year T-bill rate at the 
end of the month as the risk-free rate. Once we obtain daily values for 𝑉𝐴, we compute the drift 𝜇 
as the mean of the change in ln 𝑉𝐴. Finally, using the normal distribution implied by Merton, we 
can show that the physical PD at time 𝑡 is given by the following formula: 
𝑃𝐷𝑡 = 𝑁(−𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑡) = 𝑁(−
ln(
𝑉𝐴,𝑡
𝑋𝑡
)+(𝜇−
𝜎𝐴
2
2
)𝑇
𝜎𝐴√𝑇
),    (A.4) 
where we refer to 𝑃𝐷𝑡 as the Merton measure. 
In order to evaluate the performance of the Merton measure, we employ two widely used 
measures, the Hosmer and Lemeshow (2010) grouping and the area under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. 
First, based on the Hosmer and Lemeshow method, each month we rank the estimated PDs 
and divide them into deciles. Out of the ten groups created (each one containing 1/10 of the firms 
in that month), the first group has the smallest average estimated PD and the last the largest. 
Next, we aggregate the number of defaulted firms in each decile for each month over the sample 
period and calculate the corresponding percentages of the defaulted firms in each decile. The 
percentage of defaulted firms in the last decile is 58.72%. When we look at the last three deciles, 
this percentage becomes 79.87%. This provides us initial evidence that the Merton measure 
captures important default-related information. 
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Second, we construct the area under the ROC curve (AUC) from the estimated PDs versus 
the actual status of the firms in each month for all possible cut-off probability values. 
Specifically, the curve plots the ratio of correctly classified defaulted firms to actual defaulted 
firms (sensitivity) and the ratio of wrongly classified healthy firms to actual healthy firms (1 - 
specificity) for all possible cut-offs. The AUC ranges from zero to one. A model with an AUC 
close to 0.5 is considered a random model with no discriminatory power. An AUC of 0.7 to 0.8 
represents good discriminatory power, an AUC of 0.8 to 0.9 very good discriminatory power and 
an AUC over 0.9 is exceptional and extremely unusual. The AUC that we obtain is equal to 
0.8212. This result further supports our belief that the Merton measure is indeed a good default 
predictor. 
As a supplementary and final test, we follow Vassalou and Xing (2004) and compare the PDs 
of the defaulted firms (treatment group) with the PDs of a group of non-defaulted firms (control 
group). For each defaulted firm, we choose a healthy firm of similar size (market capitalization) 
and same industry (4-digit ICB code). We try to match the size of defaulted and healthy firms on 
the exact month or year of delisting due to default whenever possible. Figure 3.1.1 shows the 
average PDs of both groups up to 160 months before delisting. It is apparent that the PDs of both 
groups move closely together up to four years (48 months) before delisting. In the beginning of 
the fourth year before delisting though, the average PD of the treatment group goes up sharply, 
whereas the average PD of the control group does not follow this extreme behavior. Its moderate 
upward movement can be attributed to general worsening economic conditions in times of many 
defaults that move upward all PDs in the economy. The average PD at 𝑡 = 0 is 0.14 for healthy 
firms and 0.34 for defaulted firms (around 2.5 times higher). This final test provides additional 
support that the Merton measure captures default risk successfully. 
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Figure 3.1.1. Average Merton Measure of treatment group (defaulted firms) and control group (healthy firms). We choose 
firms in the control group that have similar size (market capitalization) and the same four-digit industry code as those in the 
treatment group.  Specifically for size, we select firms that have similar size with their defaulted counterparts immediately before 
they delist. We also match the month or year of delisting whenever possible. 
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Appendix 3.2 Calculation of the CHS Measure 
Following Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008), we use eight variables to calculate the CHS 
measure (all converted into euros). NIMTA is the ratio of net income (WC07250) to the market-
adjusted version of total assets, where the latter is the sum of the market value of equity and the 
book value of liabilities (WC03351); TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market-
adjusted version of total assets; EXRET is the monthly log excess return relative to the MSCI 
index of the country that is the firm’s main market; SIGMA is the standard deviation of the daily 
returns over the previous year; RSIZE is the log ratio of firm’s market value to the total market 
value of firms in the same country and month; CASHMTA is the ratio of cash and short-term 
investments (WC02001) to the market-adjusted version of total assets; MB is the market-to-book 
ratio; and PRICE is the log price per share winsorized at the first and third quartiles of the pooled 
price distribution. We winsorize all other variables at the first and ninety-ninth percentile of their 
pooled distributions. We lag all accounting data by at least 4 months and market data by 1 
month, to ensure their availability at the time of default prediction. To avoid excluding firms 
shortly before they default, we use data for up to 12 months if more recent data are unavailable. 
Table 3.2.1 presents summary statistics of these variables. A comparison of Panels B and C 
reveals the differences in the defaulted observations. They have lower profitability, higher 
leverage, lower stock excess returns, higher stock volatility, lower MB ratios and lower prices 
compared to the healthy observations. They are also smaller. Interestingly, they do not differ 
much in their cash holdings. 
Concerning the applied estimation method, we assume that the marginal probability of 
default over the next period follows a logistic distribution and is given by: 
𝑃𝐷(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) =
1
1 + exp(−α −𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1)
 , (B.1) 
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where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator that equals one if the firm defaults in period 𝑡 and zero otherwise, i.e. if 
the firm disappears from the sample for some reason other than default, such as delisting due to a 
merger; and 𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 is a function of firm-specific characteristics that includes a vector of 
predictor variables 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 known at the end of the previous period. Finally, to capture cross-
country differences, we follow two different methods: (i) we estimate separate models for each 
country; (ii) we introduce country fixed effects and estimate only one model. 
Table 3.2.2 reports the regression results only under method (ii) due to space limitations. The 
coefficients confirm the findings from Table 3.2.1. The CHS measure is negatively related to 
profitability (NIMTA), excess return (EXRET), size (RSIZE), and PRICE. It is positively related 
to leverage (TLMTA), volatility (SIGMA), liquidity (CASHMTA) and MB. Most coefficients 
are significant at a 5% level, with the exception of CASHMTA and MB. The pseudo-R
2
 
(McFadden’s R2) is 17.4%, indicating a rather good fit.  The pseudo-R2 may look low when 
compared to R
2 
values of linear regression models, but such low values are normal in logistic 
regression. 
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Table 3.2.1 
 Summary Statistics for the CHS Measure 
The table reports summary statistics for all of the accounting and market variables used to calculate the CHS measure. NIMTA is the ratio 
of net income (WC07250) to the market-adjusted version of total assets, where the latter is the sum of the market value of equity and the book 
value of liabilities (WC03351); TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market-adjusted version of total assets; EXRET is the monthly 
log excess return relative to the MSCI index of the country that is the firm’s main market; RSIZE is the log ratio of firm’s market value to the 
total market value of firms in the same country and month; SIGMA is the standard deviation of the daily returns over the previous year; 
CASHMTA is the ratio of cash and short-term investments (WC02001) to the market-adjusted version of total assets; MB is the market-to-
book ratio; and PRICE is the log price per share winsorized at the first and third quartiles of the pooled price distribution. All other variables 
are truncated at the first and ninety-ninth percentile of their pooled distributions. Panel A describes the distributions of the variables in all 
observations, Panel B describes the sample of healthy observations, and Panel C describes the defaulted observations. 
 NIMTA TLMTA EXRET RSIZE SIGMA CASHMTA MB PRICE 
Panel A. All 
Mean 0.01 0.45 0.00 -7.98 0.41 0.09 2.33 1.65 
Median 0.03 0.44 -0.01 -8.04 0.36 0.06 1.63 1.62 
Std.Dev. 0.06 0.23 0.10 2.41 0.20 0.09 2.03 1.03 
Min -0.16 0.07 -0.19 -12.01 0.15 0.00 0.40 0.39 
Max 0.09 0.84 0.19 -3.61 0.91 0.33 8.22 2.92 
N 761,779 761,897 796,573 803,106 803,106 761,578 802,965 803,106 
Panel B. Healthy 
Mean 0.01 0.45 0.00 -7.98 0.41 0.09 2.33 1.65 
Median 0.03 0.44 -0.01 -8.04 0.36 0.06 1.63 1.62 
Std.Dev. 0.06 0.23 0.10 2.41 0.20 0.09 2.03 1.03 
N 761,257 761,374 795,979 802,511 802,511 761,055 802,370 802,511 
Panel C. Defaulted 
Mean -0.07 0.64 -0.05 -10.56 0.66 0.10 1.48 0.74 
Median -0.08 0.77 -0.04 -11.39 0.71 0.05 0.69 0.39 
Std.Dev. 0.09 0.25 0.13 1.88 0.24 0.11 1.90 0.74 
N 522 523 594 595 595 523 595 595 
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Table 3.2.2 
Regression Results for the CHS Measure 
The table reports results from the multi-period logit regression of the default indicator on the eight predictor 
variables. NIMTA is the ratio of net income (WC07250) to the market-adjusted version of total assets, where 
the latter is the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities (WC03351); TLMTA is the 
ratio of total liabilities to the market-adjusted version of total assets; EXRET is the monthly log excess return 
relative to the MSCI index of the country that is the firm’s main market; RSIZE is the log ratio of firm’s market 
value to the total market value of firms in the same country and month; SIGMA is the standard deviation of the 
daily returns over the previous year; CASHMTA is the ratio of cash and short-term investments (WC02001) to 
the market-adjusted version of total assets; MB is the market-to-book ratio; and PRICE is the log price 
truncated at the first and third quartiles of the pooled price distribution. We truncate all other variables at the 
first and ninety-ninth percentile of their pooled distributions. We lag all accounting data by at least 4 months 
and market data by 1 month. The model is estimated for January 1990 to December 2012, with yearly 
observations. Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-square values in parentheses. Standard errors 
are cluster-robust to correct for dependence between firm-year observations of the same firm. Numbers 
significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
NIMTA -4.449 (-7.15) 
TLMTA 2.914 (11.33) 
EXRET -1.550 (-3.91) 
RSIZE -0.455 (-10.29) 
SIGMA 2.311 (9.19) 
CASHMTA 0.367 (0.75) 
MB 0.014 (0.51) 
PRICE -0.253 (-3.32) 
Constant -14.160 (-27.54) 
Firm-year observations 755,243  
Firms 7,980  
Distressed firms 522  
Country fixed effects Yes  
Pseudo R-squared 0.174  
Log likelihood -3568.9  
Wald test 970.0  
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Chapter 4 Are Private Equity Backed Initial Public Offerings Any 
Different? Timing, Information Asymmetry and Post-IPO Survival 
 
“I am not against Private Equity in general, but when it comes to IPOs they are in the business to 
get the highest price for their investors. This means there is a tendency to flatter the books to 
make the investment look a lot better than it is.” (James Laing, Aberdeen Asset Management, in 
the Financial Times, 18 February 2014). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this study with the term Private Equity (PE) I refer to both buyouts (BOs) and venture capital 
(VC) transactions, which are the largest and most important subclasses of PE. BO and VC 
sponsors are similar in terms of involvement and contribution to their portfolio companies. The 
main differences between the two are the companies they invest in and the methods they use to 
create value. VC targets early stage companies with high growth potential (often start-ups based 
on new technology or other innovation) and uses minority equity investment. BOs target larger 
and more mature companies (typically with above average profit margins, tangible assets and 
stable cash flows) and often use leverage to finance acquisitions (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). 
Usually studies focus on either BOs or VC, but here I examine both, differentiating between the 
two. I focus on the period just before, during and after exit of PE sponsors and examine only 
exits via IPOs. 
There are three ways that a PE sponsor can exit a portfolio company: (i) a sale to another 
financial buyer (e.g. another PE fund - in thecase of BOs, this is a secondary BO), (ii) a sale to a 
strategic buyer (i.e. a trade sale), and (iii) an IPO. I study this latter IPO exit because the 
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literature argues that they can potentially involve more information asymmetry than other exit 
strategies. Bayar and Chemmanur (2011) build a theoretical model that predicts that, in high IPO 
valuation periods, companies that are harder to value by public investors are more likely to go 
public than be acquired.
16
 In another theoretical paper, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) show 
that public investors produce less information than acquirers due to the free-rider problem.
17
 
Both studies suggest that information asymmetries between insiders and public investors can 
result in inflated valuations, but that acquirers (both financial and strategic ones) can value firms 
more accurately. This is because financial buyers perform sophisticated analyses and strategic 
buyers thoroughly investigate potential synergies before investing. 
The role of PE sponsors, as professional insiders, in such a setting is interesting. On the one 
hand, they may be more able to “exploit” the IPO market than insiders of stand-alone companies. 
On the other, every effort to “fool” public investors may be detrimental for their reputation and, 
as a consequence, their liquidity. It is possible also that BO and VC sponsors behave differently 
from each other. Academic literature as well as practitioners suggest that they may have different 
motives when taking portfolio companies public. BO sponsors prefer to exit quickly as these 
deals are very large and involve high potential losses. Thus, they may rush companies into 
premature IPOs. In accordance with this argument, Cao (2011) finds that BO deals that are 
exited quickly default more often post-IPO. VC sponsors, instead, undertake more risk that BO 
sponsors as only a small percentage of their companies make it to an IPO (the “stars”). It is a real 
opportunity for VC sponsors to establish their reputation from these transactions and, as a 
                                                          
16
 In a following paper, Bayar and Chemmanur (2012) empirically confirm these findings. 
17 Whereas the information production cost is incurred only by a small group of public investors, the benefits are 
shared among all, reducing the incentive of any single public investor to engage in information production. 
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consequence, they are unlikely to “fool” the IPO market. In accordance with this intuition, Neus 
and Waltz (2005) show that VC sponsors have incentives to report the true quality of their 
portfolio companies during the IPO process. 
In my study, I focus on IPO timing, information asymmetry and post-IPO survival. I also ask 
whether PE sponsors time their IPOs better, whether they inflate valuations more and whether 
they seek to sell firms with poor prospects (“unload lemons”) compared to insiders of stand-
alone companies. In my analysis I differentiate between BO and VC-backed IPOs in order to 
uncover their potentially different motives. My study is related to four literature strands that I 
present below. 
The first is the strand on IPO timing, which refers to either performance or market timing. In 
the performance timing literature, studies test whether companies time their IPOs to occur in 
years when there are exceptionally favorable market fundamentals. In an early study, Degeorge 
and Zeckhauser (1993) study a sample of 62 reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs)
18
 and find that 
LBO sponsors time their IPOs in years when their operating performance increases more than 
that of comparable companies. More recently, Cao (2011) studies 594 RLBOs from 1981 to 2006 
and does not find evidence of performance timing. He does not include comparisons with other 
companies, unlike Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) which do make these comparisons. In the 
market timing literature, Ritter and Welch (2002) argue that market conditions are the most 
important factor in a company’s decision to go public. Schulz (2003) characterizes this 
phenomenon as “pseudo” market timing because companies do not predict market peaks but 
simply follow their peers and go public at high valuation periods. Similarly, Alti (2005) shows 
theoretically that high offer price realizations have spillover effects that attract subsequent IPOs. 
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 These are LBO-backed IPOs. 
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Pastor and Veronesi (2005) develop similar predictions and confirm them empirically. For LBO 
sponsors, Cao (2011) studies the duration of LBO-backing pre-IPO and documents a negative 
relationship with high valuation periods and post-IPO default rates and a positive relationship 
with operating improvements. For VC sponsors, Lerner (1994) explores the exit choice between 
IPOs versus acquisitions and shows that they are particularly proficient at taking their portfolio 
companies public near market peaks. Similar are the findings of Ball, Chiu and Smith (2011) 
who argue in support of “pseudo” market timing. As Cao (2011) though, these two studies do not 
include comparisons with other firms. 
The second strand is on IPO underpricing. Existing academic literature uses short-run 
underpricing (first-day returns) as a measure of information asymmetry and finds higher 
underpricing for VC-backed IPOs and lower for BO-backed IPOs.
19
 Gompers (1996) argues that 
younger VC sponsors need to establish reputation in order to successfully raise capital for new 
funds (grandstanding hypothesis) and they use underpricing as a device to achieve this. For 
example, they might purposely leave money on the table to signal quality. Lee and Wahal (2004) 
report similar results with Gompers (1996) and find greater underpricing for VC-backed IPOs 
compared to other matched IPOs. Hogan, Olson and Kish (2001) find that first-day returns of 
RLBOs are higher from other IPOs in the period 1987-1998. However, these studies do not look 
at IPO proceeds to address the issue of inflated valuations. 
The third strand focuses on default risk in PE transactions. These studies usually track 
companies only during the period that they are PE-backed, thus they examine default as an exit 
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 An exception is Megginson and Weiss (1991) who examine an early small sample of VC-backed IPOs and find 
that they are less underpriced than matched IPOs (certification role of VC). Barry et al. (1990) find lower 
underpricing for VC-backed IPOs with better monitors (monitoring role of VC). 
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outcome. On the BO side, two early studies of the first wave of BOs are Kaplan and Stein (1993) 
and Andrade and Kaplan (1998). Studies of the second wave of BOs often involve comparisons 
with other companies. Tykvova and Borell (2012), Hotchkiss, Smith, and Stromberg (2013) and 
Wilson and Wright (2013) document similar default rates between BO-backed and comparable 
companies in Europe, the US and the UK respectively. On the VC side, Puri and Zarutskie 
(2012) find that cumulative failure rates of VC-backed companies are lower relative to 
comparable companies. Of the above studies, only Hotchkiss, Smith, and Stromberg (2013) look 
also at defaults post-exit and find that BO-exited companies have lower default rates than others. 
This suggests that BO sponsors leave their portfolio companies in good financial condition. 
However, they do not study IPO exits in particular. I am aware of two more studies that examine 
default risk post-exit: Harford and Kolasinski (2013) for BO-backed companies and Jain and 
Kini (2000) for VC-backed companies. Harford and Kolasinski (2013) study strategic 
acquisitions and find that having been owned previously by a BO fund has no impact on whether 
the company will eventually undergo distressed restructuring. Jain and Kini (2000) study a small 
sample of 877 IPOs that took place in the period 1977-1990 and find that VC-backing increases 
the survival likelihood. 
Whereas only Jain and Kini (2000) focus on post-IPO defaults, the fourth strand includes 
plenty of studies that focus on post-IPO stock and operating performance. On stock returns, Cao 
and Lerner (2009) and Brav and Gompers (1997) do not find strong evidence that BO and VC-
backed IPOs respectively outperform others. On operating performance, early studies of a few 
RLBOs have apparently contradictory conclusions. Whereas Muscatella and Vetsuypens (1990) 
report improvements, Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) document declines post-IPO. Krishnan et 
al. (2011) study VC-backed IPOs and find that more reputable. VCs contribute to stronger post-
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IPO operating performance. In a comparative framework, Holthausen and Larcker (1996) find 
that the operating performance of RLBOs is stronger than their industries as a whole. 
I make several contributions to this literature. To my knowledge, this is the first study about 
IPO exits of both BO and VC-backed companies. By focusing on an environment of high 
information asymmetry and looking at both types of PE sponsors, I am better able to examine 
their behavior during the IPO process and also uncover potentially different incentives between 
them. Another interesting aspect is my focus on default risk (both pre and post-IPO) instead of 
operating performance. Although the two are related, default risk can be heavily influenced by 
other factors, such as leverage and liquidity. Thus default measures reflect better the company’s 
pre-IPO financial situation. By looking also at actual defaults post-IPO, I offer important insights 
about the solvency situation of portfolio companies after PE sponsors unload them in the IPO 
market. It is also the first study to test if PE sponsors time their IPOs in “hot” periods or rush 
them more than their peers do. Finally, I extend the literature on underpricing and look directly at 
proceeds instead of only first-day returns, so enabling me to compare valuations of similar 
companies. 
In the first part of my analysis, I examine the pre-IPO period in order to address IPO timing 
considerations for PE-backed versus stand-alone IPOs. Initially, I measure pre-IPO default risk 
instead of operating performance (Degeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993; Cao, 2011) and perform 
comparisons between PE-backed and stand-alone companies in a matching framework. After I 
control for leverage (in the case of BO-backing) and profitability (in the case of VC-backing) I 
do not find significant differences in the pre-IPO default measures of PE-backed and matched 
stand-alone IPOs. I interpret this as evidence that PE sponsors do not time their IPOs in years 
that their financial situation is better compared to their peers. Then, on the IPO market timing 
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side, I move to a regression framework to test whether PE sponsors are better able than managers 
of stand-alone companies to time their IPOs for when overall market conditions are more 
favorable. I find neither BO nor VC-backed IPOs to be more common in hot periods. Moreover, 
although I find that, on average, companies enter at a younger age when the IPO market is hot, 
both BO and VC-backed IPOs that take place in hot market periods are older at the time of the 
IPO. The above suggests that PE sponsors do not target their IPOs in hot market periods and do 
not rush their companies into premature IPOs when market conditions are favorable more than 
managers of stand-alone companies do. If anything, they seem to rush them less. 
In the next part of my analysis, I test whether information asymmetries during the IPO 
enable PE sponsors to inflate valuations compared to those achieved by stand-alone companies. 
Conversely, I investigate whether these sponsors' reputation and liquidity concerns mitigate such 
behavior. Consistent with the literature, I find more underpricing for VC-backed IPOs than 
stand-alone IPOs. However, I do not find significant differences in the first-day returns between 
BO-backed and stand-alone IPOs. As a next step, I go beyond past studies and look directly at 
the size of the IPO. Practitioners argue that the size of the IPO does not receive as much 
extensive attention in the media as first-day returns. By comparing the proceeds of BO and VC-
backed IPOs with these of matched stand-alone IPOs, controlling for the float percentage, I can 
further test if these sponsors raise more or less cash. In the case of VC sponsors, the underpricing 
mentioned above together with past literature (Gompers, 1996; Neus and Walz, 2005; Lee and 
Wahal, 2004) suggests that they do not issue overvalued equity. However, the behavior of BO 
sponsors is less clear. As expected, I do not observe significant differences in IPO proceeds 
between VC-backed and matched stand-alone IPOs. Surprisingly, I find that BO-backed IPOs 
have lower IPO proceeds compared to matched stand-alone IPOs. These results suggest that BO 
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sponsors not only do not inflate valuations, but on the contrary, public investors price BO-backed 
IPOs more conservatively. Thus these results contradict the criticism that BO sponsors have a 
tendency to inflate valuations. 
In the last part of my analysis, I examine the post-IPO period in order to address the ultimate 
question of whether PE-backed IPOs delist more due to default or failure than stand-alone IPOs. 
I use actual default and failure rates post-IPO instead of stock or operating performance. With 
this I test whether PE sponsors are more likely than managers of stand-alone companies to take 
problematic portfolio companies public before hidden problems can unfold. By doing so they 
would transfer the risk and loss to public investors. Interestingly, I find that default and failure 
rates of BO-backed versus stand-alone IPOs and VC-backed versus stand-alone IPOs do not 
differ significantly in a matching framework that tracks companies up to five years post-IPO. 
When I move to a regression framework that uses all firm-year observations post-IPO, I even 
find evidence that BO and VC-backed IPOs default less frequently than others. Finally, in 
accordance with the theoretical model of Yung, Colak and Wang (2008), I find that IPOs that 
take place in hot market periods are significantly more likely to default, but this result is not any 
stronger for BO or VC-backed examples. These results indicate that PE sponsors are not any 
more likely than managers of stand-alone companies to “fool” the market and it is in accordance 
with the intuition that if these sponsors are caught “cheating”, they will struggle to raise money 
in the future. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the dataset and presents summary 
statistics. Section 4.3 describes the methodology and the reasons for its selection. Section 4.4 
presents the results, and Section 4.5 concludes. 
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4.2 The Data 
I collect data related to the IPOs that took place on the AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE exchanges 
for the period 1975 to 2013. Data is provided by Jay Ritter 20 and also that which is available in 
Thomson Reuter’s SDC Platinum New Issues Database. I follow the literature and exclude IPOs 
with an offer price below $5.00 per share, a total valuation below $1.5 million, unit offers, 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, natural resource partnerships, 
acquisition companies, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), bank and Savings and Loans 
(S&L) IPOs, and firms not listed on CRSP. I end up with 7,033 IPOs out of which 897 are BO-
backed (13%) and 2,763 are VC-backed (39%). I identify the BO and VC-backed IPOs as 
follows: For years 1984 to 2006, Jerry Cao provides me with his data on BO-backed IPOs. For 
years 2002 to 2013, Jay Ritter provides me with his data on VC-backed IPOs. For the remaining 
years, I complement these data with Thomson Reuter’s VentureXpert Database. I follow Jay 
Ritter’s classification and characterize growth-capital backed IPOs as VC-backed.21 
I take offer dates, offer prices, file price ranges, proceeds, number of shares, SIC codes, 
headquarter states, over-allotment details and other IPO specific data items mostly from SDC 
Platinum New Issues Database and complement them where possible with data from Jay Ritter. I 
collect underwriter rankings and founding dates from Jay Ritter’s website (based on Loughran 
and Ritter, 2004). To construct “IPO hotness” measures and to identify IPOs that receive star 
analyst coverage, I use the same website. Specifically, for my IPO hotness measures, I collect 
monthly data on the number of IPOs, average first-day returns and the percentage of deals each 
month that are priced above the midpoint of the original file price range (based on Ibbotson, 
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 Field and Karpoff (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) use earlier versions of this dataset. 
21
 Growth capital is a hybrid form between venture capital and buyouts, but closer to the first. 
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Sindelar, and Ritter, 1994). For IPOs that receive star coverage, I collect data on analysts (based 
on Cliff and Denis, 2004; Bradley and Ritter, 2008; Fang and Yasuda, 2009; Liu and Ritter, 
2011). To calculate financial ratios, default measures and first-day returns, I get financial 
information from Compustat, and delisting and price information from CRSP. Compustat 
generally has financial information available up to two years pre-IPO. Codes DLDTE provide 
the delisting date and DLRSN the delisting reason. The standard matching variable is the 9-digit 
CUSIP, complemented with the ticker symbol where necessary. 
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 provide summary statistics of my sample. Panel A of Table 4.1 
shows the industry distribution of all IPOs, BO-backed IPOs and VC-backed IPOs across two-
digit SIC codes that have at least 30 IPOs. There is significant variation across industries with 
BO-backed IPOs representing 45.10% of all IPOs in SIC code 53 (Food stores) and VC-backed 
IPOs representing the vast majority (64.38%) of all IPOs in SIC code 28 (Chemicals and Allied 
Products). In absolute terms, there are large clusters of both BO-backed and VC-backed IPOs in 
SIC code 73 (Business services). In Panel B, I show the geographic distribution of all IPOs, BO-
backed IPOs and VC-backed IPOs noting states in which the company is headquartered. I 
display the distribution only for states that represent at least 2% of all IPOs (at least 140 IPOs). 
VC-backed IPOs represent 63.62% of all IPOs in Massachusetts and 59.80% in California. The 
most BO-backed IPOs are in California (130) and New York (77), and the most VC-backed IPOs 
are in California (1,694) and Massachusetts (306). There is high geographic concentration, with 
45% of all IPOs originating from just four states: California, New York, Texas and 
Massachusetts. The fact that BO and VC sponsors invest in particular types of companies is 
reflected in both company and IPO characteristics, as shown in Panel C. BO-backed IPOs occur 
with older and larger companies (both in terms of assets and sales), whereas the opposite is the 
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case for VC-backed IPOs. BO-backed IPOs also have higher valuations, gross spreads and 
underwriter rankings compared to both stand-alone and VC-backed IPOs. Moreover, they are 
more leveraged. VC-backed IPOs are less profitable on average. Past studies report very similar 
summary statistics (Lee and Wahal, 2004 and others). Consistent with the literature, VC-backed 
IPOs have higher first-day returns (27.86%) and BO-backed IPOs lower first-day returns 
(10.51%) than stand-alone IPOs. Finally, Figure 4.1 plots the number of all IPOs, BO-backed 
IPOs and VC-backed IPOs per year. It is obvious from the graph that both BO and VC-backed 
companies follow the trends of general IPO activity. 
 
4.3 The Methodology 
PE backing represents an endogenous choice for PE sponsors and entrepreneurs since its 
provision and receipt is the outcome of many negotiations between them (Megginson and Weiss, 
1991). This endogenous choice is also reflected at the time of exit in the non-random 
distributions and characteristics of BO and VC-backed IPOs that Table 4.1 demonstrates. The 
non-randomness of these data suggests that I can use this information to construct instruments 
wiht some power to predict BO and VC backing. Once I construct such instruments that are 
correlated with the endogenous choice and control for the selection bias, I use them in a first-
stage regression that predicts BO backing. Then, estimates from the first-stage regressions are 
fed into various matching methods to match BO-backed IPOs with stand-alone IPOs. I repeat 
exactly the same procedure for VC-backed IPOs. It is important to have two sets of estimates, 
one for BO and one for VC backing, since, as shown in Table 4.1, the two kinds of PE invest in 
quite different companies. In many cases, as an alternative to the above matching approach, I 
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also estimate OLS regressions with two dummy variables, one for BO and one for VC backing, 
and various controls. 
I now explain the matching approach in the case of BO backing (since the VC backing case 
is exactly the same). Let us suppose that 𝑡 is a binary random variable that takes the value of 1 if 
an IPO is BO-backed and 0 otherwise. I call 𝑡 the treatment level. Thus IPOs that are BO-backed 
belong to the treatment group and stand-alone IPOs belong to the control group. The potential 
outcome for a firm would when given treatment 𝑡 ∈ {0,1} is 𝑦𝑡. Each 𝑦𝑡 has realizations 𝑦𝑡𝑖. For 
potential outcome variables I examine pre-IPO default measures, underpricing, IPO proceeds and 
post-IPO delistings. The parameter of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATET) which is the average effect of BO-backing on BO-backed IPOs and is given by 𝐸(𝑦1 −
𝑦0|𝑡 = 1, 𝑋), where 𝑋 is a vector of predictor variables. This could be estimated if the following 
condition is recognized: 
𝐸(𝑦1 − 𝑦0|𝑡 = 1, 𝑋) = 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑡 = 1, 𝑋) − 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑡 = 1, 𝑋)    (1) 
𝐸(𝑦1|𝑡 = 1, 𝑋) is the average outcome variable for BO-backed IPOs. However, 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑡 =
1, 𝑋), the average outcome variable that BO-backed IPOs would experience if they did not 
receive BO backing, is unobservable. The traditional approach is to use 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑡 = 0, 𝑋) instead, 
the average outcome variable of stand-alone IPOs. Unfortunately, because BO backing is not 
randomly assigned but represents an endogenous choice, this creates a bias. The bias is defined 
as: 
𝐵(𝑋) =  𝐸(𝑦0|𝑡 = 1, 𝑋) − 𝐸(𝑦0|𝑡 = 0, 𝑋)      (2) 
Rubin (1974, 1977) and Rosenhaum and Rubin (1983) show that, under certain conditions, 
matching on Pr (𝑡 = 1| 𝑋) eliminates the bias and reduces the dimensionality of the problem. I 
use two widely used matching estimator techniques to do that: (i) one-to-one nearest neighbor 
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matching (Rubin, 1974, 1977; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and (ii) one-to-many smoothed 
weighted matching (Heckman et al., 1997). 
With the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching techniques the distance between pairs of 
observations with regard to a set of covariates is calculated. Then each observation of the 
treatment group is matched to a comparable observation of the control group that is closest to it. 
This technique has two different types: propensity score matching; and the full covariate 
matching. Propensity score matching requires the estimation of a model for the endogenous 
choice treatment variable with a vector of 𝑋 observable variables. The predicted probability of 
treatment is then used as the propensity score, and each observation of the treatment group is 
matched with an observation of the control group with the highest propensity score. The full 
covariate matching does not require the estimation of a formal treatment model. The nearest 
neighbor is instead determined by using a weighted function of the covariates for each 
observation. 
The one-to-many smoothed weighted matching techniques use a weighted average of the 
outcomes of several (or perhaps all) observations of the control group to calculate the treatment 
effect. The weight given to each observation of the control group is in proportion to "closeness" 
of the vector of 𝑋 observable variables. Again, there are two main types of this technique, the 
regression-adjusted local linear matching and the inverse probability weighing matching. The 
regression-adjusted (RA) local linear matching performs a linear regression to predict potential 
outcomes from observable variables. To estimate the treatment effect, local weights are 
calculated, with more weight given to outcomes of observations of the control group that are 
similar in the predicted outcomes to those of the treatment group. The inverse probability 
weighting (IPW) matching performs a regression to predict the probability of treatment, instead 
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of potential outcomes, from observable variables. To estimate the treatment effect, local weights 
are calculated, with more weight to outcomes of observations of the control group with high 
probability of treatment. So the RA builds a formal model for the outcome, whereas the IPW 
builds a formal model for the treatment status. 
I do all matching with replacement and rely on Abadie and Imbens standard errors to 
conduct statistical inference because they are more appropriate than bootstrapped standard errors 
for matching estimators (Abadie and Imbens, 2006). Finally, I calculate selection-bias-adjusted 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
4.4 The Results 
4.4.1 Pre-IPO Default Risk, Fundamentals and IPO Timing 
In this section, I examine the pre-IPO period in order to understand and compare IPO timing 
considerations for both PE-backed and stand-alone IPOs. Initially, I apply the above matching 
approach and test whether PE-backed IPOs have higher or lower default risk in the year prior to 
the IPO compared to the default risk of comparable stand-alone IPOs. Then, I move to a 
regression framework and test whether PE sponsors or insiders of stand-alone companies are 
more likely to time their IPOs for when overall market conditions are more favorable. 
 
4.4.1.1 Do PE sponsors time their IPOs when their default risk is lower compared to matched 
companies? 
Here, I first examine various fundamentals in the year prior to the IPO that are related to default 
risk (such as profitability and leverage) then calculate default measures and, finally, perform 
comparisons between PE-backed and stand-alone companies. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show average 
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selection-bias-adjusted default measures and financial ratio differences between BO-backed 
versus stand-alone IPOs and VC-backed versus stand-alone IPOs respectively. I use two one-to-
one nearest neighbor techniques (propensity score and full covariate matching) and two one-to-
many smoothed weighted techniques (regression-adjusted local linear and inverse probability 
weighting matching). Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors appear in parentheses and 95% 
confidence intervals are in square brackets. 
The default measures that I use are Altman and Hotchkiss’s (2005) survival probability 
(Z’’score), Zmijewski’s (1984) default probability, and Shumway’s (2001) default probability, 
calculated from Chava and Jarrow’s (2004) model for private firms (who re-estimate Shumway’s 
(2001) model augmented with industry and interaction terms). The financial ratios that I choose 
to present here as fundamentals are the leverage ratio (total assets to total liabilities), the earnings 
per share (net income to shares outstanding) and the return on assets (net income to total assets). 
In both Tables 4.2 and 4.3, Panel A presents my basic model, in which I use the following 
dummies as instruments in the first-stage regression that predicts either BO backing (Table 4.2) 
or VC backing (Table 4.3): the underwriter rank, the logarithm of total assets in the year prior to 
the IPO, two-digit SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, the natural 
logarithm of firm age, the number of total managers, road show success dummies, and stock 
exchange . Jain and Kini (2000) show that PE-backed IPOs attract more prestigious underwriters, 
have a higher number of total managers and greater road show success. Thus, it is important to 
use these variables as instruments in my first-stage regression. To measure road show success, I 
construct three road show success dummies based on the offer price being below, within, or 
above the initial filing range. Moreover, I use total assets and age as instruments, since the 
summary statistics in Table 4.1 show substantial differences in these variables. Also evident 
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from Table 4.1 are the industry and geographic concentrations of PE-backed IPOs. Thus SIC and 
headquarter-state dummies are necessary instruments. Time-series variation in IPOs and the 
presence of “hot” markets suggest that I should control for year effects as well. Finally, I use 
stock exchange dummies because there are differences in listing restrictions among stock 
exchanges. Although I use the same instruments to predict BO and VC backing, I estimate two 
different models because the two kinds of PE sponsor invest in different companies. 
Table 4.2 reports results for BO-backed IPOs. In Panel A, I find that BO-backed IPOs have 
significantly lower survival probabilities in the year prior to the IPO, as measured by the Altman 
and Hotchkiss (2005) model, and higher default probabilities (as measured by Zmijewski’s 
(1984) model) compared to matched stand-alone IPOs. Specifically, BO-backed IPOs have 
significantly lower survival probabilities (3.2% to 5%) and significantly higher default 
probabilities (4.8% to 8.5%). Shumway’s (2001) model gives insignificant results. I also find 
that they have significantly higher leverage ratios (12% to 15%), but the evidence for differences 
in other fundamentals is rather weak. Thus, in Panel B, I add the leverage ratio as an instrument 
and, interestingly, differences based on Altman and Hotchiss (2005) and Zmijewski’s (1984) 
models are no longer significant, whereas according to Shumway’s (2001) model, BO-backed 
IPOs have significantly lower default probabilities pre-IPO this time 2.4% to 4.2%. This is 
evidence that the differences in the default measures of Panel A are mostly driven by the higher 
leverage ratios of BO-backed IPOs and do not hold when I compare firms with similar leverage 
levels. In Panels C and D, I repeat the analysis performed in Panels A and B, controlling for 
additional instruments. Specifically, I include an all-star analyst dummy, a syndicate dummy and 
the overallotment percentage. Again, moving from Panel C to Panel D, I add the leverage ratio as 
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an instrument and I no longer find evidence that the pre-IPO default measures of BO-backed and 
matched stand-alone IPOs differ. 
Table 4.3 reports results for VC-backed IPOs. Similarly to the results for BO-backed IPOs, 
in Panel A, I find that VC-backed IPOs have significantly lower survival probabilities pre-IPO 
(as measured by the Altman and Hotchkiss (2005) model) and higher default probabilities (as 
measured by both Zmijewski’s (1984) and Shumway’s (2001) models) compared to matched 
stand-alone IPOs. Specifically, VC-backed IPOs have significantly lower survival probabilities 
(5.2% to 14%) and significantly higher default probabilities (1.8% to 8.3%). Contrary to the 
findings on BO-backed IPOs, though, these differences are not due to higher leverage ratios of 
VC-backed IPOs compared to matched stand-alone IPOs, but rather due to significant 
differences in their profitability ratios. Specifically, VC-backed IPOs have lower earnings per 
share and ROA (14.5% to 22.7%) than matched stand-alone IPOs. Thus, in Panel B, I add the 
ROA as an instrument and, interestingly, almost all differences lose their significance. This is 
evidence that the differences in the default measures of Panel A are mostly driven by the lower 
profitability ratios of VC-backed IPOs and do not hold when I compare firms with similar 
profitability. As before, in Panels C and D I repeat the analysis performed in Panels A and B, 
controlling for additional instruments and find the same results. 
In unreported results, I find that results for both BO and VC-backed IPOs are robust to 
different default measures such as Olson’s O-score (1980), different measures of size (i.e. 
number of employees, total sales or IPO proceeds instead of total assets) and different ratios. 
To sum up, as expected, I find that in the year prior to the IPO, BO-backed companies have 
significantly higher leverage ratios and VC-backed companies have significantly lower 
profitability ratios than matched stand-alone companies. These differences explain entirely the 
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greater prevalence of measures indicating default for both BO and VC-backed IPOs in the year 
prior to the IPO. Thus, I do not find strong evidence of a difference between pre-IPO default 
measures of PE-backed and matched stand-alone IPOs differ after I control for leverage, in the 
case of BO-backing, and profitability, in the case of VC-backing. I interpret this as evidence that 
PE sponsors do not time their IPOs in years that they have lower default risk, thus better 
financial situation, compared to their peers. 
Even if PE sponsors are not more proficient than stand-alone companies in timing their IPOs 
for when company’s financial situation is better compared to peers, it can be that they are better 
in timing the IPO when overall market conditions are more favorable. This is another version of 
IPO timing that I test below. 
 
4.4.1.2 Are PE sponsors better than insiders of stand-alone companies in timing their IPOs when 
overall market conditions are more favorable? 
To answer this question, I move to a regression framework and look at both the exact period as 
well as the age of the firm when IPOs take place. Firstly, I study whether PE-backed IPOs are 
more common than stand-alone IPOs in hot market periods. Secondly, I study if PE-backed IPOs 
that take place in hot market periods are younger firms at the time of the IPO compared to stand-
alone IPOs. 
Table 4.4 reports the regression results of two IPO timing measures on a BO and a VC 
dummy, along with controls that include firm and IPO specific characteristics. I construct the 
two dependent variables as follows. The first (columns 1-3) is a dummy equal to one if the 
average first-day return in the month of the IPO is above the median for the period January 1975 
to August 2014 (12.5%). The second (columns 4-6) is a dummy equal to one if the percentage of 
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IPOs with an offer price above the midpoint of the initial offer file range in the month of the IPO 
is above the median for the period January 1980 to August 2014 (42%). The coefficients of 
interest are the ones of the BO and VC dummies. The coefficient of the BO dummy is negative 
and significant in four out of the six specifications. This is some evidence that BO-backed IPOs 
are less common than other IPOs in hot market periods. The coefficient of the VC dummy is 
positive and significant in only one specification. Given the above results, I cannot argue that PE 
sponsors target their IPOs in hot market periods more than stand-alone companies do. In the case 
of BO sponsors, there is indeed some evidence to the contrary. Other results that demonstrate 
some significance are that IPOs that have negative EPS in the year prior the IPO and IPOs that 
receive coverage from an all-star analyst are more likely to take place during hot market periods. 
Table 4.5 reports the regression results of firm age at the time of the IPO on a BO and a VC 
dummy, two IPO market hotness measures, and interactions among these measures and the BO 
and VC dummies, along with controls that include firm and IPO specific characteristics. To 
proxy for market conditions at the time of the IPO, I follow Cao (2011) and construct two 
measures. The first (column 1) is the average market first day return in the three months prior to 
the IPO and the second (column 2) is the number of IPOs in the three months prior to the IPO. 
As expected, I find that BO-backed IPOs tend to occur for older firms and VC-backed IPOs for 
younger firm on average. This is consistent with the summary statistics in Table 4.1 (Panel C). In 
specification (2), I also find some evidence that companies enter at a younger age when there is a 
high number of IPOs in previous months. This is in accordance with the intuition that companies 
rush into IPOs when the market conditions are favorable, and thus they can take advantage of 
higher valuations. The coefficients of the interactions terms of BO and VC dummies, which are 
of interest, are negative and significant though (at 10% and 5% respectively). This indicates that 
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the firms that undergo BO and VC-backed IPOs during hot market periods are older on average 
than stand-alone IPOs that take place during the same periods. Thus, I can argue that, if anything, 
PE sponsors are less likely to rush their companies into premature IPOs. Other results that 
demonstrate significance are that companies which are older at the time of the IPO are also more 
levered, more profitable and larger. 
 
4.4.2 IPO Underpricing and Valuations 
In this section, I test whether PE sponsors, as professional insiders, take more advantage of 
information asymmetries during the IPO compared to stand-alone companies. To test this, I first 
follow the literature and measure differences in information asymmetries through differences in 
underpricing. Then, I look directly at the proceeds from IPOs and examine whether PE sponsors 
inflate valuations more or less compared to similar stand-alone companies. 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the average differences (both for selection-bias-adjusted first-day 
returns and the proceeds from IPO) between VC-backed versus stand-alone IPOs, and BO-
backed versus stand-alone IPOs respectively using the methods described above. As before, in 
my basic model, I use the following instruments in the first-stage regression that predicts either 
VC backing (Table 4.6) or BO backing (Table 4.7): the underwriter rank, the logarithm of total 
assets, two-digit SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, the natural 
logarithm of firm age, the number of total managers, road show success dummies, and stock 
exchange dummies. . In Panels B, C, and D, I include additional instruments to control for 
differences in the equity, default probability and leverage ratio, also obvious from Panel C of 
Table 4.1. Given the missing value problem associated with some of these data items and the 
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different methods employed, the observations used in the estimation are not always equal among 
panels and methods. 
Table 4.6 reports results for VC-backed IPOs. In accordance with the literature (Gompers, 
1996; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Neus and Walz, 2005) and in line with the summary statistics in 
Table 4.1 (Panel C), I find some evidence that first-day returns of VC-backed IPOs are higher 
compared to stand-alone IPOs. These studies suggest that VC-backed companies face higher 
information asymmetries in the IPO market. Thus, VC sponsors are willing to underprice IPOs to 
signal their quality and use underpricing as a mechanism to establish their reputation. 
Specifically, I find that first-day returns of VC-backed IPOs are significantly higher by 4.7% to 
7.2% (Panel D, inverse probability weighting and regression-adjusted local linear matching) 
when I use the one-to-many smoothed weighted techniques. As a next step, I go beyond existing 
literature and look directly at the size of the IPO. In the vast majority of cases, I do not observe 
significant differences in net IPO proceeds between VC-backed and matched stand-alone IPOs. 
Combining the above results, VC-backed companies have similar initial valuations with stand-
alone firms but their stocks often have higher first-day returns. This is an indication that the 
market soon recognizes them to be “stars”. 
Now I test if these results differ in “hot” versus “cold” IPO valuation periods. For this 
reason, I split my sample in two sub-periods based on Jay Ritter’s monthly measure of "hotness" 
of the IPO market: the percentage of deals that are priced above the midpoint of the initial file 
price-range. Specifically, I characterize high valuation periods as those months when the 
percentage of IPOs with an offer price above the midpoint of the initial offer range is above the 
median for January 1980 to August 2014 (42%). I characterize low valuation periods as months 
when this percentage is below median. The two sub-periods are almost equal in size (425 “high 
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valuation” months and 418 “low valuation” months). For the sub-period analysis, I do not 
calculate sub-period estimates by partitioning the full sample results because they are obtained 
from a first-stage regression that uses all the data. Instead, I follow Lee and Wahal (2004) and re-
estimate the first-stage regression for each sub-period, thereby I tighten the conditioning 
information and find more conservative estimates. 
As before, I find the differences in first-day returns to be almost always positive and both 
economically and statistically significant in many cases, especially during low valuation periods. 
In such periods, the differences demonstrate significance under all techniques and are larger in 
size, ranging from 3.7% (Panel D, full covariate matching) to 12.4% (Panel C, propensity score 
matching). This is evidence that when valuations are low, VC-backed IPOs outperform stand-
alone IPOs even more, as they have quite high first-day returns. Differences of net proceeds 
remain insignificant in both “hot” and “cold” markets. 
Table 4.7 reports results for BO-backed IPOs. First-day returns in most cases do not differ 
significantly between BO-backed and stand-alone IPOs. This indicates that information 
asymmetry is similar for both. Interestingly, I always find that BO-backed IPOs have lower 
valuations as measured by the net IPO proceeds, compared to matched stand-alone IPOs. Results 
are both economically and statistically significant, as well as robust to the use of the book value 
of equity, default probability and float percentage as instruments (Panels A, C and D 
respectively), which suggests that the lower valuations of BO-backed IPOs are not solely driven 
by their higher indebtedness/default risk levels and potentially lower float percentages. This is an 
unexpected finding, since, in the summary statistics in Table 4.1 (Panel C), BO-backed IPOs 
have more than double the net proceeds of stand-alone IPOs. Specifically, I find that IPO 
proceeds for BO-backed IPOs are significantly lower for the full sample by 29.51 (Panel B, full 
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covariate matching) to 205.71 million (Panel A, inverse probability weighting matching). This is 
evidence that BO sponsors do not exploit information asymmetries in the IPO market to inflate 
valuations of their portfolio companies. On the contrary, public investors value these IPOs more 
conservatively. All findings hold in both high and low valuation periods. 
In unreported results, I find that results for both VC and BO-backed IPOs are robust to 
different measures of size, to gross instead of net proceeds, to addition of other variables such as 
the initial amount filed, a positive earnings dummy, an “all-star” analyst dummy and a syndicate 
dummy as instruments, and to another measure of IPO “hotness” (based on the average first day 
return being above the median for the period January 1975 to August 2014, which is 12.5%). 
To sum up, VC-backed IPOs have higher first-day returns than matched stand-alone IPOs, a 
result that is in accordance with the literature and indicates that VC sponsors are confronted with 
higher information asymmetries in the IPO market. BO-sponsors on the contrary have similar 
underpricing as their peers, i.e. information asymmetries between BO sponsors and public 
investors are similar to the asymmetries between managers and public investors. Finally, neither 
VC nor BO-backed companies have inflated valuations compared to similar companies. In the 
case of BO sponsors, there is indeed evidence that they are conservatively priced. The reason for 
this may be that investors perceive them as riskier due to their high leverage. In the next section, 
I test if this fear is justified, specifically if they default more often post-IPO. 
 
4.4.3 Post-IPO Default and Failure Risk 
In the sections above, I concentrate on the pre-IPO and IPO period. It may be  that PE investors 
strategically choose to exit via an IPO before hidden problems in their portfolio companies 
unfold. Thus, what is of utmost interest is the question of whether BO and VC-backed companies 
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delist more often than stand-alone companies for reasons related to default or failure. I am 
interested in two types of delistings: delistings due to default and, more generally, delistings due 
to failure. I define as default cases of bankruptcy or liquidation (codes 400-490 and 574). I define 
as failure cases of bankruptcy, liquidation, or delisting due to other negative reasons such as non-
payment of fees (codes 400-490, 550-561 and 574-591). 
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show average selection-bias-adjusted default and failure rates differences 
between BO-backed versus stand-alone IPOs and VC-backed versus stand-alone IPOs 
respectively using the methods described above. Here, I track companies for five years after the 
IPO, thus I do not examine IPOs after 2009. By right censoring my data I control for 
survivorship bias by which older firms undergoing IPOs provide more years of data and have a 
longer period “at risk”. I examine a horizon of five years for all companies to correct for this 
effect. Robustness tests with different horizons provide qualitatively the same results. A shorter 
horizon though, (e.g. for one year) may be inappropriate since IPOs generally feature lockup 
provisions that prohibit corporate insiders from selling shares before a certain date. In our sample 
lockup provisions for PE-backed IPOs are no different from those of other IPOs and have an 
average of six months. These lockup provisions help align the interests of insiders with those of 
public investors (Field and Hanka, 2001, Aggarwal et al., 2002) and may decrease default and 
failure risk during this period. As before, in my basic model, I use the following as instruments 
in the first-stage regression that predicts either BO backing (Table 4.8) or VC backing (Table 
4.9): the underwriter rank, the logarithm of total assets, two-digit SIC dummies, headquarter-
state dummies, offer year dummies, the natural logarithm of firm age, the number of total 
managers, road show success dummies and stock exchange dummies. 
133 
Table 4.8 reports results for BO-backed IPOs. In Panel A, I find that default and failure rates 
of BO-backed and stand-alone IPOs do not differ significantly. The same holds in Panel B, 
where I add the leverage ratio as an instrument. In Panels C and D I repeat the analysis 
performed in Panels A and B, controlling for additional instruments. Specifically, I include an 
all-star analyst dummy, a syndicate dummy and the overallotment percentage. Again, moving 
from Panel C to Panel D, I add the leverage ratio as an instrument and find the same results. 
Table 4.9 reports results for VC-backed IPOs. As for BO-backed IPOs, I find that, in most 
cases, default and failure rates of VC-backed and stand-alone IPOs do not differ significantly. 
There is some weak evidence that VC-backed IPOs have lower failure rates than stand-alone 
IPOs since differences are negative and significant in a few cases, ranging from 2.8% (Panel A, 
inverse probability weighting matching) to 5.3% (Panel B, inverse probability weighting 
matching). 
In order to shed more light on the above results and further test if PE-backed IPOs delist 
more often than stand-alone IPOs due to default or failure, I now move to a regression 
framework where I use all firm-year observations post-IPO. Specifically, I apply the multi-period 
logit regression framework (Shumway, 2001) for my default and failure prediction models. As 
described above, I use two dependent variables in my regressions. The first (Table 4.10) is a 
default dummy equal to one in the year that the company delists due to bankruptcy or liquidation 
(codes 400-490 and 574). The second (Table 4.11) is a failure dummy equal to one in the year 
that the company delists due to bankruptcy, liquidation, or due to other negative reasons (codes 
400-490, 550-561 and 574-591). I regress these dummies on a BO and a VC dummy, along with 
various firm and IPO specific characteristics. To proxy for market conditions at the time of the 
IPO, I use the same measures as in Table 4.7 and examine interaction of these variables with the 
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BO and VC dummies to additionally test if BO and VC-backed IPOs that take place in hot 
market periods are more likely to default or fail afterwards. 
Table 4.10 reports the regression results for the default dependent variable from four 
different specifications. My coefficients of interest are those of the BO and VC dummies which 
are negative and significant in three out of the four specifications. This is evidence that BO and 
VC-backed IPOs default less than others. IPOs that take place in hot market periods (i.e. in 
months that follow high IPO activity as measured by the number of IPOs taking place in the 
previous three months) are significantly more likely to default on average. This is consistent with 
my previous finding in Table 4.5 that companies often rush into premature IPOs when market 
conditions are favorable. It is also in accordance with the theoretical model of Yung, Colak and 
Wang (2008), according to which there are more delistings in hot market periods. Since the 
coefficients of the interaction terms in column (3) are not significant though, I cannot argue that 
this result is stronger for either BO or VC-backed IPOs. As expected, companies with lower 
profitability and higher leverage are more likely to default as indicated from the signs of the 
profitability and leverage ratios. Table 4.11 reports the regression results for the failure 
dependent variable using the same four specifications. When we move from Table 4.10 to Table 
4.11, results remain substantially similar. The above results indicate that PE sponsors are not any 
more likely than managers of stand-alone companies to “unload lemons” in the IPO market and 
it is in accordance with the intuition that if these sponsors are caught “cheating”, they will 
struggle to raise money for future funds. 
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4.5 Concluding Remarks 
I study the role of both BO and VC sponsors in a setting of high information asymmetry as the 
IPO market. These professional insiders may be more capable of taking advantage of such 
asymmetries compared to insiders of stand-alone companies. But they also have more 
reputational capital at stake, a factor which tends to be known by the market. BO and VC 
sponsors may also behave differently from each other. Thus, I differentiate my analysis for each 
type of PE sponsor and compare BO and VC-backed IPOs with IPOs of stand-alone companies 
in a matching framework. 
I do not find significant differences between these IPOs and matched IPOs of stand-alone 
companies. The financial situation of both BO and VC-backed companies in the pre-IPO year, as 
measured by their default risk, is similar to that of their peers. Moreover, PE sponsors do not 
target their IPOs in hot periods any more than do managers of stand-alone companies. They also 
are not more prone to rush their companies into premature IPOs and do not inflate valuations. 
Finally, PE-backed companies do not default more often post-IPO. This is evidence that PE 
sponsors are not more likely to seek to sell firms with poor prospects (“unload lemons”) in the 
IPO market. 
This paper provides evidence against the criticism that PE sponsors often receive in the 
media (e.g. “Rush to get to the front of the IPO queue” in Financial Times, 18 February 2014). It 
can also have important policy implications on the regulatory framework related to PE, such as 
the Dodd-Frank Act (signed by Obama in July 2010). Finally, it comes as a timely contribution, 
given the increasing importance of PE-backed IPOs in the market (“Private equity-backed IPOs 
could hit seven-year high” in the Financial Times, 29 September 2014). 
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4.6 Tables of Chapter 4 
 
Table 4.1 
Distribution and Characteristics of IPOs, 1975 to 2014 
The table shows the distribution and characteristics of 7,033 IPOs for which data are available after excluding those with an offer price below $5.00 per share, 
a size below 1.5 million, unit offers, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, natural resource partnerships, acquisition companies, Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), bank and Savings and Loans (S&L) IPOs. I classify growth-capital backed IPOs as VC-backed. Panel A shows the 
distribution of all IPOs, BO-backed IPOs and VC-backed IPOs across two-digit SIC Codes both as a number and a percentage of all IPOs in each SIC Code. 
SIC Codes in which there are less than 30 IPOs over the entire sample period are not shown. Panel B shows the geographic distribution of all IPOs, BO-
backed IPOs and VC-backed IPOs both as a number and a percentage of all IPOs headquartered in each state. States with less than 140 IPOs, corresponding to 
2% of all IPOs, are not shown. Finally, Panel C provides means of various characteristics of stand-alone IPOs, BO-backed IPOs and VC-backed IPOs. Gross 
and net proceeds are in millions of dollars. The gross spread is in percent. Underwriter rankings are on a 0 to 9 scale, with higher ranking to more prestigious 
underwriters. All financial statements data are from up to two years prior to the offering. Assets, sales and book and market value of equity are in millions of 
dollars. The market value is calculated using the post issue shares outstanding multiplied by the offer price. I calculate first-day returns as the percentage price 
movement from the offer price to the close price on the first trading day. Age is the average number of years from the founding date to the IPO date. The 
default rate is the percentage of delistings due to bankruptcy and liquidation (CRSP delisting codes 400-490 and 574).  
  All IPOs BO-backed VC-backed     All IPOs BO-backed VC-backed 
  # # % # % 
 
  # # % # % 
Panel A. Distribution by two-digit SIC Code               
15 39 6 15.38 1 2.56 
 
49 81 6 7.41 19 23.46 
20 108 24 22.22 14 12.96 
 
50 186 26 13.98 44 23.66 
23 68 12 17.65 8 11.76 
 
51 82 13 15.85 11 13.41 
25 31 8 25.81 4 12.90 
 
53 33 13 39.39 6 18.18 
26 37 13 35.14 7 18.92 
 
54 51 23 45.10 4 7.84 
27 64 16 25.00 10 15.63 
 
56 81 21 25.93 15 18.52 
28 553 45 8.14 356 64.38 
 
57 71 15 21.13 13 18.31 
30 57 11 19.30 5 8.77 
 
58 156 29 18.59 33 21.15 
33 79 19 24.05 11 13.92 
 
59 172 25 14.53 60 34.88 
34 66 21 31.82 7 10.61 
 
63 202 33 16.34 19 9.41 
35 453 39 8.61 217 47.90 
 
65 40 5 12.50 4 10.00 
36 627 75 11.96 321 51.20 
 
70 62 6 9.68 3 4.84 
37 117 41 35.04 12 10.26 
 
73 1,499 100 6.67 858 57.24 
38 479 31 6.47 269 56.16 
 
78 69 8 11.59 14 20.29 
39 74 11 14.86 9 12.16 
 
79 52 7 13.46 1 1.92 
42 62 6 9.68 6 9.68 
 
80 244 28 11.48 108 44.26 
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44 54 9 16.67 2 3.70 
 
82 36 8 22.22 12 33.33 
45 55 2 3.64 12 21.82 
 
87 207 24 11.59 78 37.68 
47 35 5 14.29 7 20.00 
       
48 311 38 12.22 131 42.12 
 
Full sample 7,033 897 12.75 2,763 39.29 
  All IPOs BO-backed VC-backed     All IPOs BO-backed VC-backed 
  # # % # % 
 
  # # % # % 
 
Panel B. Distribution by State 
California 1,694 130 7.67 1,013 59.80 
 
New Jersey 281 36 12.81 93 33.10 
Colorado 147 12 8.16 67 45.58 
 
New York 522 77 14.75 126 24.14 
Connecticut 152 25 16.45 53 34.87 
 
Ohio 149 38 25.50 26 17.45 
Florida 306 35 11.44 68 22.22 
 
Pennsylvania 252 36 14.29 93 36.90 
Georgia 182 28 15.38 75 41.21 
 
Texas 491 62 12.63 163 33.20 
Illinois 253 62 24.51 67 26.48 
 
Virginia 162 33 20.37 50 30.86 
Massachusetts 481 31 6.44 306 63.62 
 
Washington 149 9 6.04 86 57.72 
Minnesota 148 24 16.22 62 41.89 
 
Full sample 7,033 897 12.75 2,763 39.29 
Panel C. Characteristics 
 
Stand-alone IPOs 
 
BO-backed 
 
VC-backed 
    
  # Mean 
 
# Mean 
 
# Mean 
    
Gross proceeds 3,373 70.63 
 
897 156.85 
 
2,763 58.99 
    
Net proceeds 3,373 65.80 
 
897 145.57 
 
2,763 54.29 
    
Gross spread 3,362 4.30 
 
896 10.15 
 
2,759 4.04 
    
Underwriter rank 3,314 6.38 
 
883 8.30 
 
2,726 7.71 
    
Assets 2,945 725.23 
 
861 836.03 
 
2,563 60.71 
    
Sales 2,460 300.70 
 
773 742.03 
 
2,319 52.17 
    
% profitable 2,986 72.37 
 
846 66.78 
 
2,653 49.19 
    
Book value of equity 3,218 96.50 
 
881 79.44 
 
2,698 21.94 
    
Market value of equity 2,762 338.55 
 
825 661.06 
 
2,533 406.53 
    
Debt/Assets 2,926 0.80 
 
859 0.87 
 
2,559 0.69 
    
Return on assets 2,459 -0.10 
 
773 -0.01 
 
2,317 -0.39 
    
Average first-day return 3,044 14.09 
 
883 10.51 
 
2,588 27.86 
    
Age 3,325 16.19 
 
892 34.20 
 
2,758 8.70 
    
Default rate 3,373 3.91   897 2.34   2,763 2.39         
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Table 4.2 
Pre-IPO selection bias adjusted default measures' and financial ratios' differences between BO-backed and stand-alone IPOs 
The table presents selection bias adjusted average default measures' and financial ratios' differences between BO-backed and stand-alone IPOs. Each BO-backed IPO is matched with one (nearest neighbor) or 
many (smoothed weighted) stand-alone IPOs using the propensity score, full covariate, regression-adjusted local linear and inverse probability weighting matching approaches described in the text. I do all 
matching with replacement and use Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors to conduct statistical inference. The t-statistics, 95% confidence intervals and number of BO-backed IPOs matched appear below the 
average differences. When BO-backed IPOs are matched to many stand-alone IPOs, the total number of observations used in the estimation also appears.  All financial statements data are from the year prior to 
the offering. I calculate Altman and Hotchkiss's survival probability from Altman and Hotchkiss's (2005) model. I calculate Zmijewski's default probability from Zmijewski's (1984) model. I calculate Shumway's 
default probability from Chava and Jarrow's (2004) model for private firms, who re-estimate Shumway's (2001) variables' coefficients augmented with industry and interaction terms. The leverage ratio is the ratio 
of total assets to total liabilities. The earnings per share is the ratio of net income divided by the number of pre-issue shares outstanding. The Return on Assets is the ratio of net income to total assets. ** denotes 
significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. 
Δ(Probabilities) 
 
Δ(Ratios) 
One-to-one nearest neighbor 
 
One-to-many smoothed weighted 
 
One-to-one nearest neighbor 
 
One-to-many smoothed weighted 
Propensity score Full covariate  
Regression-adjusted 
local linear 
Inverse probability 
weighting 
 Propensity score Full covariate  
Regression-adjusted 
local linear 
Inverse probability 
weighting 
   
Panel A. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success dummies, stock 
exchange dummies 
Altman and Hotchkiss's (2005) survival probability 
 
Leverage ratio 
-0.050 -0.047 
 
-0.032 -0.049 
 
0.135 0.139 
 
0.119 0.150 
(-2.56)** (-3.30)** 
 
(-2.59)** (-4.65)** 
 
(4.27)** (5.54)** 
 
(5.35)** (7.66)** 
[-0.088,-0.012] [-0.075,-0.019] 
 
[-0.057,-0.008] [-0.069,-0.028] 
 
[0.073,0.198] [0.090,0.188] 
 
[0.075,0.162] [0.112,0.189] 
698 453 
 
699/2,810 699/2,810 
 
841 613 
 
842/3,691 842/3,691 
Zmijewski's (1984) default probability 
 
Earnings per share 
0.048 0.050 
 
0.049 0.085 
 
-2.344 -1.411 
 
-2.884 -3.118 
(2.82)** (3.24)** 
 
(4.09)** (5.51)** 
 
(-1.42) (-1.46) 
 
(-1.83)* (-1.92)* 
[0.015,0.082] [0.020,0.080] 
 
[0.025,0.072] [0.038,0.079] 
 
[-5.579,0.890] [-3.301,0.479] 
 
[-5.975,0.206] [-6.294,0.057] 
732 516 
 
733/3,034 733/3,034 
 
826 604 
 
827/3,723 827/3,723 
Shumway's (2001) default probability 
 
Return on Assets 
-0.005 0.020 
 
-0.009 -0.001 
 
-0.017 -0.008 
 
0.011 -0.028 
(-0.56) (1.36) 
 
(-1.40) (-0.20) 
 
(-0.62) (-0.30) 
 
(0.44) (-2.20)** 
[-0.021,0.012] [-0.009,0.048] 
 
[-0.022,0.004] [-0.008,0.006] 
 
[-0.073,0.038] [-0.058,0.043] 
 
[-0.036,0.027] [-0.054,-0.003] 
754 516 
 
755/3,144 755/3,144 
 
755 538 
 
756/3,150 756/3,150 
Panel B. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), leverage ratio, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success 
dummies, stock exchange dummies 
Altman and Hotchkiss's (2005) survival probability 
      
-0.024 -0.033 
 
-0.001 -0.028 
      
(-1.20) (-1.70)* 
 
(-0.08) (-1.09) 
      
[-0.062,0.0149] [-0.070,0.005] 
 
[-0.024,0.022] [-0.077,0.022] 
      
698 453 
 
699/2,810 699/2,810 
      
Zmijewski's (1984) default probability 
      
0.013 0.004 
 
0.005 0.016 
      
(0.66) (0.42) 
 
(0.59) (1.66)* 
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Table 4.2. Panel B. Cont. 
[-0.026,0.053] [-0.016,0.025] 
 
[-0.012,0.022] [-0.003,0.036] 
      
732 516 
 
733/3,034 733/3,034 
      
Shumway's (2001) default probability 
      
-0.024 0.000 
 
-0.042 -0.027 
      
(-2.14)** (0.06) 
 
(-2.14)** (-4.29)** 
      
[-0.046,-0.002] [-0.022,0.023] 
 
[-0.054,-0.033] [-0.039,-0.015] 
      
754 516 
 
755/3,144 755/3,144 
      
Panel C. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success dummies, stock 
exchange dummies, all-star analyst dummy, syndicate dummy, overallotment percentage 
Altman and Hotchkiss's (2005) survival probability 
 
Leverage ratio 
-0.078 -0.042 
 
-0.038 -0.052 
 
0.154 0.131 
 
0.096 0.151 
(-3.66)** (-2.97)** 
 
(-2.60)** (-4.06)** 
 
(3.31)** (5.01)** 
 
(3.30)** (5.50)** 
[-0.120,-0.036] [-0.069,-0.141] 
 
[-0.066,-0.009] [-0.078,-0.027] 
 
[0.063,0.245] [0.080,0.182] 
 
[0.039,0.153] [0.097,0.205] 
448 453 
 
450/1,852 450/1,845 
 
512 613 
 
474/2,304 474/2,010 
Zmijewski's (1984) default probability 
 
Earnings per share 
0.059 0.046 
 
0.044 0.060 
 
-2.27 -1.44 
 
-2.72 -2.16 
(2.59)** (3.01)** 
 
(2.97)** (4.46)** 
 
(-0.92) (-1.50) 
 
(-1.33) (-1.36) 
[0.014,0.103] [0.162,0.076] 
 
[0.015,0.073] [0.034,0.086] 
 
[-7.103,2.557] [-3.325,0.446] 
 
[-6.730,1.289] [-5.276,0.959] 
472 516 
 
474/2,017 474/2,010 
 
503 604 
 
461/2,253 461/2,010 
Shumway's (2001) default probability 
 
Return on Assets 
-0.013 -0.011 
 
-0.014 -0.003 
 
-0.032 0.014 
 
0.010 -0.021 
(-1.00) (-1.33) 
 
(-1.60) (-0.49) 
 
(-0.76) (0.49) 
 
(0.36) (-1.10) 
[-0.039,0.013] [-0.027,0.005] 
 
[0.031,0.003] [-0.014,0.008] 
 
[0.0627,0.245] [-0.043,0.0720] 
 
[-0.046,0.067] [-0.058,0.016] 
479 537 
 
474/2,055 474/2,010 
 
480 538 
 
474/2,060 474/2,010 
Panel D. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), leverage ratio, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success 
dummies, stock exchange dummies, all-star analyst dummy, syndicate dummy, overallotment percentage 
Altman and Hotchkiss's (2005) survival probability 
      
-0.021 -0.019 
 
-0.007 -0.024 
      
(-0.83) (-1.46) 
 
(-0.52) (-1.89)* 
      
[-0.069,0.028] [-0.044,0.006] 
 
[-0.034,0.020] [-0.049,0.001] 
      
448 453 
 
450/1,852 450/1,845 
      
Zmijewski's (1984) default probability 
      
0.014 0.004 
 
0.006 0.017 
      
(0.49) (0.33) 
 
(0.59) (1.43) 
      
[-0.042,0.070] [-0.018,0.025] 
 
[-0.014,0.026] [-0.006,0.040] 
      
472 516 
 
474/2,017 474/2,010 
      
Shumway's (2001) default probability 
      
-0.016 -0.009 
 
-0.044 -0.031 
      
(-1.11) (-1.44) 
 
(-2.25)** (-3.57)** 
      
[-0.044,0.012] [-0.022,0.003] 
 
[-0.058,-0.030] [-0.048,-0.014] 
      
479 537 
 
474/2,055 474/2,010 
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Table 4.3 
Pre-IPO selection bias adjusted default measures' and financial ratios' differences between VC-backed and stand-alone IPOs 
The table presents selection bias adjusted average default measures' and financial ratios' differences between VC-backed and stand-alone IPOs. Each VC-backed IPO is matched with one (nearest neighbor) or 
many (smoothed weighted) stand-alone IPOs using the propensity score, full covariate, regression-adjusted local linear and inverse probability weighting matching approaches described in the text. I do all 
matching with replacement and use Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors to conduct statistical inference. The t-statistics, 95% confidence intervals and number of VC-backed IPOs matched appear below the 
average differences. When VC-backed IPOs are matched to many stand-alone IPOs, the total number of observations used in the estimation also appears.  All financial statements data are from the year prior to the 
offering. I calculate Altman and Hotchkiss's survival probability from Altman and Hotchkiss's (2005) model. I calculate Zmijewski's default probability from Zmijewski's (1984) model. I calculate Shumway's 
default probability from Chava and Jarrow's (2004) model for private firms, who re-estimate Shumway's (2001) variables' coefficients augmented with industry and interaction terms. The leverage ratio is the ratio 
of total assets to total liabilities. The earnings per share is the ratio of net income divided by the number of pre-issue shares outstanding. The Return on Assets is the ratio of net income to total assets. ** denotes 
significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. 
Δ(Probabilities) 
 
Δ(Ratios) 
One-to-one nearest neighbor 
 
One-to-many smoothed weighted 
 
One-to-one nearest neighbor 
 
One-to-many smoothed weighted 
Propensity score Full covariate  
Regression-adjusted 
local linear 
Inverse probability 
weighting 
 Propensity score Full covariate  
Regression-adjusted 
local linear 
Inverse probability 
weighting 
   
Panel A. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success dummies, stock 
exchange dummies 
Altman and Hotchkiss's (2005) survival probability 
 
Leverage ratio 
-0.131 -0.098 
 
-0.052 -0.140 
 
-0.060 -0.056 
 
-0.067 -0.039 
(-5.25)** (-4.88)** 
 
(-2.88)** (-4.93)** 
 
(-1.62) (-2.08)** 
 
(-3.20)** (-1.43) 
[-0.181,-0.082] [-0.137,-0.059] 
 
[-0.088,-0.017] [-0.196,-0.084] 
 
[-0.133,0.0127] [-0.109,-0.003] 
 
[-0.108,-0.026] [-0.092,0.0142] 
2,234 1,734 
 
2,208/4,537 2,208/4,319 
 
2,529 2,088 
 
2,235/5,380 2,235/4,536 
Zmijewski's (1984) default probability 
 
Earnings per share 
0.083 0.037 
 
0.083 0.078 
 
-1.106 -1.142 
 
-2.009 -1.475 
(3.44)** (5.52)** 
 
(6.81)** (4.34)** 
 
(-1.64)* (-1.95)* 
 
(-2.25)** (-3.41)** 
[0.035,0.130] [0.024,0.050] 
 
[0.059,0.107] [0.043,0.113] 
 
[-2.424,0.213] [-2.29,0.008] 
 
[-3.356,-0.263] [-2.323,-0.627] 
2,234 1,860 
 
2,235/4,537 2,235/4,536 
 
2,614 2,163 
 
2,202/5,512 2,202/4,371 
Shumway's (2001) default probability 
 
Return on Assets 
0.073 0.020 
 
0.018 0.076 
 
-0.145 -0.182 
 
-0.227 -0.186 
(3.10)** (1.36) 
 
(2.14)** (5.47)** 
 
(-2.72)** (-5.00)** 
 
(-7.82)** (-4.75)** 
[0.027,0.120] [-0.009,0.480] 
 
[0.002,0.034] [0.048,0.103] 
 
[-0.250,-0.041] [-0.253,-0.110] 
 
[-0.278,-0.167] [-0.263,-0.109] 
2,234 1,806 
 
2,235/4,681 2,235/4,536 
 
2,290 2,088 
 
2,235/4,686 2,235/4,536 
Panel B. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), Return on Assets, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success 
dummies, stock exchange dummies 
Altman and Hotchkiss's (2005) survival probability 
      
-0.069 0.010 
 
-0.020 -0.024 
      
(-2.73)** (0.62) 
 
(-1.00) (-0.77) 
      
[-0.118,-0.020] [-0.021,0.040] 
 
[-0.060,0.020] [-0.084,0.037] 
      
2,234 1,734 
 
2,208/4,537 2,208/4,319 
      
Zmijewski's (1984) default probability 
      
-0.011 0.011 
 
0.013 -0.042 
      
(-0.42) (0.98) 
 
(1.46) (-1.77)* 
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[-0.062,0.040] [-0.011,0.032] 
 
[-0.004,0.030] [-0.088,0.004] 
      
2,234 1,860 
 
2,235/4,537 2,235/4,536 
      
Shumway's (2001) default probability 
      
-0.025 0.001 
 
-0.039 -0.053 
      
(-0.94) (0.06) 
 
(-2.92)** (-2.15)** 
      
[-0.078,0.027] [-0.022,0.023] 
 
[-0.049,-0.030] [-0.101,-0.005] 
      
2,234 1,806 
 
2,235/4,681 2,235/4,536 
      
Panel C. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success dummies, stock 
exchange dummies, all-star analyst dummy, syndicate dummy, overallotment percentage 
Altman and Hotchkiss's (2005) survival probability 
 
Leverage ratio 
-0.131 -0.100 
 
-0.051 -0.140 
 
-0.077 -0.057 
 
-0.089 -0.039 
(-4.37)** (-4.12)** 
 
(-2.72)** (-4.93)** 
 
(-1.72)* (-2.14)** 
 
(-3.31)** (-1.43) 
[-0.190,-0.072] [-0.148,-0.053] 
 
[-0.087,-0.014] [-0.196,-0.084] 
 
[-0.165,0.011] [-0.110,-0.005] 
 
[-0.141,-0.036] [-0.092,0.0142] 
1,562 1,734 
 
1,565/4,537 1,565/4,319 
 
1,721 2,088 
 
1,585/3,509 1,585/3,119 
Zmijewski's (1984) default probability 
 
Earnings per share 
0.096 0.039 
 
0.091 0.078 
 
-3.459 -0.887 
 
-2.463 -1.475 
(3.45)** (5.92)** 
 
(5.88)** (4.34)** 
 
(-2.15)** (-1.95)* 
 
(-2.06)** (-3.41)** 
[0.042,0.151] [0.026,0.052] 
 
[0.061,0.121] [0.043,0.113] 
 
[-6.587,-0.311] [-1.778,0.004] 
 
[-4.810,-0.117] [-2.323,-0.627] 
1,582 1,860 
 
1,585/3,124 1,585/4,536 
 
1,731 2,163 
 
1,579/3,477 1,579/3,119 
Shumway's (2001) default probability 
 
Return on Assets 
0.082 0.015 
 
0.016 0.019 
 
-0.194 -0.185 
 
-0.253 -0.186 
(2.95)** (1.05) 
 
(1.45) (1.96)** 
 
(-3.23)** (-5.17)** 
 
(-6.95)** (-4.75)** 
[0.027,0.136] [-0.013,0.044] 
 
[-0.006,0.037] [-0.000,0.039] 
 
[-0.312,-0.076] [-0.256,-0.115] 
 
[-0.324,-0.181] [-0.263,-0.109] 
1,582 1,806 
 
1,585/3,165 1,585/4,536 
 
1,592 1,860 
 
1,585/3,169 1,585/3,119 
Panel D. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), Return on Assets, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success 
dummies, stock exchange dummies, all-star analyst dummy, syndicate dummy, overallotment percentage 
Altman and Hotchkiss's (2005) survival probability 
      
-0.071 0.018 
 
0.033 -0.042 
      
(-2.48)** (0.95) 
 
(-1.70)* (-1.44) 
      
[-0.127,-0.015] [-0.019,0.054] 
 
[-0.070,0.005] [-0.098,0.015] 
      
1,562 1,734 
 
1,565/4,537 1,565/4,319 
      
Zmijewski's (1984) default probability 
      
0.025 0.013 
 
0.013 -0.076 
      
(0.82) (1.25) 
 
(1.13) (-2.35)** 
      
[-0.035,0.086] [-0.008,0.034] 
 
[-0.009,0.035] [-0.139,-0.012] 
      
1,582 1,860 
 
1,585/3,124 1,585/4,536 
      
Shumway's (2001) default probability 
      
-0.001 -0.005 
 
-0.050 -0.097 
      
(-0.03) (-0.42) 
 
(-2.75)** (-4.01)** 
      
[-0.064,0.061] [-0.028,0.018] 
 
[-0.062,-0.037] [-0.145,-0.050] 
      
1,582 1,806 
 
1,585/3,165 1,585/4002C536 
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Table 4.4 
Regressions of IPO timing dummy on firm and IPO characteristics 
The table shows OLS regressions of two measures of IPO timing on firm and IPO characteristics. The first dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the average first-day return 
in the month of the IPO is above the median. The second dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the percentage of IPOs with an offer price above the midpoint of the initial 
offer file range in the month of the IPO is above median. I construct these dummies with data from Jay Ritter's website. The sample consists of all IPOs from Table 4.1 with 
available data. All financial statements data are from the year prior to the offering. NITA is the ratio of net income to total assets. TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Ln (age) is the natural logarithm of the number of years from the founding date to the IPO date. The positive EPS dummy is equal to one if the earnings per share (ratio of net 
income divided by the number of pre-issue shares outstanding) is above zero. Underwriter rankings are on a 0 to 9 scale, with higher ranking to more prestigious underwriters. The 
all-star analyst dummy is equal to one if the offer receives coverage of an all-star analyst. Industry fixed effects are based on two-digit SIC codes. ** denotes significance at a 5% 
level and * at a 10% level. 
 
Dummy =1 if average 1st day return > median 
 
Dummy =1 if % of IPOs with offer price above midpoint > median 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
BO dummy -0.142* (-1.69) -0.226** (-2.20) -0.472** (-3.78) 
 
-0.0128 (-0.15) -0.166 (-1.64) -0.347** (-2.82) 
VC dummy 0.166** (2.78) 0.075 (0.97) -0.0638 (-0.66) 
 
-0.0156 (-0.26) -0.0816 (-1.07) -0.0782 (-0.83) 
TLTA 
  
-0.185** (-2.40) -0.247** (-2.70) 
   
-0.0254 (-0.34) 0.0480 (0.55) 
NITA 
  
-0.123* (-1.65) -0.108 (-1.24) 
   
-0.00611 (-0.09) 0.0567 (0.70) 
Ln (age) 
  
0.0620** (2.13) 0.0317 (0.91) 
   
0.0283 (0.99) 0.000606 (0.02) 
Positive EPS dummy 
  
-0.243** (-3.05) -0.222** (-2.32) 
   
-0.146* (-1.88) -0.0928 (-1.00) 
Underwriter rank 
  
-0.0523** (-2.76) -0.0205 (-0.85) 
   
-0.0205 (-1.10) -0.0277 (-1.16) 
All-star analyst dummy 
    
0.284** (2.51) 
     
0.188* (1.77) 
Constant -0.802 (-1.04) 0.645 (0.85) 1.561 (0.96) 
 
-1.943** (-2.16) 0.135 (0.18) 1.421 (0.88) 
Other controls 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry FE 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations   7,033   5,045   3,507                7,033   5,045   3,507 
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Table 4.5 
Regressions of age at IPO on firm and IPO characteristics 
The table shows OLS regressions of the age at IPO on firm and IPO characteristics. I calculate age at IPO 
as the natural logarithm of the number of years from the founding date to the IPO date. The sample 
includes all IPOs from Table 4.1 with available data. All financial statements data are from the year prior 
to the offering.  NITA is the ratio of net income to total assets. TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. To proxy for market conditions at the time of the IPO, I use two measures: The average market 
first-day return and the logarithm of the number of IPOs in the three months prior the IPO. I construct 
these measures with data from Jay Ritter's website. I examine interaction effects for the additional impact 
of BO and VC-backed IPOs. Industry fixed effects are based on two-digit SIC codes. ** denotes 
significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. 
 
Age at IPO 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
BO dummy 0.335** (4.88) 
 
-0.389 (-1.10) 
VC dummy -0.107** (-2.18) 
 
-0.796** (-2.89) 
TLTA 0.222** (7.02) 
 
0.223** (7.07) 
NITA 0.165** (5.57) 
 
0.168** (5.68) 
Log (total assets) 0.223** (2.84) 
 
0.223** (2.77) 
Previous market first-day return 0.110 (0.65) 
 
-0.0306 (-0.22) 
Previous market first-day return * BO dummy -0.280 (-1.11) 
   
Previous market first-day return * VC dummy -0.189 (-1.29) 
   
Log (number of previous IPOs) -0.0296 (-0.54) 
 
-0.117* (-1.84) 
Log (number of previous IPOs) * BO dummy 
   
0.141* (1.87) 
Log (number of previous IPOs) * VC dummy 
   
0.134** (2.36) 
Constant 0.190 (0.13) 
 
0.383 (0.26) 
Other controls 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
Industry FE 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
Observations 
 
5,362 
  
5,362 
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Table 4.6 
Selection bias adjusted first-day returns' and net IPO proceeds' differences between VC-backed and stand-alone IPOs 
The table presents selection bias adjusted average net IPO proceeds' and first-day returns' differences between VC-backed and stand-alone IPOs. Each VC-backed IPO is matched with one (nearest neighbor) or 
many (smoothed weighted) stand-alone IPOs using the propensity score, full covariate, regression-adjusted local linear and inverse probability weighting matching approaches described in the text. I do all 
matching with replacement and use Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors to conduct statistical inference. The t-statistics, 95% confidence intervals and number of VC-backed IPOs matched appear below 
the average differences. When VC-backed IPOs are matched to many stand-alone IPOs, the total number of observations used in the estimation also appears. High valuations periods are months when the 
percentage of IPOs with an offer price above the midpoint of the initial offer range is above median. Low valuations periods are months when this percentage is below median. I take this measure from Jay 
Ritter's website. Δ(Proceeds) are in millions of dollars and Δ(Returns) in percentage points. ** denotes significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. 
Δ(Returns) 
 
Δ(Proceeds) 
One-to-one nearest neighbor 
 
One-to-many smoothed weighted 
 
One-to-one nearest neighbor 
 
One-to-many smoothed weighted 
Propensity score Full covariate  
Regression-adjusted 
local linear 
Inverse probability 
weighting 
 Propensity score Full covariate  
Regression-adjusted 
local linear 
Inverse probability 
weighting 
   
Panel A. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success dummies, stock 
exchange dummies 
Full sample 
0.012 0.023 
 
0.071 0.051 
 
-11.34 3.52 
 
-5.73 -6.33 
(0.36) (1.01) 
 
(4.29)** (2.32)** 
 
(-0.67) (0.28) 
 
(-0.61) (-0.80) 
[-0.054,0.078] [-0.021,0.067] 
 
[0.039,0.104] [0.008,0.095] 
 
[-44.51,21.82] [-21.37,28.40] 
 
[-24.20,12.74] [-21.76,9.10] 
2,475 2,034 
 
2,475/5,208 2,474/5,207 
 
2,541 2,081 
 
2,541/5,375 2,541/5,374 
High valuations periods 
0.023 0.000 
 
0.080 0.040 
 
10.79 -5.45 
 
4.76 6.54 
(0.44) (-0.01) 
 
(2.98)** (1.12) 
 
(0.43) (-1.10) 
 
(0.33) (0.58) 
[-0.774,0.123] [-0.071,0.071] 
 
[0.028,0.133] [-0.030,0.110] 
 
[-38.01,59.59] [-15.14,4.23) 
 
[-23.79,33.30] [-15.54,28.62] 
1,425 1,187 
 
1,425/2,897 1,425/2,889 
 
1,470 1,223 
 
1,470/3,000 1,470/2,994 
Low valuations periods 
0.063 0.038 
 
0.045 0.054 
 
-13.92 -2.22 
 
-13.94 -13.36 
(2.37)** (1.96)** 
 
(3.17)** (3.13)** 
 
(-1.06) (-0.42) 
 
(-1.18) (-1.99)** 
[0.011,0.116] [-82e-07,0.075] 
 
[0.017,0.074] [0.020,0.087] 
 
[-39.78,11.93] [-12.52,8.08] 
 
[-37.08,9.20] [-26.51,-0.210] 
1,027 709 
 
1,043/2,311 1,043/2,311 
 
1,048 716 
 
1,064/2,375 1,064/2,373 
Panel B. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), log (equity), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success 
dummies, stock exchange dummies 
Full sample 
0.031 0.036 
 
0.071 0.052 
 
-10.65 0.67 
 
-5.58 -5.99 
(0.94) (1.52) 
 
(4.30)** (2.40)** 
 
(-0.62) (0.05) 
 
(-0.59) (-0.77) 
[-0.034,0.097] [-0.010,0.083] 
 
[0.189,0.243] [0.009,0.095] 
 
[-44.18,22.87] [-24.82,26.17] 
 
[-24.08,12.93] [-21.27,9.28] 
2,474 2,033 
 
2,474/5,200 2,474/5,199 
 
2,540 2,080 
 
2,540/5,367 2,540/5,366 
High valuations periods 
-0.005 0.007 
 
0.080 0.042 
 
6.85 -7.52 
 
5.28 6.65 
(-0.10) (0.19) 
 
(3.00)** (1.19) 
 
(0.27) (-1.52) 
 
(0.36) (0.59) 
[-0.108,0.097] [-0.064,0.078] 
 
[0.028,0.132] [-0.029,0.110] 
 
[-42.44,56.14] [-17.24,2.20] 
 
[-23.40,33.95] [-15.46,28.75] 
1,425 1,187 
 
1,425/2,893 1,425/2,885 
 
1,470 1,223 
 
1,470/2,996 1,470/2,990 
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Low valuations periods 
0.073 0.043 
 
0.044 0.054 
 
-20.67 -4.16 
 
-14.16 -13.32 
(2.50)** (2.30)** 
 
(3.08)** (3.13)** 
 
(-1.32) (-0.77) 
 
(-1.21) (-1.99)** 
[0.016,0.130] [0.006,0.080] 
 
[0.016,0.072] [0.020,0.087] 
 
[-51.44,10.10] [-14.81,6.49] 
 
[-37.05,8.73] [-26.44,0.20] 
1,026 709 
 
1,063/2,307 1,042/2,307 
 
1,047 715 
 
1,063/2,371 1,042/2,369 
Panel C. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), default probability, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success 
dummies, stock exchange dummies 
Full sample 
0.010 0.018 
 
0.069 0.039 
 
-7.37 3.15 
 
1.25 -3.93 
(0.26) (0.68) 
 
(3.48)** (1.16) 
 
(-0.38) (0.20) 
 
(0.11) (-0.44) 
[-0.067,0.877] [-0.034,0.071] 
 
[0.030,0.107] [-0.023,0.105] 
 
[-45.34,30.59] [-27.63,33.95] 
 
[-21.13,23.62] [-21.46,13.59] 
2,126 1,679 
 
2,126/4,199 2,126/4,199 
 
2,160 1,707 
 
2,160/4,283 2,160/4,283 
High valuations periods 
-0.060 -0.750 
 
0.071 0.005 
 
10.83 -6.74 
 
12.07 9.36 
(-0.85) (-0.11) 
 
(2.27)** (0.08) 
 
(0.37) (-1.19) 
 
(0.74) (0.73) 
[-0.198,0.078] [-13.85,12.34] 
 
[0.010,0.133] [-0.12,0.13] 
 
[-46.99,68.65] [-17.87,4.39] 
 
[-20.02,44.17] [-15.62,34.34] 
1,268 524 
 
1,268/2,440 1,268/2,434 
 
1,296 1,044 
 
1,296/2,501 1,296/2,495 
Low valuations periods 
0.124 0.040 
 
0.045 0.056 
 
-17.97 0.02 
 
-9.14 -12.79 
(1.72)* (1.68)* 
 
(2.70)** (2.82)** 
 
(-1.05) (0.52) 
 
(-0.54) (-1.65)* 
[-0.017,0.265] [-0.007,0.086] 
 
[0.012,0.078] [0.017,0.095] 
 
[-51.55,15.61] [-0.057,0.098] 
 
[-42.12,23.84] [-27.97,2.39] 
835 522 
 
852/1,759 852/1,759 
 
841 1,017 
 
858/1,782 858/1,782 
Panel D. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), float percentage, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success 
dummies, stock exchange dummies 
Full sample 
0.020 0.035 
 
0.072 0.047 
 
-5.01 3.50 
 
-3.53 -5.86 
(0.61) (1.53) 
 
(4.24)** (2.09)** 
 
(-0.27) (0.26) 
 
(-0.36) (-0.73) 
[-0.045,0.086] [-0.010,0.080] 
 
[0.039,0.105] [0.003,0.091] 
 
[-40.72,30.70] [-22.46,29,46] 
 
[-22.90,15.83] [-21.62,9.91] 
2,405 1,959 
 
2,405/5,020 2,405/5,020 
 
2,453 1,997 
 
2,453/5,122 2,453/5,122 
High valuations periods 
0.041 0.018 
 
0.083 0.026 
 
6.58 -5.11 
 
7.63 10.72 
(0.79) (0.51) 
 
(3.03)** (0.59) 
 
(0.25) (-1.02) 
 
(0.51) (0.84) 
[-0.061,0.144] [-0.051,0.087] 
 
[0.029,0.136] [-0.059,0.111] 
 
[-44.34,57.49] [-14.88,4.67] 
 
[-21.74,36.99] [-14.19,35.64] 
1,403 1,164 
 
1,268/2,822 1,268/2,434 
 
1,439 1,197 
 
1,296/2,899 1,296/2,495 
Low valuations periods 
0.053 0.037 
 
0.041 0.051 
 
-15.96 -2.6 
 
-12.29 -13.84 
(1.91)* (1.87)* 
 
(2.68)** (2.76)** 
 
(-0.99) (-0.45) 
 
(-0.96) (-1.90)* 
[-0.001,0.107] [-0.002,0.075] 
 
[0.011,0.070] [0.015,0.088] 
 
[-47.43,15.51] [-13.99,8.79] 
 
[-37.38,12.81] [-28.15,0.46] 
980 662 
 
996/2,184 996/2,184 
 
992 667 
 
1,008/2,223 1,008/2,223 
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Table 4.7 
Selection bias adjusted first-day returns' and net IPO proceeds’ differences between BO-backed and stand-alone IPOs 
The table presents selection bias adjusted average net IPO proceeds' and first-day returns' differences between BO-backed and stand-alone IPOs. Each BO-backed IPO is matched with one (nearest neighbor) or 
many (smoothed weighted) stand-alone IPOs using the propensity score, full covariate, regression-adjusted local linear and inverse probability weighting matching approaches described in the text. I do all 
matching with replacement and use Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors to conduct statistical inference. The t-statistics, 95% confidence intervals and number of BO-backed IPOs matched appear below the 
average differences. When BO-backed IPOs are matched to many stand-alone IPOs, the total number of observations used in the estimation also appears. High valuations periods are months when the percentage 
of IPOs with an offer price above the midpoint of the initial offer range is above median. Low valuations periods are months when this percentage is below median. I take this measure from Jay Ritter's website. 
Δ(Proceeds) are in millions of dollars and Δ(Returns) in percentage points. ** denotes significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. 
Δ(Returns) 
 
Δ(Proceeds) 
One-to-one nearest neighbor 
 
One-to-many smoothed weighted 
 
One-to-one nearest neighbor 
 
One-to-many smoothed weighted 
Propensity score Full covariate  
Regression-adjusted 
local linear 
Inverse probability 
weighting 
 Propensity score Full covariate  
Regression-adjusted 
local linear 
Inverse probability 
weighting 
   
Panel A. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success dummies, stock 
exchange dummies 
Full sample 
-0.008 -0.027 
 
0.008 -0.003 
 
-130.88 -32.26 
 
-65.71 -205.71 
(-0.43) (-1.67)* 
 
(0.76) (-0.26) 
 
(-3.30)** (-3.29)** 
 
(-3.31)** (-3.16)** 
[-0.045,0,029] [-0.058,0.005] 
 
[0.082,0.112] [-0.022,0.017] 
 
[-208.67,-53.09] [-51.46,-13.07] 
 
[-104.59,-26.83] [-333.12,-78.31] 
848 697 
 
849/3,581 849/3,581 
 
854 701 
 
855/3,688 855/3,688 
High valuations periods 
0.010 0.003 
 
0.010 0.011 
 
-194.03 -61.54 
 
-62.57 -241.07 
(0.31) (0.12) 
 
(0.56) (0.71) 
 
(-2.70)** (-3.93)** 
 
(-1.96)** (-1.90)* 
[-0.054,0.074] [-0.044,0.049] 
 
[-0.024,0.044] [-0.020,0.043] 
 
[-334.77,-5.33] [-92.22,-30.87] 
 
[-125.73,-0.60] [-489.64,7.50] 
420 312 
 
423/1,891 423/1,887 
 
425 318 
 
428/1,956 428/1,952 
Low valuations periods 
-0.027 -0.042 
 
0.003 0.008 
 
-73.96 -49.39 
 
-63.37 -172.62 
(-1.56) (-2.34)** 
 
(0.27) (0.43) 
 
(-1.99)** (-2.72)** 
 
(-2.94)** (-2.92)** 
[-0.062,0.007] [-0.077,-0.007] 
 
[-0.016,0.022] [-0.029,0.045] 
 
[-146.99,-0.94] [-84.97,-13.82] 
 
[-105.65,-21.09] [-288.62,-56.62] 
417 295 
 
422/1,690 422/1,752 
 
418 296 
 
423/1,732 423/1,732 
Panel B. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), log (equity), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success dummies, 
stock exchange dummies 
Full sample 
-0.004 -0.029 
 
0.011 -0.001 
 
-156.68 -29.51 
 
-67.30 -190.04 
(-0.21) (-1.78)* 
 
(1.00) (-0.08) 
 
(-4.09)** (-3.01)** 
 
(-3.43)** (-3.67)** 
[-0.041,0.033] [-0.060,0.003] 
 
[-0.010,0.031] [-0.020,0.018] 
 
[-231.69,-81.67] [-48.71,-10.31] 
 
[-105.79,-28.81] [-291.63,-88.45] 
848 696 
 
849/3,681 849/3,574 
 
854 701 
 
855/3,681 855/3,681 
High valuations periods 
0.017 -0.008 
 
0.008 0.015 
 
-212.65 -62.74 
 
-67.18 -192.71 
(0.49) (-0.32) 
 
(0.47) (0.91) 
 
(-2.82)** (-4.00)** 
 
(-2.10)** (-2.47)** 
[0.050,0.084] [-0.055,0.039] 
 
[-0.027,0.044] [-0.017,0.047] 
 
[-360.27,-65.04] [-93.46,-32.03] 
 
[-129.92,-4.44] [-345.54,-39.87] 
424 312 
 
423/1,887 423/1,883 
 
425 318 
 
428/1,952 428/1,948 
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Table 4.7. Panel B. Cont. 
Low valuations periods 
-0.015 -0.060 
 
0.009 0.011 
 
-167.65 -34.47 
 
-62.70 -164.02 
(-0.77) (-3.28)** 
 
(0.86) (0.56) 
 
(-2.88)** (-1.90)* 
 
(-2.93)** (-3.10)** 
[-0.052,0.228] [-0.096,-0.024] 
 
[-0.011,0.028] [-0.026,0.047] 
 
[-281.72,-53.58] [-69.95,1.01] 
 
[-104.59,-20.81] [-267.61,-60.42] 
417 295 
 
422/1,687 422/1,687 
 
418 296 
 
423/1,729 423/1,729 
Panel C. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), default probability, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success 
dummies, stock exchange dummies 
Full sample 
-0.008 -0.009 
 
0.011 0.000 
 
-170.61 -40.86 
 
-85.34 -195.48 
(-0.37) (-0.51) 
 
(0.92) (0.03) 
 
(-3.73)** (-3.53)** 
 
(-3.89)** (-3.69)** 
[-0.050,0.0334] [-0.042,0.024] 
 
[-0.012,0.034] [-0.022,0.022] 
 
[-260.34,-80.89] [-63.52,-18.20] 
 
[-128.33,-42.36] [-299.19,-91.77] 
718 570 
 
719/2,792 719/2,792 
 
721 573 
 
722/2,845 722/2,845 
High valuations periods 
0.004 0.027 
 
0.019 0.017 
 
-179.37 -63.25 
 
-94.40 -275.04 
(0.08) (0.94) 
 
(0.95) (0.93) 
 
(-1.81)* (-3.60)** 
 
(-2.53)** (-1.92)* 
[-0.098,0.107] [-0.029,0.083] 
 
[-0.021,0.059] [-0.019,0.054] 
 
[-373.30,14.55] [-97.68,-28.82] 
 
[-167.52,-21.28] [-556.32,6.23] 
358 247 
 
361/1,531 361/1,527 
 
360 249 
 
363/1,566 363/1,562 
Low valuations periods 
-0.012 -0.046 
 
0.003 0.019 
 
-123.66 -66.01 
 
-71.28 -156.69 
(-0.58) (-2.16)** 
 
(0.24) (0.87) 
 
(-2.10)** (-3.05)** 
 
(-3.12)** (-2.88)** 
[-0.052,0.282] [-0.088,-0.004] 
 
[-0.019,0.024) [-0.023,0.061] 
 
[-239.09,-8.24] [-108.36,-23.65] 
 
[-116.12,-26.43] [-263.22,-50.16] 
350 220 
 
354/1,261 354/1,261 
 
351 220 
 
355/1,279 355/1,279 
Panel D. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), float percentage, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of total managers, road show success 
dummies, stock exchange dummies 
Full sample 
0.002 -0.013 
 
0.012 0.001 
 
-206.64 -39.12 
 
-71.94 -205.69 
(0.13) (-0.78) 
 
(1.14) (0.07) 
 
(-4.33)** (-3.16)** 
 
(-3.51)** (-3.15)** 
[-0.340,0.039] [-0.045,0.019] 
 
[-0.008,0.032] [-0.019,0.020] 
 
[-300.16,-113.12] [-63.40,-14.84] 
 
[-112.11,-31.76] [-333.79,-77.60) 
826 673 
 
827/3,427 827/3,427 
 
830 677 
 
831/3,500 831/3,500 
High valuations periods 
0.017 0.013 
 
0.017 0.013 
 
-174.03 -59.11 
 
-70.39 -225.23 
(0.39) (0.56) 
 
(0.94) (0.76) 
 
(-1.90)* (-3.60)** 
 
(-2.11)** (-1.98)** 
[-0.068,0.101] [-0.033,0.060] 
 
[-0.018,0.052] [-0.020,0.045] 
 
[-353.34,5.28] [-91.32,-26.90] 
 
[-135.71,-5.06] [-448.62,-1.85] 
410 297 
 
413/1,829 413/1,825 
 
413 301 
 
416/1,874 416/1,870 
Low valuations periods 
-0.020 -0.008 
 
0.005 -0.010 
 
-92.88 -32.34 
 
-67.20 -154.36 
(-1.09) (-0.43) 
 
(0.50) (-0.99) 
 
(-2.27)** (-1.68)* 
 
(-3.04)** (-2.90)** 
[0.055,0.016] [-0.045,0.029] 
 
[-0.015,0.025] [-0.031,0.010] 
 
[-173.19,-12.56] [-70.15,5.38] 
 
[-110.57,-23.83] [-258.54,-50.19] 
405 282   410/1,598 410/1,598   406 282   411/1,626 411/1,626 
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Table 4.8 
Post-IPO selection bias adjusted default and failure rates' differences between BO-backed and stand-alone IPOs 
The table presents selection bias adjusted average default rates' differences between BO-backed and stand-alone IPOs. Each BO-backed IPO is matched 
with one (nearest neighbor) or many (smoothed weighted) stand-alone IPOs using the propensity score, full covariate, regression-adjusted local linear and 
inverse probability weighting matching approaches described in the text. I do all matching with replacement and use Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard 
errors to conduct statistical inference. The t-statistics, 95% confidence intervals and number of BO-backed IPOs matched appear below the average 
differences. When BO-backed IPOs are matched to many stand-alone IPOs, the total number of observations used in the estimation also appears. I track 
companies for five years after the IPO, thus I do not examine IPOs after 2009. I define default as delisting due to bankruptcy or liquidation (CRSP 
delisting codes 400-490 and 574). I define failure as delisting due to bankruptcy, liquidation or other negative reasons i.e. failure to meet various trading 
requirements (CRSP delisting codes 400-490, 550-561 and 574-591). ** denotes significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. 
 
One-to-one nearest neighbor 
 
One-to-many smoothed weighted 
 Propensity score Full covariate  
Regression-adjusted 
local linear 
Inverse probability weighting 
  
Panel A. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of 
total managers, road show success dummies, stock exchange dummies 
Default 0.004 0.003 
 
0.119 0.003 
 
(0.57) (0.44) 
 
(0.84) (0.71) 
 
[-0.010,0.018] [-0.010,0.016] 
 
[-0.159,0.396] [-0.006,0.012] 
 
750 668 
 
750/3,536 750/3,535 
Failure -0.011 -0.002 
 
0.011 -0.020 
 
(-0.58) (-0.16) 
 
(1.01) (-0.87) 
 
[-0.047,0.025] [-0.031,0.026] 
 
[-0.010,0.032] [-0.066,0.026] 
 
750 668 
 
750/3,536 750/3,535 
Panel B. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), leverage ratio, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln 
(age),  number of total managers, road show success dummies, stock exchange dummies 
Default 0.000 0.002 
 
0.003 0.003 
 
(0.00) (0.31) 
 
(0.35) (0.60) 
 
[-0.015,0.015] [-0.011,0.015] 
 
[-0.012,0.017] [-0.006,0.011] 
 
726 644 
 
726/3,347 726/3,347 
Failure -0.029 -0.006 
 
0.016 -0.026 
 
(-1.42) (-0.36) 
 
(1.48) (-1.30) 
 
[-0.069,0.011] [-0.036,0.024] 
 
[-0.005,0.037] [-0.065,0.013] 
 
726 644 
 
726/3,348 726/3,347 
Panel C. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of 
total managers, road show success dummies, stock exchange dummies, all-star analyst dummy, syndicate dummy, overallotment percentage 
Default 0.012 0.003 
 
0.010 0.006 
 
(1.20) (0.46) 
 
(1.64) (1.53) 
 
[-0.008,0.032] [-0.010,0.017] 
 
[-0.0019,0.0216] [-0.003,0.022] 
 
497 668 
 
497/2,279 497/2,279 
Failure -0.016 0.002 
 
-0.017 -0.029 
 
(-0.63) (-0.14) 
 
(-0.82) (-0.90) 
 
[-0.066,0.034] [-0.033,0.029] 
 
[-0.058,0.0236] [-0.092,0.034] 
 
497 668 
 
497/2,279 497/2,279 
Panel D. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), leverage ratio, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln 
(age),  number of total managers, road show success dummies, stock exchange dummies, all-star analyst dummy, syndicate dummy, overallotment 
percentage 
Default 0.010 -0.001 
 
0.001 0.002 
 
(1.02) (-0.08) 
 
(0.20) (0.26) 
 
[-0.009,0.030] [-0.015,0.014] 
 
[-0.011,0.014] [-0.011,0.014] 
 
490 644 
 
490/2,231 490/2,231 
Failure -0.045 -0.010 
 
-0.010 -0.031 
 
(-1.52) (-0.61) 
 
(-0.62) (-1.10) 
 
[-0.102,0.013] [-0.041,0.021] 
 
[-0.041,0.0211] [-0.085,0.024] 
 
490 644 
 
490/2,231 490/2,231 
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Table 4.9 
Post-IPO selection bias adjusted default and failure rates' differences between VC-backed and stand-alone IPOs 
The table presents selection bias adjusted average default rates' differences between VC-backed and stand-alone IPOs. Each VC-backed IPO is matched 
with one (nearest neighbor) or many (smoothed weighted) stand-alone IPOs using the propensity score, full covariate, regression-adjusted local linear and 
inverse probability weighting matching approaches described in the text. I do all matching with replacement and use Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard 
errors to conduct statistical inference. The t-statistics, 95% confidence intervals and number of VC-backed IPOs matched appear below the average 
differences. When VC-backed IPOs are matched to many stand-alone IPOs, the total number of observations used in the estimation also appears.  I track 
companies for five years after the IPO, thus I do not examine IPOs after 2009. I define default as delisting due to bankruptcy or liquidation (CRSP 
delisting codes 400-490 and 574). I define failure as delisting due to bankruptcy, liquidation or other negative reasons i.e. failure to meet various trading 
requirements (CRSP delisting codes 400-490, 550-561 and 574-591). ** denotes significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. 
 
One-to-one nearest neighbor 
 
One-to-many smoothed weighted 
 Propensity score Full covariate  
Regression-adjusted 
local linear 
Inverse probability weighting 
  
Panel A. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of 
total managers, road show success dummies, stock exchange dummies 
Default -0.003 0.001 
 
0.004 0.001 
 
(-0.46) (0.16) 
 
(0.97) (0.18) 
 
[-0.018,0.011] [-0.011,0.013] 
 
[-0.004,0.011] [-0.007,0.009] 
 
2,360 2,035 
 
2,360/5,146 2,360/5,145 
Failure -0.037 -0.020 
 
-0.015 -0.028 
 
(-1.85)* (-1.23) 
 
(-1.39) (-2.08)** 
 
[-0.076,0.002] [-0.051,0.012] 
 
[-0.037,0.006] [-0.054,-0.0016] 
 
2,360 2,035 
 
2,360/5,146 2,360/5,145 
Panel B. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), return on assets, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln 
(age),  number of total managers, road show success dummies, stock exchange dummies 
Default -0.007 0.000 
 
0.002 0.001 
 
(-0.80) (0.04) 
 
(0.37) (0.13) 
 
[-0.024,0.010] [-0.013,0.014] 
 
[-0.007,0.010] [-0.009,0.010] 
 
2,035 1,705 
 
2,035/4,205 2,035/4,205 
Failure -0.045 -0.005 
 
-0.016 -0.053 
 
(-2.00)** (-0.26) 
 
(-1.24) (-2.38)** 
 
[-0.089,-0.001] [-0.039,0.030] 
 
[-0.040,0.009] [-0.097,-0.009] 
 
2,035 1,705 
 
2,035/4,205 2,035/4,205 
Panel C. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln (age),  number of 
total managers, road show success dummies, stock exchange dummies, all-star analyst dummy, syndicate dummy, overallotment percentage 
Default -0.002 -0.001 
 
0.000 0.004 
 
(-0.17) (-0.17) 
 
(-0.01) (0.72) 
 
[-0.022,0.018] [-0.013,0.011] 
 
[-0.010,0.010] [-0.006,0.013] 
 
1,719 2,035 
 
1,719/3,504 1,719/3,501 
Failure -0.014 -0.018 
 
-0.005 -0.017 
 
(-0.53) (-1.15) 
 
(-0.39) (-1.07) 
 
[-0.066,0.038] [-0.049,0.013] 
 
[-0.031,0.021] [-0.048,0.014] 
 
1,719 2,035 
 
1,719/3,504 1,719/3,501 
Panel D. Instrumental variables: Underwriter rank, log (total assets), return on assets, SIC dummies, headquarter-state dummies, offer year dummies, ln 
(age),  number of total managers, road show success dummies, stock exchange dummies, all-star analyst dummy, syndicate dummy, overallotment 
percentage 
Default -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.003 0.001 
 
(-0.06) (-0.18) 
 
(-0.51) (0.21) 
 
[-0.021,0.020] [-0.016,0.013] 
 
[-0.014,0.008] [-0.010,0.013] 
 
1,575 1,705 
 
1,575/3,110 1,575/3,110 
Failure -0.020 -0.004 
 
-0.010 -0.045 
 
(-0.70) (-0.21) 
 
(-0.69) (-1.86)* 
 
[-0.075,0.035] [-0.038,0.030] 
 
[-0.040,0.091] [-0.093,0.002] 
 
1,575 1,705 
 
1,575/3,110 1,575/3,107 
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Table 4.10 
Regressions of default dummy on firm and IPO characteristics 
The default models are estimated for 1975-2014 with yearly observations using the multi-period logit technique (Shumway, 
2001). The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the company is delisted due to bankruptcy or liquidation 
(CRSP delisting codes 400-490 and 574). Financial variables are lagged by one year. NITA is the ratio of net income to 
total assets. TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. To proxy for market conditions at the time of the IPO, I use 
two measures: The average market first-day return and the logarithm of the number of IPOs in the three months prior the 
IPO. I construct these measures with data from Jay Ritter's website. Other controls include the ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities, the natural logarithm of age and interaction terms of industry effects and financial variables (Chava and 
Jarrow, 2004). Industry fixed effects are based on Chava and Jarrow's (2004) wide industry classifications. Parameter 
estimates are given first followed by chi-square values in parentheses. ** denotes significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% 
level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BO dummy -0.614** (-2.48) -0.563** (-2.24) -1.778 (-0.99) -0.644** (-2.59) 
VC dummy -0.416** (-2.60) -0.342** (-2.04) -0.372 (-0.37) -0.396** (-2.35) 
NITA -0.579** (-4.05) -0.583** (-4.06) -0.581** (-4.06) -0.581** (-4.02) 
TLTA 1.755** (8.63) 1.761** (8.66) 1.764** (8.67) 1.762** (8.64) 
Log (number of 
previous IPOs) * BO 
dummy 
    
0.282 (0.69) 
  
Log (number of 
previous IPOs) * VC 
dummy 
    
0.00635 (0.03) 
  
Constant -7.289** (-25.3) -8.763** (-16.05) -8.629** (-14.40) -7.470** (-24.13) 
Other controls 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
Industry FE 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
Year FE   No   Yes   Yes    Yes 
Firm-year observations 
 
65,378 
 
65,378 
 
65,378 
 
65,378 
Firms 
 
6,943 
 
6,943 
 
6,943 
 
6,943 
Defaulted firms 
 
218 
 
218 
 
218 
 
218 
Pseudo R-squared 
 
0.065 
 
0.072 
 
0.072 
 
0.069 
Log likelihood 
 
-1,328.2 
 
-1,319.3 
 
-1,319.0 
 
-1,323.4 
Wald test 
 
547.95** 
 
580.49** 
 
581.59** 
 
580.39** 
Area under Curve   0.77   0.79   0.78   0.78 
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Table 4.11 
Regressions of failure dummy on firm and IPO characteristics 
The failure models are estimated for 1975-2014 with yearly observations using the multi-period logit technique (Shumway, 
2001). The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the company is delisted due to bankruptcy, liquidation or other 
negative reasons i.e. failure to meet various trading requirements (CRSP delisting codes 400-490, 550-561 and 574-591). 
Financial variables are lagged by one year. NITA is the ratio of net income to total assets. TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets. To proxy for market conditions at the time of the IPO, I use two measures: The average market first-day return and 
the logarithm of the number of IPOs in the three months prior the IPO. I construct these measures with data from Jay Ritter's 
website. Other controls include the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, the natural logarithm of age and interaction terms 
of industry effects and financial variables (Chava and Jarrow, 2004). Industry fixed effects are based on Chava and Jarrow's 
(2004) wide industry classifications. Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-square values in parentheses. ** denotes 
significance at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BO dummy -0.664** (-6.81) -0.629** (-6.36) -1.203* (-1.74) -0.665** (-6.82) 
VC dummy -0.660** (-11.12) -0.619** (-10.08) -0.884** (-2.58) -0.618** (-10.05) 
NITA -2.197** (-3.40) -2.163** (-3.37) -2.162** (-3.38) -2.221** (-3.47) 
TLTA 1.700** (1.98) 1.720* (1.93) 1.712* (1.93) 1.709** (1.96) 
Log (number of 
previous IPOs * BO 
dummy 
    
0.135 (0.83) 
  
Log (number of 
previous IPOs * VC 
dummy 
    
0.060 (0.78) 
  
Constant -5.293** (-7.67) -6.2341 (-8.47) -6.082** (-8.14) -5.349** (-7.66) 
Other controls 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
Industry FE 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
Year FE   No   Yes   Yes    Yes 
Firm-year observations 
 
65,378 
 
65,378 
 
65,378 
 
65,378 
Firms 
 
6,943 
 
6,943 
 
6,943 
 
6,943 
Failed firms 
 
1,772 
 
1,772 
 
1,772 
 
1,772 
Pseudo R-squared 
 
0.139 
 
0.141 
 
0.145 
 
0.140 
Log likelihood 
 
-6,974.5 
 
-6,953.7 
 
-6,953.1 
 
-6,963.3 
Wald test 
 
2,317.25** 
 
2,319.19** 
 
2,315.45** 
 
2,328.81** 
Area under Curve   0.84   0.84   0.84   0.84 
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4.7 Figures of Chapter 4 
 
 
Figure 4.1. IPOs per year. The figure plots the number of all IPOs, BO-backed IPOs and VC-
backed IPOs per year for the period 1975 to 2013, excluding those with an offer price below 
$5.00 per share, a size below 1.5 million, unit offers, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), 
closed-end funds, natural resource partnerships, acquisition companies, Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs), bank and Savings and Loans (S&L) IPOs. I classify growth-capital backed IPOs 
as VC-backed. 
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Conclusions 
The three papers of this thesis explore default and credit performance determinants in private 
firms (SMEs), listed firms (especially mid and small-caps), and companies that are in the 
transition phase between private and public ownership (IPOs) respectively. The work has several 
implications for banks, investors and policy makers by (i) uncovering regional corporate default 
risk vulnerabilities, (ii) explaining the observed anomalous pricing of default risk in the stock 
market, and (iii) exploring the impact of alternative investment funds such as private equity and 
venture capital on the default risk of their portfolio companies. 
The first paper uses macro-economic variables to compliment firm-specific data, enhancing 
the models’ forecasting ability, especially at the aggregate default incidence level for different 
sovereign environments in Europe. So, while fundamental, firm-specific variables show 
important stable and robust levels of accuracy across countries, the aggregate level of distress is 
considerably enhanced by adding macro-determinants and cross-country data. The paper 
validates the superiority of models that incorporate macroeconomic dependencies, suggested by 
previous research, also in the case of SMEs. Specifically, macro variables differ among 
European regions based on region-specific conditions and characteristics. Since our regional 
distress models always perform better than a generic model estimated for the regional sub-
samples, we conclude that their use can lead to performance improvements in the risk 
management of international SME portfolios. 
The second paper tackles a thorny and controversial issue in Finance involving risk and 
return expectations versus actual results. We provide an explanation for the anomalous pattern 
based on an argument that rests on the impact of systematic default risk (SDR) on returns of 
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individual firms. We show that the physical PD is usually a poor measure of exposure to 
aggregate default risk because stocks in the highest PD quintile have relatively low SDR 
exposure. Investors indeed require a premium to hold stocks that are riskier when aggregate 
default risk is higher but they do not require compensation to hold stocks with high firm-specific 
risk because these stocks are a source of portfolio risk diversification. Our results suggest that 
riskier stocks, as measured by the physical PDs, will tend to under-perform because they have, 
on average, lower exposure to aggregate default risk. Their riskiness is mostly idiosyncratic and 
can be diversified away. On the contrary, it is the systematic component of default risk, 
measured by the SDR betas, that requires a return premium. 
The third paper involves assessing the impact of PE-backed firms which tap the IPO market 
as an exit strategy and compares these IPOs with non-PE backed IPOs. The different incentives 
of PE investors and managers can strongly impact subsequent performance and default risk. 
These professional insiders may be more capable of taking advantage of information 
asymmetries compared to insiders of stand-alone companies. But they also have more 
reputational capital at stake, a factor which tends to be known by the market. We find evidence 
against the hypothesis that PE sponsors “cheat” the market  . The financial situation of both BO 
and VC-backed companies in the pre-IPO year, as measured by their default risk, is similar to 
that of their peers. Moreover, PE sponsors do not target their IPOs in hot periods any more than 
do managers of stand-alone companies. They also are not more prone to rush their companies 
into premature IPOs and do not inflate valuations. Finally, PE-backed companies do not default 
more often post-IPO. This is evidence that PE sponsors are not more likely to seek to sell firms 
with poor prospects (“unload lemons”) in the IPO market. 
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